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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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- 2 From the Commander
- 3 From the CSM
- 4 Behind the Lines
- 5 Feedback

Features

- 6 **Counterterrorism and Intelligence**
Captain Brian R.E. Miller examines how intelligence can be applied in counterterrorist operations.
- 11 **Counterintelligence Analysis — The Untrained Discipline**
Major E.H. Coet identifies some problems associated with CI analysis and recommends solutions.
- 14 **The Future of Combined Arms Operations in Low Intensity Conflict**
Captain Dennis L. Warriner discusses how and why the combined arms approach should be the doctrinal basis for future counterinsurgency operations.
- 16 **7th Infantry Division G2 Workstation Exercise**
Lieutenant Colonel Dan M. Vannatter and Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. Hayden provide feedback on their recent involvement with the G2 workstation.
- 18 **Another Look at the Language Problem**
Staff Sergeant Sydney A. Seiler addresses some of the problems facing the 98G and their implications for IEW success on tomorrow's battlefield.
- 20 **Voices in the Sand**
Captain George L. Reed describes deception operations being conducted by the Opposing Forces at the National Training Center.
- 24 **Battlefield Deception**
Lieutenant Colonel Glenn W. Whittaker analyzes the U.S. Army's renewed interest in deception planning and operations.
- 26 **The Monkey's Paw**
Major James R. Koch provides insight into the dichotomy between the Soviet system of *Maskirovka* and U.S. deception doctrine.
- 29 **The Soviet Soldier**
William T. Garmon takes a look at the modern Soviet soldier in terms of military indoctrination, training and service.

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Military Intelligence

From the Home of Intelligence

Volume 14 Number 4 PB 34-88-4(TEST) October 1988

33 America's Objectives in the Middle East

Major Robert B. Adolph, Jr. and Major Frank Moore III trace the history of American diplomacy in this troubled region.

38 CEWI in Direct Support to a Brigade at the NTC

Captain Joseph C. May and Lieutenant David C. Erickson elaborate on the deployment of an MI company team to the National Training Center.

Departments

40 Hohenfels Training Area: NTC-European Style

Lieutenant Patrick M. O'Sullivan characterizes an ARTEP at Hohenfels as a USAREUR combat arms battalion intelligence officer.

41 Scenario Design at the Battalion Level

Captain Lee A. Sweetapple stresses the importance of coordinated planning to conduct successful intelligence training during a battalion field training exercise.

42 Training MI Tactical Teams to Survive

Captain Jiyul Kim demonstrates the necessity of an effective intelligence team tactical ARTEP.

46 USAICS Notes

47 Branch Notes

48 Professional Reader

53 History of the 102d MI Battalion

Staff

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
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from the Commander

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.

In peace and war, counterintelligence is a lucrative asset in the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare mission. The CI mission of finding, exploiting and neutralizing intelligence collection to protect our critical facilities and operations directly impacts on a commander's ability to succeed on and off the battlefield. Our IEW counterintelligence force relies on the total Army to assist in finding enemy collectors so the appropriate effort can be made to counter collection.

Counterintelligence has always been directed against the enemy multi-source collection capability. Of late, we have been reevaluating how to best structure our force to counter enemy HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. Our small counterintelligence force conducts investigations, operations, and performs analysis in support of all commands to counter enemy capabilities. This small group of professionals counters sophisticated espionage operations, investigates security breaches, performs personnel security investigations and other directed investigations, provides the intelligence picture to OPSEC and deception operations, and assists in a command's security programs. They are intelligence collectors and analysts in the classic sense with a long history of success.

At USAICS we have put forth a diligent effort to upgrade CI doctrine, force structure, and training so we can meet the needs of field commands. Our accomplishments and future accomplishments have included close and continuing exchanges with DCSINT action officers and a continuing dialogue with the field units. We are sending a new FM 34-60, *Counterintelligence*, to the field that I think accurately describes CI operations in its multidisciplinary flavor. It provides both doctrinal principles as well as "how to" information for field use. In our USAICS notes we describe the new manual and solicit your careful review so we can, in fact, make this a most useful manual.

Field units have identified serious shortcomings in acquiring enough qualified CI Special Agents to accomplish the mission. As the Command Sergeant Major describes in his letter, we are actively working to resolve this issue. Coupled with this are attempts to save field units and the Army money by combining the two courses, 97B10 and CI

Transition courses, into one CI Agent course. Through coordination with TAPA and DCSINT we will make appropriate changes to regulations and DA Pams to increase age requirements, validate aptitude levels, and finally meet the needs of the field. This will place additional requirements on the field as well. Sustainment training and field certification, when these soldiers reach the age of 21 and become eligible for issuance of badge and credentials, becomes a field commander's responsibility.

As an interim measure to continue meeting the field's needs, we are training selected 97B10s to full 97B20 standards. The number of soldiers we train up is dependent on demonstrated academic potential, age, a total soldier evaluation, and availability of space. Also, our in-service acquisition 97B20 course is being opened to transition students from the field when a class is not filled to maximum capacity. TAPA is tracking space availability so the field can be notified as early as possible when training seats are available.

Simultaneous with examining the needs of the 97B MOS, in January 1989 we will begin a concentrated effort with DCSINT to identify future requirements in force structure, doctrine and material to accomplish the Counter-SIGINT mission. This will require gathering threat materials and comparing these materials with our friendly communications systems for the future to better describe the continuing and future role of Counter-SIGINT.

The counterintelligence mission in peace and war is a critical IEW mission area because of its relationship to protecting the force. From division to EAC we have dedicated CI assets to perform these continuing, long term operations. CI personnel work at all echelons to accomplish the total Army CI mission of countering the enemy's intelligence collection attempts. These soldiers and civilians will not always be available at "dress right dress" formations because of the requirements levied on them. But rest assured that they will be there, silently looking on and aggressively working to counter enemy intelligence. These dedicated and proud members of the MI Corps are at war with the enemy today. *Toujours en avant Always Out Front!*

from the CSM



CSM Robert H. Retter

For some time now we have been wrestling with shortages in the counterintelligence field. These shortages have been especially acute in the enlisted and warrant officer grades. With a shortage in the noncommissioned officer grades, we not only have positions going unfilled but are forced to take in senior people from other branches. When we do this, we are only able to train them in counterintelligence at skill level 2. Consequently, we often have junior people with more CI experience working for less experienced senior NCOs. To eliminate some of these problems, we have been forced to restructure the entire 96 Career Management Field and develop a way to recruit and train our own CI Agents without raiding other branches. We have had the 97B10 CI Assistant program with us for some time now as one of the methods selected to solve the problems.

My observations on the 97B10 CI Assistant program lead me to believe we have had mixed success. Our original intent was that CI Assistants would undergo training which would allow them to assist in a CI operation, while gaining experience and knowledge from more senior agents. This has not always been the case. There are many examples of organizations where effective training and utilization programs have been implemented. There are still places where none exist. Our plan was to have all CI Assistants eventually return for transition training, after which they would be fully qualified for accreditation. Where good training programs and command emphasis on funding TDY and return for transition training have been observed, some very good CI Agents have been produced. Funding is short throughout the Army but especially short in the TDY and return category. Another problem has been Skill Qualification Testing (SQT). When it became obvious that CI Assistants would not be able to return for training before becoming eligible for promotion to

E5, we created ASI Y2 to reflect 97B10 soldiers in need of transition training. These soldiers were permitted to compete for promotion so as not to fall behind their contemporaries. Once promoted to E5, however, there was generally confusion as to what SQT they would take. Additionally, ASI Y2 has not been used consistently.

We have adjusted the 97B10 CI Assistant program to remedy some of these problems. I ask that commanders and supervisors get involved to ensure that ASI Y2 is on the records of every 97B who has not yet attended transition training, and that it is removed from the records of those who have. Once this is accomplished, we can then get an accurate picture of the problem. We can estimate how much money would be involved if we could get a solution to the TDY funding problem. We have started to train selected 97B10 Initial Entry Training soldiers through Skill Level 2. We only do this when there is no CI Assistant in the field who is approved and funded for training. This measure will reduce the future need for transition training. By October 1990, we are planning to train all IET 97B10 soldiers in this manner. The field has been informed that 97B10 soldiers who are promoted beyond Skill Level 1 may be exempted from the SQT until they are afforded the transition course.

The 97B10 CI Assistant program is working to a degree. It works where we see active training programs and funding support for TDY and return. It works where records are up to date and well maintained. The CI Assistant program is at present virtually our only source of CI Agents of the future. We are working to fine-tune the program and make it more responsive. Without the active involvement of commanders, supervisors and more senior agents, the CI field will never achieve full strength. Seek out the CI Assistant, whether assigned to your unit or one nearby, and help.

Behind the Lines

Counterintelligence (CI) is not limited to counter-HUMINT. CI personnel have often been stereotyped as cloak-and-dagger types: non-green suiters who were never involved in tactical, "green suit" operations. The CI agent has borne the brunt of this stereotypical, narrow-minded sketch. CI, however, is multifaceted and involves a great deal more than what would normally come to the minds of the uninformed. According to Field Manual 34-60, *Counterintelligence*, CI operations include the identification of the hostile multidisciplined intelligence collection threat, the determination of friendly vulnerabilities to that threat and the recommendation and evaluation of security measures. Contained within the structure of CI are three distinct doctrinal missions: counter-HUMINT, counter-SIGINT and counter-IMINT. To accomplish this multifaceted mission, the expertise of various intelligence specialists must be integrated to form an effective, operational data base.

This issue strives to present articles that address certain facets of counterintelligence. Also presented are a number of articles that discuss operations that need an effective, operational CI data base to succeed. Among the topics are counterterrorism, tactical CI, counterinsurgency operations and deception operations.

To be successful on tomorrow's battlefield, the MI professional must be ready for all contingencies. A true all-source, multidisciplined intelligence effort must include all phases of intelligence working in concert. No single discipline within the intelligence field is more important than another. To ignore this basic precept will result in failure.

William A. Daniels
Editor

feedback . . .

Dear Editor:

(The following letter is the personal opinion of the author and in no way represents any official position on LIC doctrine.)

After reading the article, "The Future of Combined Arms Operations in LIC" in this issue of *Military Intelligence*, I wish to offer the following comments.

The author seems to suggest that the need for mobility in LIC (and COIN in particular) is a recent discovery. Quick reaction forces have long been understood as a basic requirement. What is perhaps more innovative is the size and structure of the airmobile force deployed.

COIN is, and will be for the foreseeable future, a HUMINT "heavy" environment. Notwithstanding recent advances in the technical areas, it is a dangerous misconception to believe that SIGINT will provide the best information about enemy positions and future intentions. Insurgent mobility and the SIGINT lead times on information have meant that targetting specifically from that source more often than not produces empty camps and only traces of the opposition. The best information will come from a carefully controlled and developed agent handling and surveillance program backed up by all the other sources. The point is that the insurgent nowadays is entirely familiar with the problems of OPSEC. He will not, or at least only very rarely, produce the sort of lucrative information that the author is suggesting.

I would certainly agree that the current equipment deployed by the U.S. Army in COIN operations (SIGINT, that is) is inappropriate. Other agencies using "off-the-shelf" equipment have been much more effective.

The author appears to be considering SIGINT in isolation. For a number of reasons there are very considerable constraints on the value of SIGINT. However, its overall contribution is enhanced significantly when SIGINT analysis is applied to intelligence produced from all other sources. Indicators then take on real shape in the light of the overwhelmingly important all-source COIN intelligence environment.

Host-nation collection abilities are, as a generalization, excellent in the HUMINT field. In other words, there is no shortage of information from a wide range of agencies. The problems here are in the collection management and analysis areas. These are the areas we need to concentrate on.

In an ideal world a lot of what the author has to say about field artillery would be

appropriate. However, most of these advantages only relate to the Stage 3 of an insurgency. The ease with which small insurgent groups can disperse into difficult terrain negates the impact of artillery unless forward observation officers, et al, can bring down highly accurate, almost immediate fire. What has proved effective is preregistering likely enemy attack positions (the TRAP overlay) as part of the NAI-TAI process in IPB. I would suggest that any extra time spent in training host nations on fire adjustment would bear heavy dividends.

I would caution against the idea of "...use of constant patrols and area ambushes in concert with IPB will deny the insurgents an area of operations . . ." Operations must be based upon sound all-source intelligence. Too often we have made the mistake of deploying large numbers of troops in futile "search and destroy" missions which the enemy can easily avoid. The enemy will simply wait until the force moves on before reoccupying its area. Meanwhile, it will transfer the forces to those areas not occupied by the host nation. Ground forces are also highly vulnerable to mine and booby trap warfare in these sorts of situations with the accompanying effect on morale.

I sharply disagree with the statement: "Airmobile strike forces and an Army in the field tied to MI and FA assets will defeat an insurgency." This comment ignores the fundamental nature of sound COIN planning, which is a sophisticated combination of balanced political and social development, national commitment and effective military observations.

Maj. N. J. Newell, UK
Low Intensity Task Group
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Dear Editor

I'm not sure in my mind that the article, "The Soviet Soldier" by William Garmon, in this issue of *Military Intelligence*, helps solve the enigma of the Soviet soldier. While the author doesn't dispute that the Soviets are a formidable military threat, the picture he presents to me is quite the opposite. The author portrays the Soviet soldier as overindocinated, overworked, oversupervised, undereducated, underfed,

racist and exploited by a conscriptive system.

While the Soviets are not 10 feet tall militarily, they are not midgets either. The Soviet military system has one of the best military training systems in the world — from basic training to the equivalent of our service war colleges. This investment in their military training system would tend to support the argument against the picture of the Soviet soldier that Garmon is presenting.

In addition, I also don't believe the author has factored in the impact of General Secretary Gorbachev's program of stabilizing the growth of the Soviet military, based on his self-sufficiency program. The program's objectives are to adjust the military's requirements to specific missions — nothing more, nothing less. I believe that this openness policy will affect the life of the Soviet soldier in many ways.

The author is making an erroneous analogy between the victory achieved in World War II and the situation in Afghanistan. I don't believe the Soviets ever attempted to have a military victory in Afghanistan along the lines of World War II. The situation in Afghanistan is more of a political and religious problem. The author also states that the Soviets have "left" Afghanistan. Actually, only about half of the Soviet forces have been withdrawn. The remaining Soviet forces are expected to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan by May 1989.

Garmon also uses the terms "decisive victory" and "unrest" in his references to Soviet military actions. However, on the one hand he uses the term "decisive victory" in reference to the Soviet military and then cites Afghanistan along with Hungary and Czechoslovakia as cases of "unrest."

There is no doubt that much of what the author states is true about the plight of the Soviet soldier. But life in the Soviet Union is hard for both civilians and military. There is a great deal of nepotism in the Communist Party system. The saying, "It's not what you know but WHOM you know that counts" is very true. The Communist Party (of workers and peasants) has turned itself into an elite with special stores, housing, education, cars and vacations in the Crimea. These are the principal "sins" that are coming down on the head of the Soviet soldier. State organs and "perestroika" will hopefully accelerate the reforms that the woefully inadequate Soviet system requires.

Michael S. Evancevich
Threat Office
Directorate of Combat Developments

COUNTER TERRORISM *and* Intelligence



by Capt. Brian R. E. Miller

Western political leaders have become increasingly aware of the terrorist threat over the last decade. Acts of political terrorism directed against Western democracies have intensified since 1968. In the Eastern Bloc, this situation is totally reversed. From 1968 through 1981, fewer than 500 people from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were victims of terrorist attacks. During the same time period, almost 4,500 individuals from Western Europe and North America became terrorist victims.¹

There are a number of reasons for the disproportion in the amount of violence in the West compared to the East. The primary reason stems from the fact that the Eastern Bloc regimes have instituted controls that extend into every facet of a citizen's daily life. Movement is controlled by the state. The authorities decide where you can travel, where you live and work and, in many cases, what types of transportation can be owned and used. These restrictions

impede the rapid movement necessary to a terrorist organization and limit the establishment of bases. Freedom of press, assembly and speech is severely limited. In most cases, the state decides what organizations can exist (political or otherwise) and who can be a member. These controls practically prevent the formation of any political extremist group. If peaceful opposition organizations cannot legally publish their ideas, a group bent on spreading a doctrine of violence through demonstrations or written propaganda has no chance of success. Most important, from a counterterrorist standpoint, is the extensive secret police apparatus that ensures all of these controls are enforced. The KGB keeps extensive intelligence files on all Soviet citizens. This pervasive secret police intelligence system makes it much easier to prevent and defeat any terrorist organization operating in the Eastern Bloc. Before anyone has a chance to become a terrorist, the authorities already possess the equiv-

alent of a police file on them. As Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne stated:

"For the most effective defense against terrorism is undoubtedly to set up a police state such as that which exists in the Soviet Union, where anybody can be declared an enemy of the state and incarcerated without any process of law. And any dissident can and often is, sent to a mental home for 'treatment.' Such dire precautions of course involve the setting up of a gigantic apparatus of state security.

Such procedures are unthinkable in the West, and what has to be contrived is a system of increased security that does not impose too many restrictions on freedom."²

It is indeed ironic that terrorist groups have exploited the carefully protected civil liberties of the Western democracies in order to conduct their campaigns of violence. Groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF), in West Germany, advocate destruction of the liberal democratic system. However, when members of this group are captured by the authorities, they are not hesitant to protest against any alleged violation of their "rights."

Terrorist groups pose a unique and growing threat to Western democracies. Reliable and timely intelligence is the "first line of defense" in an effective counterterrorism program. The terrorists have the advantage of choosing the place and time of their strikes from a number of potential targets. Consequently, security forces are at a considerable disadvantage in thwarting

these attacks, since they do not have enough forces to protect all these targets adequately. A well developed intelligence capability should try to provide the authorities with advance warning about a forthcoming terrorist incident, to permit them to take steps to prevent the incident or at least ameliorate the danger. A good intelligence system also aids in identifying extremist groups that have the potential of adopting political violence as part of their program.

The clandestine and flexible nature of the terrorist threat poses a unique challenge to a counterterrorist intelligence organization. By contrast, it is easier for Western intelligence personnel to analyze and predict the activities of the Soviet Union. The Soviets publish doctrine on how their forces conduct operations. Their military equipment can be photographed, captured and studied. Their military bases can be located and charted. Their units and leadership can be identified. We can listen to and analyze their communications and, consequently, their strategies and tactics. When asked about the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. intelligence agencies, former Deputy Director of the CIA, Adm. Bobby R. Inman replied: "We're at our best in picking up warnings about a major use of Soviet force outside their borders. We understand Russia's military establishment. We can count what they have, understand how they operate it, how they train, how they use it . . . When you turn to the rest of the world, we are very restricted."³

Terrorism is a covert tactic, practiced by small groups organized into cells with a high regard for operational security. By their dedication to the destruction of parliamentary democracy, they are, by definition, a political threat. Their discipline, organization and degree of success indicate that they are not merely political fanatics. But on the other hand, they do not have a large base of popular support and are not capable of conducting a full-scale guerrilla war. According to Brian Jenkins, the RAND Corporation's terrorist expert, terrorist groups exploit the fact that they "operate in the cracks between organizational boundaries and missions, just beyond law enforcement, just before national security, where intelligence files touch the limits of legality."⁴

Terrorists are highly flexible. There is no one grand "terrorist strategy" that

will provide the key to a full understanding of the problem. Terrorist leaders/theorists spend a great deal of effort developing political strategies and military tactics. They have shown that they learn from their mistakes. When the numerous skyjackings in the early 1970s forced strict airport security measures, terrorists shifted to other targets that were less well protected.

Faced with the difficult challenge posed by the terrorist threat, U.S. foreign intelligence agencies are operating under greater restrictions than ever before. The dilemma is the difficult problem of protecting civil liberties, while at the same time using intelligence resources to target and collect against terrorist organizations. Certainly, it is tempting to fall into the trap of adopting totalitarian security measures in the name of eradicating a serious terrorist threat. But, the first priority of a constitutional state in administering its counterterrorism program must be the preservation of the constitutional democracy and its requisite legal system. This does not mean that the protection of the citizenry's rights prevents a government from combatting political extremism. Failure to collect and analyze intelligence data on radical groups can have disastrous consequences.

Intelligence Uses in Counterterrorism

The production of good intelligence presupposes that relevant raw data is collected and that the data is analyzed and evaluated by knowledgeable personnel. This evaluated data (intelligence) must then be disseminated to the appropriate decision maker, who needs the best intelligence available so that he will choose the best possible course of action. The decision maker has the responsibility of defining the mission and specifying the intelligence target so that the intelligence agencies will know what to collect against. The intelligence process can break down at any one of the tasking, collection, production or dissemination points. Unless the mission is specifically stated during the tasking phase, the rest of the process will not function effectively.

The same principles apply in the use of intelligence for counterterrorism. The following goal was outlined in a U.S. State Department document: "Although terrorist groups are inherently difficult to penetrate because of their small size

and the intense secrecy of their operations, we give high priority to collecting intelligence about their activities and modus operandi. The intelligence community analyzes and disseminates all available information so that we can warn those at risk and respond quickly to impending terrorist attacks."⁵

The goal of predicting individual terrorist attacks in order to warn the intended victim should be a top priority of our intelligence system. However, there is not one documented case of a major terrorist attack that has been successfully predicted. The question remains — how should the intelligence community organize its counterterrorist collection program?

Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel describe two different strategies a government can adopt in structuring its antiterrorist intelligence program.⁶ First is the "Defensive-Passive Strategy," under which an intelligence organization is limited to identifying and giving warning about a terrorist threat before actual political violence breaks out. The intelligence assets attempt to ascertain what the group's ideological and operational goals are, what or who its potential targets are and who its supporters and members are.

Second is the "Active Counter-Strategy." This is an offensive program in which the government's intelligence assets aggressively assist the security forces in eradicating an active terrorist threat. This involves covert and overt operations, both within and outside a nation's borders. They are designed to deny the terrorists any bases necessary for recruiting, training and conducting offensive operations. Tactics involved in the "Active Strategy" include police raids, deception and disinformation programs and military actions if necessary. The threat must be carefully assessed in order to decide which strategy would work best.

Gazit and Handel used examples from the Israeli experiences in fighting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This ongoing conflict involves counterterrorist and counter guerrilla operations, as well as conventional military actions. In spite of the relatively unique experience of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Gazit and Handel have outlined some valuable "lessons learned" that the West can employ against a lower-level terrorist threat.

The first and perhaps most important lesson is that a purely *defensive* cam-

paign against a terrorist offensive will not succeed. A defensive strategy alone will ensure that the terrorists maintain the initiative and that government security forces merely react after the fact. The West Germans learned this lesson after 1972. Even after the capture of the RAF leadership, the gang was able to recruit new members and continue their attacks.⁷ Additionally, the West Germans faced new terrorist threats from right wing extremists and from Palestinian groups. Although the threat was not a full-scale guerrilla war,⁸ the authorities were forced to adopt some offensive tactics from the "Active Strategy."

There are limitations on the effectiveness of intelligence under the defensive strategy. The kind of precise intelligence needed to effectively block a bombing or assassination attempt is difficult to obtain. A government can always "harden the target" by providing key officials with armored vehicles, building more fences or deploying more guards. This may result in better security for high priority targets, but it will not halt a determined terrorist. Terrorists can always switch to "soft," more vulnerable targets that have less protection. The only viable solution is to use intelligence to go on the offensive against these groups. If the authorities are actively pursuing the terrorists, then it is the terrorists themselves who are on the defensive. They will not have time to plan new acts of violence, recruit new members or train themselves; instead, they will be preoccupied with eluding capture. Gazit sums up this point nicely: "Whoever adopts a defensive, passive strategy against insurgency, I would say, is almost doomed to failure. You cannot fight and win any war by defensive means alone, and technically, from many points of view, I think that intelligence can be more effective in the effort against insurgency targets from an active, offensive point of view than a defensive, passive point of view."⁹ So the answer to the effective use of intelligence for counterterrorism is to integrate it into an active offensive program, tailored to defeat the particular threat that is faced.

The first use of intelligence is to identify possible indicators of terrorist attack. Many campaigns of political violence have been preceded by abusive ideological attacks on the government, its leaders and values.¹⁰ The bombing attacks of the RAF in West Germany

occurred after years of student protests, accompanied by a steady stream of left wing diatribes against the war in Vietnam and the conservative policies of the government. In the early 1970s, U.S. military installations in West Germany were attacked to protest the war in Vietnam. Similarly, the "Weathermen," an American leftist terrorist group, attacked the State Department, the Pentagon and the Capitol building in Washington, D.C.; all to back up their anti-Vietnam rhetoric.

There are times, however, when ideological pronouncements are not always reliable indicators of impending terrorism. Some small groups may have causes so obscure or bizarre that their desires are not well publicized before they launch their attacks. The South Moluccan independence movement and the Armenian campaign against the Turks are good examples. Still other groups may not publicize their cause at all before they use violence to get attention. Ideological tracts can sometimes be written in such a confusing way that they are of little use to the intelligence analyst. Another problem is the inclusion of disinformation, deliberate or otherwise, in extremist political literature. The problem can arise when supporters distribute written material that is similar to actual terrorist communiques. In the case of West Germany during the mid-1970s, at least three separate, but ideologically similar, terrorist groups were operational (RAF, *Revolutionaere Zellen* (RZ) and 2JM). Since these groups sometimes cooperated and supported each other operationally, it was easy for the media and government to blur the distinctions between them.

Analysts that study terrorist communiques should establish a detailed data base. Documents that are determined to be valid should be given a careful content analysis. Items such as sentence structure, idiom, handwriting, typewriting and so forth, should be examined. If a pattern can be established, then it will be much easier to differentiate between genuine writings, disinformation and outright fakes.

Logistics indicators are often used to aid in predicting Soviet military activity. In a similar way, indicators of upcoming terrorist attacks can be derived.¹¹ The RAF is notorious for stealing automobiles and other vehicles prior to attacking targets. To camouflage these vehicle thefts, license plates, registra-



tion documents and driver's permits are also stolen and duplicated. Blank identity documents or permits, passports, identity papers and weapons permits are stolen to facilitate travel and prevent arrest. Abnormal quantities of purchased or stolen weapons, ammunition, explosives, medical supplies or uniforms indicate possible terrorist involvement. Unique items may be the trademark of a certain group or region; for example, the theft of milk bottles in Northern Ireland foreshadowed the use of Molotov cocktails in future political violence.¹²

A useful indicator used to predict the Soviet army's offensive operations is tactical reconnaissance. Soviet ground commanders rely heavily on their extensive reconnaissance assets to provide tactical information about the objective. Terrorists and their supporters also conduct detailed reconnaissance of their targets. This collection of pre-operational intelligence includes sketching buildings, thefts of installation diagrams or blueprints and the observation of guards and other security procedures. RAF safehouses raided after the Ramstein Air Base bombing in August 1981 revealed sketches of the installation, as well as diagrams of other U.S. military installations. The assassination attempts on Gen. Alexander Haig in 1979 and Gen. Kroesen in 1981 were preceded by careful observation of their travel routes to and from work. Intelligence analysts should be on the alert for any reports of suspicious surveillance of installations or key personnel.

Reports of terrorist supporters going underground may also indicate future operations. As the ranks of the hard-core terrorists are depleted, active supporters will be needed to fill their places. Increased numbers of these supporters moving from a "legal" to an "illegal" underground status may mean new operators are being trained for a specific attack.

The movement of known terrorists can also mean new terrorist activity is being planned. As the West German security services became more effective, RAF terrorists fled the country to sanctuaries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Often, "legal" RAF supporters or sympathizers conducted surveillance of a proposed target. Next, the "illegal" terrorist triggermen would leave their safehavens and travel to the target area for the actual attack.

Still another indicator of future attacks is the congregation of known terrorists, revolutionaries or foreign leaders who support terrorism. Travel of key terrorist personalities usually involves flight to escape capture, movement to a training camp or movement to attempt a new terrorist attack.

Intelligence Collection Methods

Once a terrorist campaign is underway, what are the best collection means available to an intelligence agency? The "best" collection method is the one that provides the *greatest amount of accurate data* on the threat. Terrorist groups that operate in the West, for the most part, are small covert organizations, urban based, highly mobile and composed of well educated young men and women. They are ideologically motivated, highly security conscious and often well trained in guerrilla-type operations.

Overt collection against these groups is not likely to provide much hard data on actual operations. Overt collection is useful in determining the ideological motivation of the group and, in general terms, their "enemy" (the state, military, rival political faction). Media interviews with terrorist personalities can often reveal useful insights into their psychological makeup. Occasionally, an interview will document useful items for the analyst.¹³ Academic analysis can be useful in providing another method of approaching the threat as well as giving the analyst an unclassified reference tool.

Communications intelligence

(COMINT) has some utility in counter-terrorism. However, one must have a general idea where the terrorists are and what communications devices they are using in order to intercept them. Unlike a military unit, terrorists do not rely on a rigid chain of command or established communication network that can be identified or analyzed. One situation where COMINT might prove invaluable is a sophisticated hostage-barricade situation. Terrorists often take over buildings and hold the occupants hostage in order to force a government to grant concessions. It would be vital to intercept any radio communications between the hostage-barricade scene and any outside collaborators or supporters. Powerful directional microphones can be used when authorities are unable to approach the hostage-barricade site.

Operational intelligence can be extremely useful in understanding a particular terrorist threat. Operational intelligence determines the way in which a group operates. This includes details such as organization, weapons, equipment, training and tactics. Although terrorists are notoriously flexible, they do establish patterns. It is important for an intelligence analyst to be familiar with these patterns, not only to keep the decision maker informed of the current threat but also to be able to perceive changes in operational patterns that could signal greater danger. For example, West German terrorists have never conducted a direct armed assault against a heavily guarded installation. There are obvious, good reasons why this is so — the target is protected, casualties would be high and the terrorists probably wouldn't be able to escape once they got in. By far, the most frequent type of attack against the U.S. military in West Germany has been clandestine placement and detonation of explosives within installations. This tactic is followed by acts of vandalism against private property; theft of U.S. military property such as weapons and ammunition; and lastly, direct attacks against military personnel.

A number of factors influence the choice of targets and the methods of attack. First, the terrorist is going to choose a target that will be symbolic of his political beliefs. In the case of the RAF, the West German government and the U.S. military are the prime enemies. U.S. targets tend to get more publicity due to extensive media cov-

erage in West Germany and in the United States.

This leads to the second consideration in selecting a target — publicity. If the RAF or RZ blow up a water tower on an isolated section of a military base, chances are it won't get much news coverage. However, if they detonate explosives at the USAREUR Officer's Club, it definitely will get publicity. Next, the *kind* of publicity is also important. These groups would probably not detonate a bomb in a school filled with U.S. dependent children. The RAF and RZ are also in the business of building political support among German leftists. Blowing up a school is repugnant, even to those that would support other acts of violence.

The third factor in target consideration is the probability of success expected in the attack. Inherent in this consideration is the vulnerability of the objective. Terrorists will *usually* choose the target that is the most vulnerable (less protected) and therefore the easiest to attack. There is a trade-off involved — obviously the most vulnerable target is not going to gain them the most publicity. At the other end of the spectrum are the high visibility targets that are attacked even though they are well protected. The objective in these high-risk operations may be publicity, gaining leverage against the government or merely to demonstrate the group's power.

A fourth factor in choosing a target is punishment of the enemy. In Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, the following instructions are given:

"... the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points toward two essential objectives: (a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and police; (b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists and imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and large ones for the sustenance of the revolution itself."¹⁴

Terrorists justify their violence by referring to their cause as a just war against an unjust enemy — in this case the capitalists and the government they support. The RAF justified their campaign of bank robberies by quoting Marighella's advice. They did not think of themselves as thieves. They thought of themselves as hurting the hated

West German capitalist system. The cash they obtained was a useful by-product of the act of expropriation.

Another related reason in target selection is revenge. This may be revenge against a former terrorist who has betrayed his comrades or revenge for setbacks in terrorist attacks. In 1972, the West German police captured a 2JM terrorist who was planning a bombing attack on the Turkish Embassy in Bonn. He became a government witness and revealed details about the 2JM/RAF's international connections and plans. In June 1974, he was executed by an RAF assassin for being a traitor and a counter-revolutionary.¹⁵ In November 1982, three top members of the RAF were captured by West German security forces. In December 1982, three U.S. soldiers stationed in Germany were the victims of car bomb attacks. These bombings were the first assassination-type attacks by West German terrorists in over a year. The timing fit the past pattern of revenge-motivated violence.

Another area where operational intelligence is useful is the analysis of technical data that can provide useful warnings. Examples include the types of weapons or explosives the terrorists have been known to use, the types of automobiles they prefer to drive or the types of disguises they wear.

Photographic intelligence is of limited utility in counterterrorism. Covert terrorist organizations do not have fixed facilities that can be recorded with aerial photography. However, hand-held cameras can be useful in recording the faces of terrorist sympathizers at radical gatherings.

The best potential source of intelligence in counterterrorism is human intelligence (HUMINT). Reliable human sources can provide the detailed and accurate information that can be used to penetrate terrorist security measures and provide warnings of future operations. From an intelligence agency's standpoint, the ideal situation would be to have an agent in place among the leadership of the group's decision making element. This would enable the government security assets to find out who the terrorists are, what they are planning and where their safehouses and weapons caches are.

There are many problems associated with the recruitment and placement of agents in terrorist groups. First, since

terrorists always form clandestine groups and are highly security conscious, how do you find them? Second, agent recruiting usually takes a great deal of time, during which a climate of trust is built between the agent and his handler. Terrorists usually work in close-knit cells of two to five people. Therefore, they keep a close watch on each other. Anyone that couldn't explain long absences or other suspicious behavior would immediately be suspected. Third, terrorists usually have strong anti-state ideological motivations that would prevent them from even considering cooperation with the authorities. Fourth, terrorists fear retribution from their comrades if they become traitors. A better approach would be to send an intelligence agency's own agent out to penetrate the terrorist organization. This process could take months or even years. Counterterrorist agent operations must be meticulously planned by HUMINT professionals and protected by a careful security system in which only those necessary to the operation are aware of the operation's details.

Finally, there is intelligence interrogation of captured terrorists: "The 'cheapest' and easiest source of information available is an immediate, thorough and systematic interrogation of a captured terrorist. In such cases, there is always a race against time between the capacity to gain an immediate advantage from the information obtained by interrogation and the precautionary measures taken by the terrorist organization when they learn that one of their members has been captured."¹⁶

Conclusions

HUMINT, if properly developed, can be the best intelligence weapon in the counterterrorism fight. The problem that faces the U.S. intelligence community is the potential erosion of our HUMINT capability and a corresponding increasing reliance on technical systems for collection. Technical systems are extremely valuable against major conventional threats. However, technical collection systems are of limited use in counterterrorism. ★

Footnotes

1. "Patterns of International Terrorism 1981," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2965, August 1982.

2. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Terrorists* (New York: Facts on File, Inc. 1982), pp. 148-149.
3. "U.S. Intelligence Agencies Still Suffering from Scars," *U.S. News and World Report*, December 20, 1982, p. 37.
4. Brian Jenkins, "Combating International Terrorism: The Role of Congress," *Rand Paper*, No. P-5808, 1977, p. 18.
5. *GIST*, U.S. Department of State, June 1981.
6. Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Intelligence," *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Counter Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), pp. 125-158.
7. In 1977, the RAF assassinated several leading West German business leaders. This put increased pressure on the West German government to react.
8. On September 26, 1980, a member of a neo-Nazi group planted a bomb at the Munich Oktober Beer Festival. The bomb exploded, killing the terrorist, 12 others and wounding 312. Dobson and Payne, p. 252.
9. Gazit and Handel, p. 145.
10. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 135.
11. *Ibid*.
12. Lt. Col. Timothy Laur, class notes, SO 680 Indications and Warning/Terrorism, Defense Intelligence School, April 1982.
13. "Interview with OPEC Terrorist Klein," *Der Spiegel*, August 7, 1978, pp. 68-70. See also "Terrorists — What are they Like? How Some Terrorists Describe their World and Actions," *A RAND NOTE*, N-1300-SL, November 1979.
14. Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (Adelphi Paper #78) by Robert Moss (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1971), p. 21.
15. Obid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood*, pp. 244-245.
16. Gazit and Handel, p. 137.

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strengths and weaknesses. These analytical efforts are designed to assist the commander in his decision-making process. Intelligence analysis training, like the intelligence analysis mission, is focused on "how we see the enemy" as opposed to "how the enemy sees us." It is this focus that distinguishes the intelligence analyst from the CI analyst. Herein lies the problem.

The Problem

The program to counter the multidisciplined intelligence collection threat



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS - *The Untrained Discipline*

by Maj. E. H. Coet

"Because the hostile intelligence threat arrayed against U.S. forces and agencies is multidiscipline, the countering of that threat must also be multidiscipline. The requirement for such an approach recognizes the need for a single program which counters hostile HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT collection as well as an analysis capability to bring it all together."

This counterintelligence (CI) analysis capability is found in CI analysis sections at Corps and Division level. The focus of the CI analysis effort differs from the intelligence analysis found in all-source production sections (ASPS) at the same echelons. The trained intelligence analyst utilizes information acquired from our multidiscipline intelligence collection apparatus. He then analyzes this information and produces meaningful intelligence which identifies the full spectrum of enemy compositions, intentions,

cannot be accomplished without a dedicated and highly skilled multidisciplined CI analytical effort. The lack of a well guided, dedicated and highly skilled CI analytical effort represents a dangerous void in the overall intelligence effort at any echelon of command. This void exists today, and it needs to be filled quickly. Despite the fact that the Army provided for a CI analytical effort in the tables of organization and equipment (TOE) of each Corps and Division, CI analysis has been and remains a fragile discipline. This is especially true at echelons corps and below (ECB).

You will find wide variations in CI analysis section mission statements and performance objectives. The con-

"The focus of CI analysis differs from that of ASPS at the same echelon."

ceptual mission of CI analysis is to analyze the threat, support friendly vulnerability assessment and develop and recommend countermeasures to the G3.² The following is a concept of CI analysis section duties and responsibilities:

- Support the G3 by providing input and advice in the development of essential elements of friendly information.
- Develop and maintain the hostile intelligence threat data base. The intelligence collection assets of the command collect the data to identify the hostile intelligence collection threat.
- Provide its products to the operations security (OPSEC) staff element to assist them in performing their OPSEC management responsibilities.
- Coordinate with the collection management and dissemination section for intelligence support.
- Develop the friendly force profiles through identification of friendly signatures and patterns in conjunction with the G3 operations element.
- Support the analysis of friendly force profiles to determine vulnerable signatures and patterns.
- Perform analysis of enemy intelligence collection operations.
- Develop and recommend countermeasures to reduce, eliminate or take advantage of friendly force vulnerabilities.
- Assist in the evaluation of countermeasure effectiveness.
- Prepare appropriate portions of CI/OPSEC documents such as plans, estimates, annexes and other related documents.

These broad CI analysis mission concepts and responsibilities are focused in large measure to G3 OPSEC support. Many parallel or actually duplicate the responsibilities of the G3 OPSEC section. Still others parallel or duplicate the responsibilities that are inher-

ent to the G2 CI operations division. While valid, none of these responsibilities specifically address the salient analytical points associated with counter-enemy HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT collection, except in the broadest sense. These concepts have not kept pace with the rapidly changing, always progressive, multidiscipline intelligence world.

The February 1988 coordinating draft of Field Manual 34-60, *Counterintelligence*, did not fully address what CI analysis should be concerned with ("how the enemy sees us" issue). Barely three pages of this large document are devoted to CI analysis. Within the context of these three pages, the CI analytical effort is almost exclusively counter-HUMINT oriented and the section's efforts are either buried in the products of ASPS (which mandate their being concerned with "how we see the enemy" issues) or in the realm of G3 OPSEC responsibilities. The composition of the CI analysis section proposed in the coordinating draft does not reflect current authorizations and does not satisfy the analytical requirements of CI analysis.

The capabilities of the CI analysis effort are limited by the TOE structure and staffing available to accomplish that effort. The Corps CI analysis and OPSEC section falls under the staff supervision of the G2 and can be found in the TOE of the Corps tactical operations support element (CTOCSE). CI analysis and OPSEC section personnel authorizations are shown in figure 1 (with minor variations).

In reality, the CI analysis section is not staffed as the figure implies. The OPSEC officer and operations sergeant positions are invariably assigned to the Corps G3 OPSEC section, although carried against CI analysis section authorizations. The TOE implies they work in a consolidated effort with CI analysis. While there is interface between the CI analysis section and the G3 OPSEC section, the latter does not work for or contribute to the work of the CI analysis section. On the contrary, it is the CI analysis section that is frequently called upon to support and provide services to the G3 OPSEC section. Hence, strike two senior positions from the CI analysis section. The chief imagery analyst and imagery analyst positions are invariably consolidated into the CTOCSE imagery and analysis section, to again respond to "how we

POSITION	GRADE	MILITARY SPECIALTY
CI ANALYSIS OFFICER	O-4	35E
OPSEC OFFICER	O-3	35E
CI TECHNICIAN (2)	WO1-CWO4	971AO
OPERATIONS SERGEANT	E-8	97B50
CHIEF IMAGERY ANALYST	E-7	98D40
ELSEC SERGEANT	E-7	98J40
SIGSEC SERGEANT	E-7	97G40
DECEPTION NCO	E-6	98G30
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	E-6	96B30
IMAGERY ANALYST	E-5	96D20
CI ASSISTANT	E-4	97B10

Figure 1

see the enemy" issues. While the imagery analyst positions are carried against CI analysis section authorizations, they also do not work for or contribute significantly to the CI analysis effort. The result is to strike two more positions from the CI analysis section. The important SIGSEC sergeant position is in the process of being deleted from all Corps CI analysis section authorizations — strike one more position. While the CI analysis officer and CI analysis technician positions are authorized, you rarely find two CI technicians in a CI analysis section at the same time. Therefore one more position is struck.

The 12-soldier CI analysis section now actually becomes a six-soldier section, provided a full complement of soldiers is assigned. This six-soldier section is charged with the full Corps CI analysis mission. It is important to note that of the remaining positions, only the intelligence analyst and perhaps the CI analysis officer have any analytical training or experience. None of the section personnel have CI-specific analytical training or experience. The deception NCO is trained as an electronic warfare/SIGINT voice interceptor. Not only is he untrained as an analyst, he also has no training in deception, the precise mission his position was created for. The electronic security (ELSEC) sergeant is trained in electronic warfare/SIGINT noncommunications intercept. He has no training in electronic security analysis, his primary mission. The CI technician, should one actually be assigned, is an expert on

document security, personnel security, perhaps automated data processing security and may or may not have experience in counter-HUMINT operations (counter-espionage, counter-sabotage, counter-subversion, counter-terrorism). He is not trained as an analyst and, because he is a specialist, he knows little about the other MI disciplines (counter-SIGINT, counter-IMINT). The CI assistant's training and experience is the most limited of all. In fact, assignment of a 97B10 to a CI analysis section could prove to be damaging to the soldier's career. For advancement, he should understudy a CI agent and learn the "ins and outs" of agent operations. The CI analysis section has an analytical mission and does not conduct CI agent operations. Moreover, experience gained in a CI analysis section will not contribute to the basic skills required of a CI agent. There is not a single question about multidisciplinary CI analysis on any 97B SQT, regardless of grade. Not only does the CI assistant have to learn his analytical job from scratch, he must spend time learning to be proficient in his MOS in order to compete for promotion and bona fide CI assignments.

The responsibilities and problems of the CI analysis officer are worthy of special attention. He must, if he is to properly serve his commander, provide multidiscipline intelligence analysis to counter the enemy's HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT threat. This represents a monumental challenge to the CI analysis officer, who, unless he received

"... an 'intelligence void' exists with regard to how the enemy sees us..."

special intelligence analysis training and experience, is limited to the rudimentary analytical skills acquired during his MI basic and advanced courses. Though his supervisory chain will frequently assume that his CI training equates to CI analysis expertise, he is most likely trained and experienced in counter-HUMINT.

CI analysis sections tend to expend many manhours building data bases on the enemy multidiscipline collection apparatus but spend too little time analyzing the impact of enemy capabilities as measured against the friendly force profile. Little effort is expended prioritizing the most significant collectors threatening the friendly force at a given point and time. Rarely do they produce the friendly priority intelligence requirements from the enemy's perspective. More often, CI analysis sections are assigned missions that have little to do with analysis and often duplicate efforts of other sections.

Some G2s, G3s and commanders tend to perpetuate the CI analysis problem. While they routinely ask for intelligence estimates and summaries to gain a clear understanding of the enemy situation, only infrequently do they inquire as to the enemy's perspective concerning friendly forces. While they may devote some attention to the OPSEC profile of their respective commands, often their OPSEC concerns are limited to the general countermeasures taken to mask friendly vulnerabilities against the enemy's multidiscipline intelligence collection effort.

Recommended Solutions

There are some isolated examples of excellence in the CI analytical effort. The III Corps CI analysis effort certainly is among them and may well be the trend setter in multidiscipline CI analysis. In III Corps, a large multidiscipline data base has been established and is being automated. A graphic CI summary which portrays the potential threat to the Corps rear area, while still in need of some refinement, is nonetheless a reality. An attempt at CI Intelli-

gence Preparation of the Battlefield has produced useful templates/overlays which clearly identify potential enemy drop zones, landing zones, ambush points, rendezvous points and other important intelligence requirements in the friendly rear area. Detailed terrorist threat assessments in areas of interest to the Corps are routinely published. Friendly force OPSEC profiles on all Corps units to battalion level have been developed. Locating the source of the multidiscipline intelligence threat affords the section the opportunity to nominate targets. The full Army-wide scope and mission of multidiscipline CI analysis will not likely be accomplished without quick deliberate action to correct the problems.

Commanders and intelligence professionals need to recognize that an "intelligence void" exists with regard to our understanding of how the enemy sees us and then act to fill that void. They need to ask the "tough questions" and demand answers to them. They need to assign to the CI analysis section trained, quality soldiers.

While CI analysis must interface with G3 OPSEC, G2 CI operations and many other staff elements, CI analysis has a unique analytical mission and must not be allowed to duplicate the efforts of other sections.

TOE positions that do not perform specific CI analysis functions should be removed from authorization documents. This action will eliminate the inaccurate impression that the CI analysis section has a strength and capability that it does not actually have. Signal security analysis is an important part of the multidiscipline CI analysis mission. The signals security sergeant position should be restored. Delete the CI assistant position and replace it with a 97B40 CI analysis sergeant position. A more senior CI agent would bring the additional counter-HUMINT experience required for mission accomplishment. Replace one of the two 971AO CI technician positions with a 350D imagery interpretation technician or SIGINT technician position. One CI technician along with a senior CI agent would provide an adequate counter-HUMINT analytical capability. The addition of an imagery interpretation or SIGINT technician would fill the IMINT/SIGINT gap. Replacing the 35E analysis officer position with a 35A/35G position would add an intelligence officer with not only a strong SIGINT background but also

multidiscipline analytical experience.


Finally, and most importantly, more extensive CI analysis doctrinal guidance must be developed and CI analysis training must be provided to all personnel assigned to CI analysis duties. A short, two-to-three week course could be developed at USAICS concentrating on the CI specific aspects of each MOS in the CI analysis section. The primary focus of the training should be the CI analytical "how to's" of mission accomplishment.

Capt. Ralph Peters, in his article, "Wanted: Analysts," published in the March 1987 issue of *Military Intelligence*, correctly states, "the identification of enemy intentions, strength and vulnerabilities is the primary goal of operational-level analysis." If this is true for us, then it is likewise true for our enemy. Our commanders cannot exploit enemy vulnerabilities if the enemy first exploits our vulnerabilities and defeats us. The enemy cannot exploit that which he does not know, see or hear. This is why CI analysis is so vitally important to victory on the battlefield. This is also why actions to correct problems inherent to CI analysis are desperately needed. The time to act is now.★

Footnotes

1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-38(S), U.S. Army Operational Concept for Counterintelligence(U), (1 June 1984), Section III, Para 8 (U), p. 12.
2. op. cit.

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The Future of Combined Arms Operations in Low Intensity Conflict

by Capt. Dennis L. Warriner

Combined arms operations in low intensity conflict (LIC) have been implemented in many countries experiencing an insurgency. U.S. doctrine regarding how combined arms operations can be best used is evolving based on our experiences in Vietnam and current operations in Central America. Additionally, new technologies allow us to find and attack the insurgent in ways not possible 15 years ago.

A combination of Special Forces (SF), psychological operations (PYSOP), and civil affairs (CA) has traditionally made up a counterinsurgency (COIN) team. We now recognize the importance of MI, Field Artillery (FA) and quick reaction air mobile forces as major players on the COIN team. However, we have not established a doctrine for integrating MI, FA and air mobile forces. The absence of a doctrinal foundation for employing COIN forces will hinder the complete development of a reliable COIN team. The intent of this article is to discuss how and why the combined arms approach should be the doctrinal basis for future COIN forces.

Insurgent Strategy

Influencing other people for radical

political change is the insurgent's goal. His methodology is to gain popular support by convincing the population that the government is exploiting the common citizen while it materialistically prospers. The insurgent identifies actual or perceived inequities in the current political system and, using propaganda, attempts to gain popular support, sympathy, cooperation and assistance from the population.

Insurgents will control remote areas of rural countryside, establish a shadow government and harass government troops or the government infrastructure to demonstrate their system. In the urban environment, insurgents will conduct acts of terrorism to gain media recognition and cause economic and political chaos. The urban insurgent is more difficult to control due to his relatively easy ability to blend with the population. His strategy is designed to cause the government to overreact and impose restrictions on the population at large that will further feed the flames of discontent.

MI Support

What can be done to support friendly governments and destroy the criminal activities of insurgents? MI is the key to such operations. Within the scope of MI are signals intelligence (SIGINT), counterintelligence (CI) and area intel-

ligence (AI). Currently, the US government supports COIN through the country team assigned to the U.S. Embassy in the host nation. The country team has a military group (MILGP) that advises the host nation on COIN operations and coordinates the training and transfer of equipment to support COIN.

The MILGP supports the host nation at the country level as well as at the tactical level. Presently, MILGP support is offered on an ad hoc basis that causes MI unnecessary problems of coordination at Theater and CONUS nodes. If an MI operations doctrine was developed at MILGP level it would greatly enhance U.S. objectives in the host nation. It would also offer a model from which future applications could be empirically designed. We must consider two significant aspects: MI is to serve the host nation and, if properly employed, MI becomes a battlefield force multiplier.¹

Of the three facets of MI, SIGINT provides the tactical commander with the best information on the insurgents' location and future intentions. However, CI and AI are also important for continuity and as an alternate means of intelligence after the insurgents recognize their vulnerability to SIGINT. The key here is SIGINT only works when the insurgents' radio is transmitting. CI and AI provide constant sources of

information.

Future doctrine for SIGINT must focus on early deployment of collection platforms designed for COIN operations. Deployment must precede other forms of MILGP buildup by at least 90 days to avoid tipping off the insurgent force to U.S. intentions. Additionally, we currently focus our efforts on collection platforms to support a mid-high intensity conflict and have overlooked the radio spectrum insurgents use. Our equipment is too bulky, heavy and inflexible. Equipment must be air transportable, easily operated and rugged. The equipment's operation must be simple to lend easy training to local nationals whose technical abilities may be limited.

SIGINT in COIN has two primary uses; the insurgents' use of the radio can be exploited by direction finding (DF) resulting in the location of the transmitter or it can be exploited by collecting information passed during transmission. If we are to adequately exploit these options we must rapidly disseminate the intelligence because it is very time perishable. Intelligence that is eight hours old is considered too old. Only a combined arms approach to intelligence exploitation will be successful.

The intelligence can also result in long term planning for the host nation if historical data banks, pattern analysis and terrain analysis are conducted. The use of portable computers makes this work technologically feasible. The desired result of long term analysis is intelligence that will prepare the tactical commander and national-level planners for intended insurgent activities.

There are limitations to the use of SIGINT. These are predominately terrain and weather, and urban or rural use of radios. Terrain affects the enemy transmission much the same as terrain limitations on conventional operations. Weather will impact on both ground-based and airborne platforms. Urban operations are very difficult to DF due to radio wave propagation patterns around solid man-made structures. It is advisable to concentrate on collection efforts instead of DF missions in the urban environment to exploit the insurgents' intentions. Rural radio transmissions are the easiest to DF and offer the tactical combined arms commander the greatest potential utility, since rural areas are comparatively easier to control once the insurgents' location is

determined.

Operational security (OPSEC) is of utmost importance. Insurgents will learn through trial and error the dangers of using a radio, and poor OPSEC will lead to diminished intelligence results.

CI operations in COIN are usually easier to implement because the host nation will probably have a CI operations program in place based on police informants or police interrogation used in response to criminal activity. The military will probably have a limited CI capability because it is relatively inexpensive, easy to use and a universal MI mission. However, U.S. forces must evaluate the host-nation CI capability and be prepared to support it by training CI operations in concert with CA and PYSOP missions. The evaluation should focus on improving the host-nation system rather than instituting a program that simply mirrors the U.S. CI system.

AI programs offer the host nation the capability to monitor insurgent activities in the absence of SIGINT. If practical, the host-nation AI program should be evaluated to determine the level of success the host nation has achieved. Significant AI operations not only provide proactive tactical COIN measures but also support the national collection effort by providing information that can diffuse the insurgents' strategies. AI programs should focus on penetrating the insurgents' network and establishing local intelligence nets that function similar to LP/OP operations in a conventional war. AI is superior to CI in the rural setting because AI missions are continuous and conducted in total secrecy. They offer the host nation information covering large geographic areas with limited military exposure. When used in concert with CA operations they undermine the insurgents while providing support to the host-nation government.

FA Support

FA is one of the oldest components of combined arms operations. The use of FA in COIN, however, is relatively new and always a point of debate. The basic issue is how to employ FA and control its collateral effects. The destruction of private property or civilian casualties will diminish the host-nation's ability to gain the population's support. Some attributes of field artillery include:²

- Great firepower, focused on small areas.

- Rapid or selective fire to destroy or disrupt the insurgent.

- Long range capability.
- All weather capability.
- Ability to deliver firepower from a location inaccessible to insurgents.
- Psychological impact on insurgents by striking without warning.

If executed judiciously and integrated into combined arms operations, particularly SIGINT DF missions, FA can help defeat insurgency by:³

- Flushing insurgents from dense vegetation (to include triple canopy jungle) and canalizing the insurgents into friendly ground fires.
- Conducting harassing fires to keep the insurgents moving, day and night and to prevent them from massing.
- Integrating elements of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) so that the commander can pre-register future insurgent locations and combine surprise with deadly accurate fires.

- Providing blocking fires to allow friendly forces time to maneuver against a withdrawing enemy.

- Deceiving the insurgents by firing into an area far remote from the intended ground operation.

- Using illumination to deter the insurgents from attacking and slow their movement through areas to weaken their logistical apparatus.

Knowing where the insurgents are located is necessary to fully exploit FA. Final destruction of the insurgents can only be accomplished with soldiers. The fusion of MI, FA and troop maneuver is the key to success.

Airmobile Support

Combat operations designed to defeat an insurgency must be capable of rapid deployment, surprise and concentration of highly accurate fire power. Airmobile forces are the best overall element capable of incorporating these facets. Airmobile forces must be well disciplined and available for immediate deployment to exploit intelligence based on time-perishable information. They must be accompanied by FA and attack helicopters to mass destructive firepower on a small area. The combined arms approach to COIN will satisfy these requirements.

Future LIC scenarios demand that a doctrine for airmobile training and employment be developed. The host-nation's tactics must develop as the insurgents become more sophisticated.

The use of constant patrols and area ambushes in concert with IPB will deny the insurgents an area of operations and hamper their ability to influence the population.

Conclusions

While a doctrinal approach to LIC does not exist relative to MI, FA and airmobile forces, our experiences and new technologies require such a development. The MI-operations relationship is crucial to battlefield success. FA can be used if the associated risks are minimized by use of intelligence targeting. In remote areas FA can disrupt insur-

gent activity by harassing the base camps and logistics routes. Airmobile strike forces and an Army in the field tied to MI and FA assets will defeat an insurgency. ★

Footnotes

1. Brig. Gen. John F. Stewart, "Military Intelligence Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict," *Military Review*, January 1988, pp. 18-27.
2. Lt. Col. Orlando V. Soriano, "The Employment of Field Artillery in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare," *Defense Technical Information Center*, June 1982, pp 12-13.
3. Ibid.

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7th Infantry Division G2 Workstation Exercise

by Lt. Col. Dan M. Vannatter and
Lt. Col. Douglas C. Hayden

Intelligence personnel from the 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, Calif., recently exercised their skills by undergoing intensive training at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. This training was accomplished through the G2 Workstation, a computer system within the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, in mid-November. The exercise gave division players the opportunity to put their tasking, reporting, processing and analysis skills into practice in an isolated, classroom environment.

The scenario, which involved the entire division intelligence system, was designed to test echelons corps and below. Players included I Corps G2 staff members, the Division Support Command, Division Artillery, Division G3 representatives, the 2d and 3d Infantry Brigades, the 9th Regiment, the 7th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 107th Military Intelligence Battalion.

G2 Workstation

The G2 Workstation is a computer system that enables the staff to replicate the division IEW system in a classroom environment. Players conduct all phases of the intelligence cycle as it is done in the field today. The actual col-

lection of data is simulated by the computer system. By using the Workstation, personnel understand the interrelationship of the various elements of the division intelligence system. Specifically, the player will understand how the division tactical operations center works with the corps tactical operations center, the MI battalion headquarters and the maneuver brigade S2 sections, using all-source intelligence to support the tactical commanders.

Currently, one scenario is embedded in the Workstation. The instructors hope to build a library of scenarios in the future, enabling the system to be used to support exercises involving all levels of conflict worldwide.

Objectives

The key players for the division established several objectives. The most important goals included, but were not limited to, the following:

- Exercise and analyze the division collection/mission management process.
- Exercise and analyze the MI battalion's asset management, reporting and tasking, and processing and analysis functions.
- Assess the amount of analysis conducted at the MI battalion Technical Control and Analysis Element vs.

the amount conducted at the G2 All-Source Production Section. The dynamics of the battle would dictate the degree of processing and analysis conducted at each level.

- Emphasize the positive aspects of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process. Successful execution of the process would result in high pay-off; doctrinal applications would represent actual ground truth.

Observations

Overall, the exercise paid enormous dividends. First, it is important to note that this was a well coordinated, multi-disciplined effort. The G2 Workstation allowed all functional intelligence disciplines to exercise in depth. It afforded basic skill practice on a professional level across the board and allowed players to focus on intelligence exclusively. Players were able to concentrate totally on the exercise without any garrison or field related distractions. The play could be stopped at any time, allowing for instant feedback. Thus, key players could establish an audit trail on any piece of information. Internal coordination was excellent. Team building within the division intelligence system was enhanced. Identification and tasking of collection assets was tracked and monitored phase by phase, disci-

pline by discipline, which proved most valuable.

Counterintelligence (CI) play for the Lightfighters is an extremely important phase of any exercise the Division participates in. Players were fortunate to be exposed to a vast amount of CI play during the week-long scenario. The recent Warfighter Exercise rear operations play carried through to the G2 Workstation. Early on, the Division CI elements, composed of the G2 CI Section and CI representatives from the MI battalion, were heavily tasked. Explicit tasking sets involved extensive pre-hostilities planning and determining the location of IPW teams. As a direct result of the amount of CI play, the division's CI collection, analysis and management capabilities and functions were well exercised, with favorable results.

The multidisciplinary training that the Lightfighters received was worthwhile in every way. Being placed in an isolated classroom environment for one week to exercise the division intelligence system proved to be invaluable.

Key division players would welcome the opportunity to take advantage of the quality training offered in this setting once again.

Lessons Learned

The division came away with some very distinct lessons learned. The following list delineates the most important points, from the perspectives of the Division G2 and the MI Battalion commander:

- When conducted again, the Division key players would prefer to run 36 to 48 hours non-stop, to decrease artificiality.
- Exercise reporting and analysis processes more fully.
- Mission management needs improvement, from the MI Battalion's perspective.
- There must be constant interface among managers to stay ahead of battle developments. This would facilitate being proactive, as opposed to reactive.
- Pre-planned targeting was successful, as measured by battlefield

damage assessments.

- Immediate feedback improved morale.

- A more formalized mission planning process between the G2 and MI Battalion is needed. This process should support specific task organization and intelligence and collection acquisition tasks that need to be developed. It should be institutionalized; something the collection plan doesn't do.

- Operations officers and collection managers must continuously interact. Clarity is essential.

The Workstation presently supports the MI Officer Advanced Course. It has now been used by three FORSCOM units. The instructors hope that both the Advanced NCO Course and reserve units will be using it in the near future.

For more information about the G2 Workstation, contact Capt. William Carrington, AV 821-3364 or commercial (602) 533-3364. ★

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Lieutenant Colonel Hayden; Brigadier General Matz, Assistant Division Commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Vannatter during the after action review.

Τη Λανγυαχε Προβλεμ

by SSgt. Sydney A. Seiler

The problems the Army faces in training, maintaining and retaining qualified linguists capable of performing both peacetime and wartime missions have been well documented. As the primary user of military linguists, the Military Intelligence (MI) community is inherently concerned with how language training and proficiency levels affect the MI units' ability to go to war.

In general, most attention has been directed toward the two primary language-driven MOSs: 97E, Interrogator and 98G, Electronic Warfare (EW) Voice Intercept Operator. Although language skills are useful to soldiers in other MI specialties, it is these two MOSs which are language dependent. Unfortunately, many non-linguists in decision making positions are not acutely aware of the vast differences between interrogators and voice interceptors, the language skills needed to perform each job and the implications of such differences when addressing language training needs.

One major problem arises when non-linguists or those not thoroughly familiar with language training are tasked with the development and administration of command-level language programs. These individuals often fail to take into account the uniqueness of language training compared to other common soldier skills with which they are more familiar. Another problem stems from the myth that mission-essential language skills are independent of global language skills. How different is an "Army linguist" from a "non-military linguist?" One further problem which contributes to that confusion is a failure to define the 98G Mission Essential Task List (METL) to accurately reflect what the voice intercept operator will need to do to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. Finally, when we look at what has been done in trying to describe the voice intercept operator's METL, it becomes apparent that great adjustments

will have to be made for current Army war fighting doctrine.

The Role of the Command Language Council

Whether at battalion, major command or DA level, the active involvement of qualified linguists in the development and implementation of command language programs is key to the ultimate success of those programs. Language training encompasses skills and training methodologies which make it unique from other areas of army training such as basic marksmanship, physical training, common soldier skills training or even MOS proficiency training. Good language training must include a sustained program which maintains the overall proficiency of all unit linguists. There must be refresher programs to bring those with degraded skills up to minimal proficiency. Enhancement programs are also needed not only to improve the overall proficiency of the unit, but to provide the individual soldiers with attainable language training goals which subsequently enhance their morale and overall self esteem as linguists. The challenges language training pose make it a much more complex problem than many other training requirements units are faced with.

The key to a successful language program is the active participation of linguists of all ranks in the development, implementation and management of the program. The 501st MI Brigade Command Language Council, with the active participation of qualified linguist and language trainers from subordinate battalions under the guidance of the Brigade S3, developed one of the best Command Language Programs in existence, the Technical Certification Program. This program has succeeded due to the guidance of language-qualified warrant officers acutely aware of the challenges of putting together a viable program to enhance language proficiencies throughout the unit. From local language councils to national-level

conferences, the active participation of NCOs and warrant officers with years of experience in the field ensures that policy and programs fit the needs of the linguists.

Global vs Job-specific Language Proficiency

One source of confusion for the commander has been the ongoing argument among linguists as to need for general or global language proficiency among Army linguists. Despite years of debate which resulted in the heavy emphasis on global language proficiency at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and in the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT), the basic argument does not seem to have disappeared. This poses a major problem for the commander when prioritizing language training needs in an already busy training schedule.

There is a tendency among 98Gs to attempt to separate their "job-specific" language proficiency from their global language proficiency. The overall victim of this trend has been global language proficiency. As the only tool for evaluating language proficiency, the DLPT is criticized for not evaluating METL or job-specific language ability due to the limited amount of military situations on the test. This is similar to the complaints leveled against many of the DLI basic, intermediate and advanced-level courses themselves. The first inclination of signals intelligence (SIGINT) linguists is to blame DLI's global approach to training for their own or their subordinate soldiers' lack of proficiency. Those same linguists tend to disregard poor performance on the DLPT by asserting that the test does not reflect their proficiency as voice intercept operators. Thus linguists and their commanders could easily disregard poor proficiency scores on the DLPT because no real tool exists to measure "technical" language skills. Upon closer evaluation, however, the value of the DLPT and of DLI's global

approach to language training becomes quite evident when assessing the role of the voice intercept operator on the battlefield of the future.

Voice Intercept Operator and AirLand Battle

To date, few have seriously questioned how language training should reflect the demands the *future* battlefield will place on linguists. We seemed to have become so immersed in resolving the language problems of the past that we have neglected the challenges of the future. The question that must be asked, therefore, is what requirements will be placed on 98Gs in time of conflict and what linguistic skills are necessary to fill those requirements. The various missions of the 98G and the classification of many of the skills make it impossible to generalize that all 98Gs regardless of language will be required to do "x," or that a Russian trained 98G must know "y" while a Korean-trained 98G must know "z."

One recurring fault of those in the intelligence field at both the tactical and strategic levels is to mirror-image when estimating the enemy's intentions. We allow our perceptions of how we would act in a given situation to influence our assessment of how the enemy will act. In our own ethnocentric ways, Americans proceed with the assumption that all people think and act as they do. The voice interceptor must learn to think like a native of his target language. He must be able to understand the context of what he hears, while at the same time translating what he hears into concepts not easily understood by those unfamiliar with the socio-linguistic peculiarities of the target language. A thorough understanding of the syntactical structures, idiomatic phrases and contextual terminology as well as a knowledge of the culture, society and the military structure of the enemy is necessary to translate and disseminate the intelligence necessary for victory on the AirLand Battlefield.

In a low intensity conflict (LIC) scenario, the 98G will be faced with many new challenges, regardless of assigned echelon and specific mission. 98Gs are considered by commanders as more than voice interceptors and are constantly called upon to do duties outside of their job description (document translation, interpretation, liaison). This is a fact which we must learn to live with in peace as well as in war. The require-

ments which would be placed on an already strained pool of linguists in a LIC would entail much linguistic work outside of standard military vocabulary.

Even in their accepted roles as voice intercept operators, 98Gs will find themselves tasked to support intelligence requirements which will vary within the context of the LIC based on the supported echelon and the changing political and military situation. As Capt. Levesque points out in his article entitled "Counterinsurgency Intelligence" (*Military Intelligence*, October-December 1986), the analyst "must gain an appreciation and understanding of the enemy's politics, strategy, tactics and organization." In LIC, the tactical 98G can no longer dismiss such responsibilities as belonging to national level authorities.

In this context, DLI and the DLPT seem justified in making cultural understanding and societal concepts terminology the bulk of the vocabulary taught in all basic DLI language courses as well as constituting a major part of the DLPT. While based on the assumption that global language skills are a necessary prerequisite to technical proficiency, DLI provides the basic socio-linguistic skills needed by the 98G. Intermediate and advanced courses continue this development, striving toward developing vocabulary bases and grammar comprehension that will enable the senior 98Gs to prepare for expanded and more difficult language tasks.

The Future of 98G Language Training

Having outlined what skills the voice intercept operator will need on the future battlefield to perform his mission, we must consider the direction language training must take in order to ensure development, maintenance and enhancement of those skills. One of the major complaints of 98Gs assigned to tactical units has been the lack of a live mission in their daily work. In the future, resources will become less and less a problem for the 98G to maintain MOS language proficiency. Under no circumstances can we afford not to continue to strive for job-related language proficiency through the readiness training (REDTRAIN) opportunities now available. Whatever day-to-day duties the 98G may encounter, time can be found for this type of training.


Much more can be done, even in the absence of live mission training. The

field environment is one of the most neglected opportunities for productive voice interceptor training. Too many commanders have been content with using the stopwatch to evaluate their EW teams' ability to erect antennae and camouflage, while neglecting the other training opportunities available to the 98G in the field. Every 98G should be trained in and aware of the basic tenets of the AirLand Battle Doctrine and the role he plays in providing timely and accurate intelligence to the supported tactical commander. He must also be aware of all aspects of the combined arms unit. He complements his linguistic knowledge with a knowledge of how the enemy operates and how the commander may be thinking in the field.

This provides several challenges to the MI commander. He must be made aware of the many responsibilities of the 98G and what training must be done to meet those responsibilities. This does not necessarily require that a greater burden be placed on an already congested training schedule to keep soldiers informed of developments in MI. Train them on the interoperability of units. Let them observe an artillery live fire, tank maneuvers or river crossings. Let them work hand in hand with infantry units, so they learn that terms such as phase lines, objective, envelopment and counterattack are more than English language equivalents of random foreign vocabulary.

Most of all, never forget that being a truly tactically proficient MI soldier-linguist capable of meeting the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) demands of the supported commander goes far beyond weapons qualification, survival in the field and physical readiness. In addition to being proficient in a target language, soldier-linguists must know all aspects of tactical operations of both friendly and opposing forces and know what intelligence can be gleaned to support IEW operations and guarantee victory on the battlefield of the future.★

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The U.S. Army has gathered a significant file of lessons learned from the many rotations conducted at the National Training Center (NTC). Experience and study have allowed many of these lessons to develop into refined skills.

Voices in the Sand - Deception Operations at the NTC

by Capt. George L. Reed

The employment of new equipment and internalization of proven doctrine has greatly increased the amount and detail of intelligence that is available to maneuver commanders. The ability to monitor numerous enemy radio nets and to see far behind enemy lines has given task force commanders a rather devastating weapon to add to their arsenal of combat multipliers. But, as is the case with many lethal weapons, this particular sword can cut both ways.

The ability to acquire, transmit and utilize intelligence stopped being orig-

inal after the Battle of Marathon. We have evolved the system, but the tenets remain the same. The way to overcome superior intelligence capability is to provide the gatherer with large quantities of believable information — while the real plan is executed somewhere else.

The focus of deception activities for the opposing forces (OPFOR) at the NTC is to prey upon a unit's failure to adhere to a basic precept of intelligence gathering — you must always confirm your intelligence. A discussion of deception operations at the NTC can be conducted in a manner as simple as

the "illusions" themselves; by explaining what, how and why.

What

The "what," of course, is the use of minimal internal assets or deception sections from Division or Army level to attrit the enemy's combat effectiveness by accomplishing three major tasks: confuse, deceive and weaken his forces.

You confuse the enemy by:

- Drawing attention to several areas. An effective deception will show major actions occurring in numerous locations. This will spread out the enemy's intelligence assets and make

confirmation more difficult. The enemy will now have less room for error, and his intelligence personnel will be under greater pressure to correctly analyze the situation.

- Making the enemy attend to details he thought were completed. This is accomplished through radio deception discussing the clearing of enemy obstacles, securing of terrain features and other such actions that will lead the enemy to waste time rechecking what he has already spent precious time completing. The benefits to this are that time spent reconfirming known data is not spent detecting the rest of the deception plan.

- Making available forces appear larger than they are. The enemy will probably have visual confirmation, or reports from higher intelligence sources, that tell him where your elements are actually located. Visual and radio deceptions can make it appear that other elements of comparable size are also located in the sector. This action leads the enemy to be overcautious in his planning, thinking he is up against a much larger force than really exists.

- Making enemy intelligence sources conflict with each other. This is easily done by providing his electronic warfare (EW) elements with large quantities of false radio traffic. The next step is to hinder other assets, such as scouts and ground surveillance radars, by screening the sector with smoke and jamming radar capabilities. The end result is a confusing barrage of senseless intelligence.

You deceive the enemy by:

- Causing him to anticipate attacks or counterattacks from fictional locations by keeping his attention devoted to areas other than where you want to operate. As the enemy watches and listens to preparations for false attacks and counterattacks, he will begin to "lean forward" by moving forces to positions of advantage against the movement he anticipates. If this is accomplished, the real attack may find little resistance in the sector opposite the deception plan.

- Causing him to believe you have made massive repositioning maneuvers since his last confirmed intelligence. Enemy artillery barrages are a significant threat to maneuver commanders, often accounting for up to 50 percent of losses. Enemy barrages will not be on target, however, if the enemy thinks he

is shooting at where you have "moved."

- Causing him to believe he is under threat of imminent destruction by ambush, penetration, attack or counterattack. The adage that "haste makes waste" is applicable when an enemy commander hastily sends part of his combat power off to guard a flank that his intelligence indicates will be attacked.

You weaken the enemy's actions by:

- Causing early deployment of reserves or counterattack forces. Command or control within a task force or brigade is a difficult thing to maintain in the heat of battle. Once a reserve or counterattack force has been deployed, it is difficult to get them to change course and direct their offensive into another area. Early deployment, at the very least, deprives the maneuver commander of a timely deployment when and where he really needs it.

- Causing unnecessary repositioning. If the enemy is repositioning against imaginary threats, he is not rehearsing in his chosen battle position, and he is not executing sleep plans. This will help to fatigue the enemy, as well as attriting his preparation for the coming battle.

- Diverting attacking forces from the main effort. Such diversions have the benefit of making the enemy believe he is about to be ambushed. Combat ratios in the actual fight are changed in your favor when the enemy commander sends teams off to guard against non-existent counterattacks. Thus you can defeat the enemy in detail at even or better odds.

- Causing the waste of combat multipliers such as artillery, air defense, close-air support and FASCAM fires. A common response to unexpected "attacks" is to fire conventional artillery or FASCAM to slow the assault and attrit the attacking force. This, if the "attack" was real, would allow the enemy time to ready himself for the "surprise attack." The end result is that the enemy wastes critical multipliers against empty ground.

- Causing command and control elements to question intelligence and spend needless time analyzing simple data and courses of action. As the deception plan comes together, the enemy will spend long hours trying to figure out what is going on and wondering why the "attack" reported as imminent never comes. Once the maneuver unit begins to doubt its intelligence sources, the value of the intelligence gatherers is compromised.

How

The key to the methodology of "how" to plan and execute deception operations is to depict a scenario that the enemy is willing, if not anxious, to accept as real. The success of the deception is directly proportional to the number of reliable intelligence sources that can be contaminated with the various forms of false data within the context of the deception plan. To put it simply, what is seen and heard, again and again, becomes believable. Show the enemy what he expects to see and you will make him think he is in control of the situation.

You must prepare the deception at the level of tactical planning — in the maneuver unit's operations order. Therefore, the false operation becomes an integral part of the real maneuver plan. This brings the deception plan into phase with all other combat multipliers at a maneuver commander's disposal. The illusory operation enhances the mission without hindering the commander's intent. This would not be accomplished if the deception were planned in the war room of a military intelligence battalion.

The OPFOR utilizes mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available analysis as the core of deception planning. At the NTC, differing styles of deception have been developed for offensive and defensive operations.

Offense

In offensive operations, mainly divisional and regimental attacks or meeting engagements, assets internal to the motorized rifle division and Combined Arms Army but parceled down to the controlling headquarters, are used. The main emphasis of deception in the offense is to deceive the enemy with false avenues of approach and attack time. This allows the regiment or division to retain surprise and momentum.

Many mediums are utilized to provide the desired picture:

- Sound: Tapes of motorized rifle regiment (MRR) vehicles in a combat line will provide both the straightforward audio presence of a "regiment," as well as an excellent background for battle traffic on the radio.

- Visual: Test fires, MILES-CHECKS, heat signatures, covering smoke and dust signatures will replicate a regimental-sized march to the attack. As the enemy begins to see the "attack" he will react with security

upgrades, indirect fires and repositioning.

- **Artillery:** This can be used to provide false illumination and false preparatory fires. Areas the "regiment" appears to be interested in will shortly be of interest to the enemy.

- **Radio:** Enemy intercept of a "busy" command and control net is often the pivotal intelligence source.

- **Flanking:** During meeting engagements, the enemy is concerned about flanking actions, ambushes and surprise attacks. If you can convince him to send elements off to the various flanks the real combat ratio is significantly improved.

- **Misfires:** Misplaced or poorly-timed FASCAM and improved capability missile fires can assist the real maneuver element. As the other elements of the deception are completed and misfired enemy artillery occurs, the enemy maneuver elements on the ground will believe their headquarters is shooting at the real attack.

The above techniques can be combined to provide an excellent battlefield effect. This occurred in a recent MRR night attack against an M1-M2 equipped task force in the Central Corridor of the NTC maneuver area. The OPFOR conducted the attack from east to west with a line of departure (LD) at Hill 720.

Phase One: Radio traffic concerning rehearsals in the north end of the sector and clearing defiles along the route of march cluttered the airwaves all afternoon.

Result: 4,800 rounds of enemy artillery ammunition were expended in vain attempts to destroy the "forces" in the north. The enemy was convinced that two motorized rifle battalions (MRBs) would attack in the north, with LD no later than 2100 hours. The enemy was out of artillery ammunition, pending resupply, when they tried to fire indirect at the OPFOR dismounted attack at 1900.

Phase Two: At 2030 the "regiment" passed the LD *en masse*, with smoke, sound, illumination, dust, chemlites and radio battle-traffic.

Result: More enemy artillery ammunition was wasted. The enemy task force was informed by their brigade headquarters that they should expect the main attack within 30 minutes. Sleep plans were cancelled; bringing the task force to 100 percent security.

Phase Three: At 2300 the "regiment" conducted a second attack, with sound,

smoke, illumination, chemlites, dust, heat signatures, fake battle damage and heavy radio battle-traffic.

Result: Enemy FASCAM fires were ineffectively used. The enemy task force came to 100 percent security, again. The enemy brigade told the task force that two MRBs were confirmed to attack in the north.

Phase Four: When the real regiment attacked in the south at 0100, the deception regiment attacked north.

End Result: Enemy forces were repositioned to the south too late, and an MRB(+) secured the objective. The task force was combat ineffective. The benefits of the deception were that the OPFOR retained surprise, initiative and momentum, while depriving the defenders of critical artillery assets and execution time.

Defense

In the defense at company, battalion and regimental levels, deception has a key role in the success of the mission. The primary goal of deceiving the attacking enemy is to seize the initiative from him; thereby draining the life's blood from his attack. Protection from air and artillery barrages, as well as from mounted and dismounted infiltrations, is also gained by a successful deception in the defense. Such combat multipliers if used effectively by the attacker can unseat a defender, however well prepared. The tasks involved with deception planning in the defense are to deceive the enemy as to where the defensive positions, avenues and routes for counterattacks and repositioning are and where the reserve forces are located. This can be done as low as motorized rifle company (MRC) level but must be coordinated with higher levels of command.

The following mediums can be useful in developing effective illusions in the defense:

- **Sound:** Tapes of repositioning or counterattacking forces, as well as vehicles idling in false positions provide a deceptive audio picture.

- **Visual:** False barriers, vehicle and infantry positions, artificial heat signatures and simulated battle damage will paint an extremely believable tale of a main defensive belt forward. Flashbulb trip-flares will add greatly to the reality of the ruse and are inexpensive and easy to construct.

- **Artillery:** Smoke and guiding illumination or special signal flares will

give a physical signature to a deception plan involving repositioning or counterattacking elements.

- **Radio:** Lengthy radio discussions of vehicle locations and rehearsals for counterattacks paint a picture of an overconfident defender with poor operations security (OPSEC).

Combinations of the above techniques can keep the enemy guessing for extended periods of time, as well as causing misfired artillery preparation, time wasted probing and breaching empty positions and forced night attacks.

Such operations rarely include actual deception sections below division or regimental level, utilizing assets internal to the motorized rifle company (MRC) or motorized rifle battalion (MRB). During a recent MRC defense, deception operations were effectively utilized to defend a maneuver area at NTC. An MRC(+) defended against a night attack from an M1-M2 equipped task force. The task force was M1-heavy, with 41 tanks and 20 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

Phase One: The MRB commander directed his MRC(+) to dig in at the western mouth of the valley, thereby leaving the eastern end open — except for a combat outpost (COP) consisting of three BMPs. False positions, obstacles and vehicles were emplaced three kilometers forward of the main defensive belt. The initial attack position of the MRC(+) was well forward of the defensive position. Heavy engineer activity was evident in the deception area.

Result: The enemy templated an MRC(+) forward, in the eastern end of the valley. Preplanned artillery barrages were prepared against the "known" positions. Enemy reconnaissance was sent out in the late afternoon to probe the templated defense.

Phase Two: The MRB commander emplaced 100 flashbulb trip-flares in the deception battle positions and along the perimeter of the false barriers. COP BMPs were placed in three of the fake fighting positions, while the rest were prepared with charcoal fires, iron gratings and simulated vehicle antennae. False radio OPSEC violations discussed feeding class I to the 13 vehicles east of OP-2.

Result: Enemy scouts were destroyed by the COP when the Bradleys began probing the initial barrier line. The enemy scouts' dying report was that they had been destroyed in the main defensive belt. The COP with-

drew to the rear of the deception position until after the enemy artillery barrage that evening. As the barrage ended, the COP reoccupied and provided harassing fires against the enemy main body as it moved to seize the battle position. The enemy main body set off numerous flashbulb trip-flares and fired upon the flare pits, thinking they were tank signatures. Withdrawing OPFOR reconnaissance vehicles in conjunction with the COP destroyed seven Bradleys near the first line of false positions.

Phase Three: Enemy tanks continued attacking the fake positions throughout the night, taking occasional casualties from the withdrawing COP.

End Result: At dawn the tank task force reconsolidated in the main OPFOR engagement area. The MRC(+) executed volley fires over the next two hours, destroying the confused vehicles. At change of mission the enemy task force had lost all 41 M1 tanks and 17 Bradleys. OPFOR casualties were one BMP (direct fire kill) and one T-72 (artillery assessment). Throughout the course of the battle the defenders used deception to take initiative and momentum away from an enemy whose equipment was built for speed and violent momentum.

Conclusions

For every good plan there are drawbacks, and deception operations are no exception. The available equipment

does not include protection against direct or indirect fires. Survival and vulnerability are a thorn in the side of a deception plan. If engaged, the deception team will be destroyed.

The good news, however, is that a successful deception operation has the enemy looking for at least an MRB-size element, not a lonely BRDM. During 15 deception missions conducted in recent months at NTC, deception teams had no casualties. Recently an M1 platoon drove within 15 meters of the OPFOR deception team's BRDM-II, but failed to engage it. They were out searching for a "regiment" and disregarded the single vehicle. Perhaps the following quote from Lawrence of Arabia, applies here:

"When a man is searching for the source of the Voices, he pays small heed to the sand in his eyes."

Deception planning continues to be an integral part of OPFOR mission execution at the NTC, within the framework of doctrine. The operations are kept simple, requiring little manpower and few assets. More importantly, the operations work. In the offense they allow the OPFOR to achieve surprise, while in the defense they disarm the attack and transfer initiative and momentum to the defender.

When confirmation and effective evaluation are internalized into the intelligence process, the maneuver commander need not fear deception. He

need only detect it and disregard the erroneous data.

There is no reason why deception tactics cannot be used within tactical operations at the U.S. division and brigade levels. Thus the "enemy" would be forced to refine his own intelligence processes, confirming what he gathers. An effective intelligence gathering system is susceptible to illusionary information and the annals of threat doctrine repeatedly showcase the tremendous EW and conventional reconnaissance capabilities of the threat force.

The same simple deception techniques can be, and have been, made to work against OPFOR threat forces at the NTC. After all, sand can obscure the vision of any man whose eyes are not protected — without regard to his uniform. ★

Capt. George L. Reed was commissioned in Armor in 1984 from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He has served in the 1-63 Armor Battalion in the Opposing Forces at the National Training Center as a Mortar Platoon Leader, Tank Platoon Leader, Tank Company Executive Officer, Battalion Liaison Officer and Regimental Fire Support Officer. Reed is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course and the Jungle Operation Training Center. He is currently assigned as S4, 1-63 Armor and is the officer in charge of Opposing Forces Tactical Deception Operations.





Battlefield Deception

by Lt. Col. Glenn D. Whittaker

In order to win on tomorrow's battlefield, U.S. forces will have to make maximum use of their technology to offset an adversary's numerical superiority. Studies have found that to do this effectively, command, control and communications countermeasures (C³CM) techniques will have to be employed. C³CM is the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, jamming and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to deny information to influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's C² capabilities while

protecting friendly C² against such action.¹ Of the above four tools, military deception has received the least attention since World War II.

The U.S. Army did not emphasize deception operations until the latter part of World War II, when the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops of the 12th Army Group Headquarters was employed. Deception was practiced by U.S. commanders prior to the 23rd's creation, but its relative emphasis lagged behind our allies. The importance of deception and surprise has been pointed out by several authors who have quoted Barton Whaley's study of

232 military engagements.² The significance of the study is that the probability of battlefield success increases when deception is properly employed with surprise. Another finding of this study is that the casualty ratio of friendly versus enemy will range from 1:1.7 to 1:14.5. This conservation of friendly manpower addresses the importance of deception as a tool of C³CM and as a combat multiplier.

With the renewed interest in deception spurred by the emphasis on C³CM operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has begun to include deception operations as a part of joint exercise objec-

tives. According to JCS and services' doctrine, all operations plans (OPLANS), to include those for major exercises, should include deception as an integral part of the plan.³ The use of deception in routine training exercises has been overshadowed and, consequently, limited due to the emphasis on the other tools of C³CM (physical destruction, OPSEC and jamming). It must become part of routine training since how we train is how we will fight. The fusion of deception into Army OPLANS will become more prevalent as battlefield deception elements are filled at corps and divisions.

Deception Elements in the Army

The corps deception element is organic to the operations battalion of the MI brigade which supports a corps. The element works for the corps G3 and is located in the G3 section of the corps tactical operations center or corps main command post. It coordinates with corps staff elements and higher and lower echelons to synchronize the deception planning of all levels. The deception element is composed of a plans and operations section and a headquarters element. The corps deception element emphasizes planning, but does not have the capability to perform deception methods such as electronic deception. It directs other units or elements and plans the overall corps effort.

The division deception element is organic to the MI battalion (CEWI) and works for the G3 as in a corps. It performs the same functions as the corps element and has teams which will plan for and train units in the employment of deception devices including decoys, communications deception and logistic or critical node replication. The light infantry divisions will have an active component, six-man planning section.

Deception Support Packages

To support Army deception in the field, support packages are planned for fielding. They include a Critical Node Decoy Package (CNDP) which will be composed of a series of two- and three-dimensional decoys providing visual, thermal and radar signature reproduction of equipment found in corps and division elements. These will include decoys to replicate corps, division and brigade tactical operations centers; landing zones; assembly areas and other troop or equipment sites.

Another package is the Logistics Base Decoy Package (LBDP) which includes a series of two- and three-dimensional decoys which provide for visual, thermal and radar signatures replication of equipment and vehicles found in corps and divisional logistics elements. Examples include trains area; ammunition supply points; petroleum, oils and lubricants or transportation units; mess facilities and supply points.

"Whisper White," the Tactical Communications Simulation Device Package, is a system of automated radio frequency emitters which simulate a cross-section of division and brigade communications in the HF, VHF and UHF spectrum. These emitters are controlled by software which has the capability to direct transmissions according to a user-designed scenario.

The Multispectral Close Combat Decoys (MCCD) package is composed of a series of two-dimensional decoys which have visual, thermal and radar signature replication of combat vehicles. In a survivability role, the MCCD will be designed for transport by the replicated vehicle and be set up by vehicle crews within five to 10 minutes. An example is the M-1 decoy which fits in a duffel bag and can take as many as 15 direct hits before falling over. The M-1 decoy also has a thermal image which can look better than the real thing.

All of the Army initiatives should provide a basis for deception planning and operations which must be done if we are to fight smarter in future conflicts. In cost comparisons with systems which kill, these new deception packages may seem expensive. But, properly employed deception justifies its expense through its overwhelming combat multiplier effect, especially when combined with the "high kill" capability of modern ground and air assets.

Deception Doctrine

As with all things, deception techniques and methods change with time. As seen from the packages being developed, emphasis is now being placed on deceiving modern intelligence assets which employ infrared photography, communications and electronic collection. To keep pace, the Army has published a new Field Manual 90-2 *Battlefield Deception*.⁴ A new classified Field Manual 90-2A, *Electronic Deception* is being written to adequately address electronic methods. Training of the corps and division deception element

personnel is being conducted at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., through a six-week course.

Deception Emphasis

At first glance, the above efforts by the Army would appear to be a giant step forward in getting deception into routine planning and exercise operations. However, commanders must fully support this effort in order for it to become effective and second nature to corps and division staffs in OPLAN (both contingency and exercise) construction and implementation. The benefit in training exercises might appear to be minimal but, based on Whaley's study, the payoff in war cannot be disputed.

As intelligence and destruction assets of the battlefield are improved, our deception efforts must be "fine-tuned" before battle if they are to be effective. Trained personnel at the corps and division levels will provide the backbone of deception planning and coordination efforts, but training should go on at all levels using the guidance and instruction from the corps and division deception elements.

As in Aesop's fable of the fox and the boar; the fox, finding the boar sharpening his tusks upon a tree, asked why he was doing so when there was no danger. The boar replied, "When danger comes, it will behoove me not to sharpen my tusks, but use them." ★

Footnotes

1. DOD Directive 4600.4 *Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures*.
2. Barton Whaley, *Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War*, reproduced by Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, 1976.
3. JCS Memorandum of Policy 116, *Military Deception*.
4. Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*.

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The Monkey's Paw

by Maj. James R. Koch

The United States, for all of its power and technological might, has only recently come to fully recognize the importance of a potentially great combat multiplier. This area is deception, both at the tactical and operational levels. The lessons that we learned under the tutelage of the British during World War II are only now being reexamined and treated with the respect that they deserve.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have not forgotten. Their military science is based, in large part, on their experiences in the "Great Patriotic War." The importance of deception, or to use their more encompassing term *maskirovka*, has not been forgotten. Their military science is aimed at the operational level of war, with victory at that level. Losses at the tactical level, while painful, are acceptable if they contribute to the overall operational-level victory.

It is this dichotomy between their system of *maskirovka* and our deception doctrine that will be examined. We can still learn from the Soviet experience, and our doctrine can profit from it. Our efforts in revitalizing deception, while laudable, are aimed at the tactical level. Until we give proper credit to the operational level, we shall remain at a distinct disadvantage in the area.

Maskirovka¹

Deception is one of the eight methods listed by Soviet Maj. Gen. S. P. Solov'ev for achieving operational surprise. It is considered so important that it is a critical segment of all plans, from the strategic to the tactical level. Soviet history is filled with examples of its use in warfare and its contribution to victory. *Maskirovka* is more than just deception; it is an all-encompassing discipline utilizing passive techniques, such as concealment and camouflage, as well as such active techniques as simulation, disinformation and maneuver.

Maskirovka is highly touted in Soviet literature, and its use is up to the imagination of the commander. At the lower levels, due to lack of time and resources, *maskirovka* may consist only of camouflage, concealment and the use of decoys. At the strategic level, diplomatic assurances that nothing is

going to happen would probably precede hostilities. Some manufactured event, such as an uprising in one of the Warsaw Pact countries, could be used to screen the mobilization of forces. In a limited objective war, this could catch the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe off guard just enough so that the ability to respond might be compromised.

C.J. Dick lists eight basic tasks of *maskirovka* at the operational level. They are:

- Masking an increase in or redeployment of forces or weapons which the enemy has spotted.
- Blocking the enemy's perception or identification of new weapons.
- Distracting the enemy's attention from other activities.
- Overloading the enemy's intelligence analysis capability.
- Focusing the enemy's attention in an area where there is no threat by portraying a false threat there.
- Presenting strength as a weakness, thereby creating a secure feeling.
- Conditioning the enemy with patterns to hide preparations.
- Confusing the enemy's expectations, leading him to misunderstand Soviet actions, thereby selecting an improper response.

Given this list, we could expect to see any number of these tasks worked into a Soviet operational plan. While we may see all of it, we will not know that it is a deception effort until the fighting begins. Even then, we might not recognize it! The reason for this is the Soviets' never ending quest for inventiveness in their deception efforts. Basically, their goal is to never let us see the same thing twice, especially at the operational level. This lesson was learned by the United States during World War II and is still valid today.

Dick enumerates other principles, some of which closely parallel our own:

- Have a clearly defined objective to support the operational scheme.
- Exercise strict control at the highest possible level.
- Preparation, execution and supervision must be thorough.
- The plan must be a credible, plausible alternative to the real one.
- The enemy must be made to work for its intelligence; it can't be given too easily.

- Feed as many intelligence collection sources as possible.

- Remain flexible to react to enemy actions.

- Security is vital to the success of the plan.

Given these tasks and principles, a basic understanding of the Soviet system and an appreciation for the historic roots of *maskirovka*, we can see that they have clearly thought out their deception doctrine and are prepared to implement it. They have created units whose sole purpose is deception execution. Yet, the one thing which may cause them problems is their almost fanatical emphasis on security, resulting in a close-hold plan. While I advocate having only a limited number of people aware of a plan, those people must be carefully selected. Innocent innovations, though tactically sound, on the part of a subordinate commander, could ruin the plan. The Soviets' overcentralized, top-down approach to deception could be their Achilles' heel.

U.S. Deception Doctrine²

U.S. Army doctrine has deception cells at division and corps level, as well as those planned for the operational level. This decentralized approach could profit by having its center of power raised to a higher level. The basis for our current doctrine is found in 10 maxims elaborated upon in Field Manual 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*. I consider four of these maxims (Magruder's principles, a choice among types of deception, the importance of feedback and "The Monkey's Paw") critical when comparing our system to that of the Soviets.

Magruder's principles espouse the theory that it is easier to make the enemy maintain a pre-existing belief than to present notional evidence to him to make him change that belief. When looking at the Soviet system and their reliance on "norms" to calculate battle plans, you will find that a knowledge of those norms will tell the deception planner what the Soviet reaction will be, given his view of the battlefield. A plan to modify or exaggerate that view could result in more predictable outcomes of our deception effort. Therefore, it is extremely important that we get to know the Soviet opera-

tional system as well as his forces.

Along with Magruder's principles is the maxim of a choice among deceptions. Whenever possible, our deception plan should be geared toward reducing uncertainty in the mind of the target. The plan should reduce the level of uncertainty and force acceptance of the false picture. The Soviet response should therefore be more predictable, though initiative at his operational level may counter some of these efforts.

Next, the importance of feedback is critical to determine if the bait has been taken. This maxim has its roots in World War II when we used ULTRA intercepts to read the German High Command's mind. We can never again expect to have a system this good (although it can be argued that ULTRA caused us to be tactically surprised at the Battle of the Bulge when German plans didn't show up on Ultra intercepts). We must use our intelligence system to verify enemy intentions, and the commander and the deception planners must review these intentions in light of our known deceptive actions. The key here is to rely on every source of feedback available, no matter how trivial it may seem at the time.

The last maxim to be discussed is "The Monkey's Paw." This states that deception may produce subtle and unwanted side effects. The more deception plans are included in operational schemes, the more likely "The Monkey's Paw" will become a factor. We should therefore have a more centralized deception planning framework.

Finally, there is one maxim that I believe should be on the list but is not — plausibility. The deception story must be plausible and within your capability to carry out. Otherwise, the enemy will most likely ignore the intelligence feeding him the story as an aberration within the system. The only case that could be made for ignoring plausibility is when you intentionally structure your effort to make it unbelievable, causing the enemy to focus his attention elsewhere at your real deception effort. This is a classic case of having a plan within a plan.

Using these maxims, with particular attention focused on the ones highlighted, we can begin to fill in the five components of a deception operation: objective(s), target, story, plan and events. While these are discussed in some detail in Field Manual 90-2, one point needs clarification. Many believe that

the target of the plan is the enemy intelligence analyst who will receive and process the information. The argument is made that if the analyst doesn't believe the story, it won't reach the commander. This has some validity, but since most analysts "comment" on their reports, there is a chance that poorly conceived deception information will still reach the decision maker. In either case, the target is the decision maker. The analyst is an important middle man in the process and has the power to influence what the decision maker sees and thinks, but he does not have the power to make the decision. Therefore, when considering what you want the target to do, remember to consider what you want the analyst to think.

Historic Examples

The most recent historical evidence showing the command and control relationships used in deception at both strategic and command levels comes from experiences during World War II. At the strategic level are the examples of Soviet operations on the Manchurian Front and the Anglo-American operation known as BODYGUARD.

The movement of Soviet forces from the Western Front to the Eastern Front involved traveling between 9,000 and 12,000 kilometers and utilizing some 136,000 railway cars. STAVKA, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, recognized that a movement of this size could not go unnoticed. The scale, timing and location of the redeployment had to be masked. Many separate, distinct efforts were undertaken, all directed by STAVKA. High ranking commanders transferred disguised as subordinates; the Trans-Siberian Railroad was camouflaged to conceal movement; movements were made at night; and assembly areas were located far from attack positions. The effect of these operations was to make the Japanese believe that the Soviets could not open an offensive earlier than late 1945 and probably not until early 1946. By July 25, 1945, all forces had been transferred. After the end of the war with Germany in April, over 1,000,000 men and their equipment were moved without drawing attention to the mission.³ This effort is probably the greatest strategic military deception in the history of warfare, and it led to virtually complete operational surprise. Note that the vast majority of

the planning and implementation was conducted at STAVKA level, with only a handful of planners aware of the magnitude of the actual preparations.

On the Anglo-American side are the experiences of the London Controlling Section (LCS), which developed deception plans in conjunction with the European invasion planning conducted by the Supreme Allied Command. The LCS kept the Germans guessing as to the actual location of the attack by creating a myth that the attack could come at anytime, anywhere, from the Balkans to Norway. Recognizing that this would not keep the Germans guessing for long, it was decided that when it was obvious that the main attack would come cross-channel, the attack would be covered with a double-bluff deception. The deception would indicate that the main attack at Normandy was a feint and depict a notional unit poised in Southeastern England ready to strike across the Pas de Calais. The extent of the planning for this deception was handled almost exclusively by the LCS. However, since they did not control the assets needed to make it appear real, LCS tasked various units to fulfill pieces of what was obviously a deception effort. Some high-level commanders were not particularly cooperative in this effort and could have caused its failure. However, due to the general weakness of the German intelligence capability and the Allied use of double agents and ULTRA, the effort was successful.⁴

The Soviets maintained their characteristic tight control on the deception effort, masking it even among their own forces. The English and Americans were more open in their efforts with the staffs, involving many subordinate commanders.

At the operational level are the U.S. effort at crossing the Rhine (Operation VIERSEN) and the Soviet effort to cross the Dnepr River north of Kiev in October/November 1943.

In March 1945, First Army had just completed crossing the Rhine at Remagen, and Ninth Army was set to force a second major crossing. The deception objective was to deceive the enemy as to the location and timing of the second crossing. The XVI Corps, chosen to make the crossing, was the weakest of the three Corps in the Ninth but was situated on the best crossing sites. To make up for the deficiency in strength, a division was chopped to the XVI from

each of the other two Corps. *VIERSEN* was to simulate a notional river crossing staging area in another Corps section, while the actual force was assembling in XVI sector. The portrayal involved 23rd Special Troops, a dedicated deception unit and a number of subordinate units. Demonstrations were conducted in the notional unit's zone, while operations security covered the assembly of the crossing force. The fact that this unit portrayed the false as real and the real as false contributed significantly to the success of *VIERSEN*.⁵ Note that this deception was planned at Army level and executed at Corps level and below.

In a similar situation the Soviets, in October 1943, had forced numerous crossings of the Dnepr River around Kiev and had decided that the main thrust was to occur at the Bukrin bridgehead. The Germans repulsed every effort made in that region, but success was being enjoyed further to the north. In view of that fact, *front* requested from STAVKA permission to shift the main effort to that success and that they be given an additional tank army to ensure the success. STAVKA permitted the shift of effort but denied the additional troops. Instead, they insisted on secretly transferring the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the effort. The *maskirovka* plan involved the regrouping of numerous units within a six-day period, to make the attack a success. In the Bukrin area it was business as usual, with aggressive patrolling, strengthening of defenses and normal patterns of behavior. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was disengaged from combat, moved north over 200 kilometers, conducted three river crossings and got into position to conduct the attack within the allotted time. *Maskirovka* efforts, including the use of simulations, were complete in Bukrin. The secrecy of the move of the 3rd Guards Tank Army was also carefully monitored. All of this led to complete success of the plan.⁶

The major difference between this move and *VIERSEN* is that the latter was planned at Army level and conducted at Corps and below, while the Kiev operation was planned at STAVKA and executed at that level, with very few people aware of the plan.

Conclusions

It has been argued that the old Field Manual 90-2 gave the impression that deception was something for the stra-

tegic or operational level, that few examples were included for the tactical level.⁷ The new version corrects that perception with relevant tactical discussions but fails to clearly show the link between the strategic, operational and tactical deception plans. "The Monkey's Paw" will be a reality if this link is not effectively realized.

In only one place is the approval of lower deception plans by higher headquarters discussed. This review and approval is necessary to avoid "The Monkey's Paw." Further, too little attention is given to planning at the operational level. Only now are we beginning to recognize the need for a deception cell at echelons above corps, the level at which we talk about operational war fighting. If we don't win the operational level of war, our tactical successes will be for nothing.

The deception cells at division must concentrate on tactical deception, ensuring that every effort that they take is properly coordinated with corps. Corps-level cells should also concentrate on the tactical level, though it is conceivable that, in some instances, they could be used at the operational level. In those cases where they may have both a tactical and an operational mission, the 12-man section may be too small to properly accomplish the task.

At the operational level, the 10-man staff is probably adequate for wartime planning, but in peacetime it is too large. It will end up being used by the G3 for other tasks not associated with deception, thereby detracting from its usefulness as a planning tool. Recognizing that each theater's requirements will differ, it would be more effective to use a three or four-man peacetime cell used solely for operation planning and contingency planning. This cell could be expanded in wartime to the size required by drawing on corps assets. These assets would, in turn, draw on subordinate divisions for augmentation. This expansion could be accomplished by pulling the planners up to the next higher level, while leaving those charged with the execution of the deception mission in place. With centralized planning there will be less of a need for the planning function at the tactical level and more at the higher, operational level. Planning could still be carried out by the deception executors at division and corps levels, when necessary, thus allowing us to centralize with experienced personnel during wartime opera-

tions while not depriving the corps and division commanders of all their expertise.

In peacetime, we should practice deception at lower levels in our command post exercises and field training exercises in order to gain experience. In times of crisis, however, that expertise should be drawn to higher levels for wartime tasks. We are too decentralized in our current level of effort. Decentralization may lead to too much innovation and initiative which, in the end, could be counterproductive. While the close-hold, commander only or STAVKA system of the Soviets is too centralized for our use, it has worked. It has probably worked more efficiently than anything we've accomplished at the operational level. We should learn from this and take deception as a tool used by the few for the benefit of the many. Given this and an understanding on the part of the commander that deception planning is a time consuming effort requiring detailed planning and utilizing precious assets, we may be able to use this combat multiplier to win the operational-level battles of the next war. ★

Footnotes

1. C. J. Dick, "Catching NATO Unawares: Soviet Army Surprise and Deception Techniques," *International Defense Review*, No. 1, 1986, pp. 24-26.
 2. Field Manual 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*, (Final Draft), pp. 1-5, 1-32.
 3. David M. Glantz, "August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria," *Leavenworth Papers*, No. 7, 1983, pp. 1-4.
 4. Charles G. Cruickshank, *Deception in World War II* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 87-93.
 5. Thomas A. Savoie, "Tactical Deception: A Lost Art?", *SAMS Monograph*, 1985, pp. 15-17.
 6. David M. Glantz, "38th Guards Tank Army's Deception as Part of the Kiev Operations, Nov. 1943, *Soviet Deception in Transition, 2d Period of the Great Patriotic War, November 1942 to December 1943* (unpublished), pp. 197-210.
 7. Savoie, p. 22.
- Maj. James R. Koch received a bachelor's degree from St. Lawrence Univ. and a master's degree from the Univ. of Oklahoma. He is a distinguished graduate of the Field Artillery Officers Advance Course. He is also a graduate of the Tactical All Source Intelligence Officer Course and the Command and General Staff College. Koch currently is serving as AFSCORD and FA Intelligence Officer, 3rd Armored Division Artillery in Hanau, Germany.



by William T. Garmon

The Soviet Army is, by many accounts, the largest and best equipped in the world. Since the end of World War II, Soviet ground forces have not seen much significant action, although ground forces did help settle unrest in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, most recently, Afghanistan. Much has been written on Soviet military equipment and doctrine, but little has been said about the individual soldier, how he lives or thinks. The Soviet soldier is something of an enigma to the United States, NATO and other Western nations.

To understand the Soviet soldier we must understand the foundation of his military indoctrination. This indoctrination begins in an organization called the All Union Lenin Pioneer Organization, better known as the Young Pioneers. Boys and girls between the ages of eight and 15 are expected to join. While membership is not mandatory, most young people realize that membership may be an asset to future careers and possibly higher schooling.

The Soviets like to compare the Young Pioneers to Western scouting organizations, but that is misleading. Their handbook *Tovarich* (Comrades) resembles the *Boy Scout Handbook*, except for one large section which contains information on the Soviet Armed Forces. This section contains colored drawings of equipment, defines the roles of the five military services and explains both officer and enlisted rank. It also emphasizes the need for the Young Pioneer to prepare himself, while in school, for service in the military.¹

Every summer the Young Pioneers conduct military sport games called *Zarnista* (Summer Lightning). During these games the participants are organized into battalions and are exposed to military regulations and discipline. These games are played on a massive scale, with as many as 16 million children participating.²

There are two additional organizations that prepare the young Soviet for military service. They are the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and Navy, most commonly called *DOSAAB* and The Young Communist League, better known as *KOMSOMOL*. *DOSAAB* is the vehicle for primary military training. *DOSAAB*'s function is described as "a popular defense-patriotic organization, whose purpose is active cooperation for strengthening the military capability of

their socialist homeland."³

In reality *DOSAAB* serves two purposes. First, it provides recreational activities for many citizens, activities that would otherwise not be available (boating, sky diving, driver training). Its second and most important function, is to provide pre-military training to youths. When children reach the age of 14, they are expected to join. The future soldier is then given the equivalent of basic training, which involves approximately 140 hours of instruction in military organization, courtesy, regulations and firearms. The girls are trained in civil defense and first aid.⁴

Besides this mandatory training, *DOSAAB* provides specific technical training in radio and vehicle repair and flight instruction to selected individuals. In his book *MIG Pilot*, John Barron described how Lt. Viktor Belenko, who flew his MiG-25 from the Soviet Union to Japan, received his primary flight instruction through a *DOSAAB* program.

Whereas *DOSAAB* provides pre-military training, *KOMSOMOL* provides ideological background and training. Membership in *KOMSOMOL* starts at age 14 and continues through age 28. The age span is significant because it covers the high school years, college years, military service and six to eight years of membership after military service.

Membership in *KOMSOMOL* is more restrictive than the Young Pioneers and *DOSAAB*. This is due to both governmental policy and personal choice, although personal choice seems to be the primary restriction. The organization puts heavy demands on the time and energy of its members. The young person is expected to be active socially, give their spare time to selected voluntary projects and, most importantly, be enthusiastic about Marxist-Leninist theories and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The government denies membership to those individuals who are politically suspect or have criminal records, strong religious beliefs or an unsuitable ethnic background.

Membership in *KOMSOMOL* is almost mandatory to those who seek a higher education, either civilian or military. It is also the path for working within the government and becoming a full member of the CPSU, the key to a successful life in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military relies almost entirely on conscription to fill its ranks.

The 1967 General Law of Universal Military Service requires military service of all 18-year-old males. Deferments are based on education, medical unsuitability or family hardships. If a deferment is granted, it is reevaluated every six months, and the individual is liable for conscription until age 28. All males, whether deferred or not, serve in the reserve until age 50. The conscription system works very well, and probably no more than 12 percent of the military-age men escape some form of active military service.⁵

The young conscripts report to the local military commissariat for entrance into active duty. The commissariat is the organization responsible for registration, processing and assigning conscripts to various branches of the armed forces and transporting them to their units. The average conscript has no voice in what service he enters or where he is to be assigned, although a relative or friend with political pull can help.

The commissariat ostensibly makes these assignments based on the conscript's intellectual and ideological level, special skills and training received through *DOSAAB*. The most ideologically committed will go to the KGB or Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), security of the nation being the paramount consideration. Tank units have traditionally received individuals of less than average height. In reality the commissariat has a quota to fill, and at times its only objective is to push bodies through the system, skills and training notwithstanding.

The young soldiers are shipped out the same day they report to the commissariat. This is always done by train and under close supervision (armed guards). Their first four weeks will be a period of orientation, which includes courses in military drill and possibly a refresher in small arms training. At the completion of this orientation period they take the "Oath of the Soldier," thus signifying their final induction into the military. Their basic term of service is two years; 18 months for college graduates.

The conscript can expect to serve in one of two basic capacities, as a rank and file soldier or as a junior leader/specialist. The rank and file soldier will be assigned directly to his unit. He will hold the rank of private (*ryadovoy*) or private first class (*yefreytor*). The junior leader/specialist will first be assigned

to a training unit or junior specialist school. These programs produce NCOs, tank gunners, radar operators and other specialists. After completion of his training, he will be assigned to a unit and serve out the remainder of his service obligation. He will hold the ranks of private through junior sergeant (*mladshiy serzhant*).

Life for the Soviet soldier can best be described as harsh. He will be overdisciplined, underpaid and underfed. There seem to be two reasons for this harsh life. First, it provides a mechanism of control over the soldier. Second, the Soviet high command believes in the adage, "difficult in peace, easy in war."⁸

A Soviet soldier is entitled to 10 days leave during his two years of service. He will normally not be granted a leave during that time but will be given a 10-day early release from service. This time is used to outprocess and as travel time home. In his book, *The New Red Legions*, Richard Gabriel told of one soldier who was allowed off garrison only twice in two years; once for a tooth extraction, and once again on a supervised trip to a local war memorial.⁷

The conscript gets paid three to five rubles a month, equivalent to 10 U.S. dollars, which is not enough to meet his basic needs.⁸ To help supplement their pay, soldiers often write home for extra money, which places a financial burden on their families. The government bureaucracy is aware of this problem and tries, through the media, to convince parents not to send money to soldiers. It is believed that such supplements develop bad habits. Another method used to supplement income is to barter with the local civilians for needed items. Bartering usually involves trading stolen items, such as auto parts or uniform items for food, cigarettes, liquor or cash.

The most common complaint among Soviet soldiers concerns the poor quality of food. Their diet is bland and unvarying. The staple is *kasha*, a form of porridge, and bread. This is occasionally supplemented with fish or meat, cabbage soup or vegetables. The same meal served for lunch will often be served again for supper. Food strikes are a common occurrence, and in his book, *The Threat*, Andrew Cockburn tells of a battalion having 15 food strikes in 18 months.⁹

Soldiers in all armies complain about the food, but it seems the Soviet soldier has a valid complaint. Running sores,

dental problems, eye infections and night blindness are common maladies, all of which are indicative of vitamin deficiencies and a poor diet. A young man should gain approximately 12 pounds between the ages of 18 and 20. Soviet soldiers gain, on the average, only six pounds during this period.¹⁰

More than 100 distinct nationalities, speaking nearly as many distinct languages, live within the borders of the Soviet Union. The government is always concerned about the ethnic composition of army units. A concerted effort is made to control the numbers of minority soldiers in certain units or to place them in other units.

Non-Slavic nationalities make up approximately 20 percent of most combat units within the Soviet Army. Tank forces normally have a higher percentage of Central Asians as their small size makes them suitable for tank crews.¹¹

Combat units stationed outside the Soviet Union are composed of almost entirely Slavic troops; the political unreliability of minorities seems to be the prime factor. Minorities in combat units often serve in noncombatant positions and receive little combat training.

Many minorities are not conscripted into the regular army but are sent to serve in other noncombat units. There are two organizations which have a large proportion of minorities. They are the Internal Security Forces (MVD) and construction battalions (*stroibat*).

The primary function of the MVD is to ensure internal security and political order within the Soviet Union. This involves suppressing riots, civil disturbances or other serious breakdowns of law and order. Another of their major functions is to guard the networks of Soviet prisons and labor camps. Central Asians make up approximately 50 percent of the MVD. Slavs represent 25 to 33 percent and the remainder are other minority groups. Even though considered a noncombat unit, MVD troops are well trained and equipped.

There was rioting in 1962 in the town of Novocherkassk caused by an increase in the price of meat and butter. The rioting was controlled by the local MVD unit, manned almost exclusively by Central Asians. The method of control was simple: shoot into the crowds until they disperse. As one emigre stated, "A Russian soldier probably would not shoot at Russian women, but a *Kazakh* would. . . ."¹²

Racism is a daily occurrence for

Soviet minority soldiers. Many Soviet Muslims are dark skinned, compared with Slavic Russians. Because of this, they are often called *chernozhop* (black ass) by Slavic soldiers. Soviet Asians are *churkas* which literally means wood chip, but implies stupidity or worthlessness.

This Slavic attitude of racial superiority leads to real discriminatory practices. A Rand report titled, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*, gave this example: "...when it is necessary to do some unpleasant work, say clean a toilet, a *Kazakh* would be sent and the Russians would make him do it. . . . *Chuchmek*s (Asians) are something like a lower race to Russians and Ukrainians. They are not strong physically; they are very stupid. They couldn't handle equipment. . . ."¹³ The fact that racism exists within the army is accepted as a routine matter, not a problem.

Troops have less than three hours per day for meals and free time. This schedule for the conscript will continue six days a week for two years. Most Soviet soldiers are taught only one skill. Cross training or additional training is almost nonexistent. The Soviet soldier does not receive training in skills that the U.S. Army considers basic. A majority of the Soviet soldier's training time simply emphasizes following orders.

A full 30 percent of a soldier's training time is spent in ideological training.¹⁴ The political training officer, also known as the *Zampolit* and the local *KOMSOMOL* are responsible for this training. Their main function is to make the soldier a class-conscious, ideologically staunch, selfless patriot. Whether this training makes better soldiers is questionable, but the Army remains convinced that it is a necessity.

The harsh life in the army is no secret and soldiers tolerate it for their two-year period, but normally no longer. In 1982, the Soviet Army had only a one percent reenlistment rate.¹⁵

During World War II, the Red Army produced soldiers who ultimately marched into Berlin. Recently the Soviet Army left Afghanistan without a decisive victory. Rumors of soldiers with drug and alcohol problems continued throughout the Afghanistan campaign. During World War II the people were fighting for their homeland and for their very existence. This was not the case in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Army is a formidable

threat even though the individual soldier may not be trained or motivated by U.S. standards. Soviet military leadership seeks overwhelming military strength for accomplishing its mission. The Soviet soldier is expected to fight if threatened and the "difficult in peace, easy in war" theory may prove true. ★

Footnotes

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2. Ibid, p. 7.
3. E.S. Williams, **The Soviet Military** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 35.
4. Richard A. Gabriel, **The Antagonists** (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 49.
5. Ibid, p. 50.
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7. Richard A. Gabriel, **The New Red Legions: An Atitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier** (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 56.
8. Ibid, p. 54.
9. Andrew Cockburn, **The Threat, Inside the Soviet Military Machine** (New York: Random House Inc., 1983), pp. 42-43.
10. Ibid, p. 43.
11. S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Aleiev, **The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces** (Rand Corp., 1982), p. 16.
12. Cockburn, p. 57.
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14. Williams, p. 78.
15. Les Aspin, **The New York Times**, June 8, 1982, p. A27.

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America's Objectives in the Middle East

by Maj. Robert B. Adolph, Jr. and
Maj. Frank Moore III

The following article presents a general overview of a very complex situation. Readers are encouraged to consult more extensive readings, that due to space constraints this bulletin cannot accommodate, to gain a better understanding of the subject matter presented here.

Modern Israel had its genesis in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British made the following proclamation: "His Majesty's government favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people . . . it being clearly understood that nothing will be done to prejudice the rights of

the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

The migration of European and Czarist Russian Jews into Palestine began in earnest during World War I and stepped up after the Paris Peace Conference. The first Jewish-Arab clash occurred in 1926. Three years later, there was a major clash which erupted into the Arab Revolt in the early '30s. Israeli success in the independence struggle of 1947-49 caused over a million Palestinians to flee their homes for neighboring Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon. The neighboring Arab states, smarting over military defeats at the hands of the Israelis and fearful for their territory, continued a posture of hostility to the newcomers.

The American public, however, generally looked upon Israel with sympathy. Americans felt a deep sense of compassion for the immigrants stemming from Nazi Germany's murder of six million Jews during World War II. Following the war, the immigrants were, for the most part, Europeans with cultural, philosophical and racial ties to the West. Both Britain and France were early supporters of the fledgling Jewish state. Israel was perceived as the only democracy in the region. The Jewish community in the United States undertook major public relations, political lobbying, fund raising and philanthropy efforts on behalf of the Israelis. The net effect of these efforts was that Israel found friends among Americans

of all ethnic and religious groups.

Thus, the continued survival of Israel became a major cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. America was the first to recognize the new state on its birth in 1948, and since then it has usually supported the Israelis diplomatically in the international arena. Although there was some friction as a result of Israel's 1956 invasion of the Sinai, Washington has been a dependable source of funds for the Jewish state, having provided some \$27 billion in military aid and \$10 billion in economic assistance — or roughly \$12 thousand for every Israeli citizen — during the period from 1948 to 1983.¹ It is understandable that the Arab states came to view U.S. policy in the region as skewed in favor of Israel, though most American arms support came after the "67" war.

East-West tensions grew steadily after 1947. The Berlin Blockade (1948), the fall of the Kuomintang regime in China (1949), the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the start of the Korean War lent a new sense of urgency to the need to contain Soviet influence. Quite naturally, American moves in the Middle East during the early 1950s reflected this view. Under the rubric of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the defensive perimeter begun by President Truman was to be extended from Turkey into Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. Engineered by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Baghdad Pact was designed to cement this wall by joining Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Britain and the United States into a formal military alliance. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon all refused to participate, however, and Egypt's stridently nationalist president, Gamal Nassar, went so far as to call the Pact "an imperialist front." As related by George Lenczowski: "The Arab view of these doctrines — Truman and Eisenhower — was a negative one. Their argument was that the United States was attempting to defend them from the imaginary danger of Soviet aggression, whereas the real danger stemmed from the presence of Israel."²

Here is the nub of the contradiction in America's policy in the Middle East. America, as a global power, put great emphasis on the need to restrain the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union and to this end sought allies in the Middle East, as elsewhere. But Washington's continued support of Israel alienated the very Arab states which

America sought as allies. This, in turn, created an opportunity for the Soviets to expand their influence in the region, which was the very thing that America was seeking to forestall in the first place. To the north and east of the Arab world, "Plugging the 'gap' between Turkey and Pakistan did not result in containing the Soviets as anticipated, for within months after the Pact came into force, the Soviet Union expanded its influence for the first time deep into the Arab world through the sale of arms and the extension of economic aid, first to Egypt, then to Syria and, after 1958, to Iraq as well."³

Past Political Trends

When the global political trends of the late 1940s through the early 1960s are analyzed, two distinct, striking phenomena meet the eye; superpower competition in the North and decolonization in the South.

The Soviet Union sought to consolidate its hold over Eastern Europe through the formation of the Warsaw Pact and the Committee for Economic Cooperation (COMECON). Anti-Soviet uprisings in East Germany, Poland and Hungary were brutally crushed. Moscow attempted to enmesh China into a communist continental system through economic and military aid, but Beijing later proved to have a mind of its own. America, for its part, sought to contain Soviet influence through the formation of political and military alliances in Europe, the Middle East and Asia (NATO, the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, SEATO, etc.), but with mixed success.

Decolonization in the South occurred in two distinct phases. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the former colonial powers — France, Britain, Holland, Portugal and Belgium — fought wars in their prewar colonies in an attempt to retain direct political control. Successful nationalist struggles in Vietnam, Algeria, Indonesia and elsewhere forced the colonial powers to grant the colonies independence, often over the objections of influential circles at home.

But many nationalist leaders in the Third World — Ben Bella in Algeria, Nkrumah in Ghana, Sukarno in Indonesia and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, among others — perceived the mere granting of sovereignty as unacceptable. Even after independence, strong economic and diplomatic ties continued to bind the newly independent states to their former masters. The nationalists believed

that true independence would come only when the states of the Third World charted their own economic courses and were free to pursue truly independent foreign policies. Domestically, this entailed the expropriation of foreign business holdings and virulent anticolonial political rhetoric. Internationally, this spelled the formation of Afro-Asian and regional diplomatic blocs.

As a logical corollary, leaders in the Third World who were perceived as insufficiently nationalist, or not sufficiently anticolonialist, found themselves with rapidly evaporating political support both domestically and internationally. Revolutions and military coups were the frequent, predictable result. In Egypt, King Farouk was overthrown by the charismatic and militant Col. Nasser. A similarly fatal tie with the former colonial powers caused the fall of Regent Abdul Ilah of Iraq at the hands of Col. Kassem, who was supported by Nasser. Militant Pan-Arab nationalism set the stage for the rise of Arab socialist Baathist regimes in both Iraq and Syria (1963).

Keeping in mind this hypersensitivity to real or imagined encroachments on national sovereignty, it is easy to understand how national leaders in the Third World in general, and in the Arab world in particular, would be loathe to enter any security arrangements with foreign powers that might carry the aroma of neocolonialism. To do so would paint a leader as a puppet of the colonial powers and would be political suicide. Thus, the Baghdad Pact, and any proposed alliance system resembling it, was almost doomed from its inception.

In Search of Balance

The inauguration of John F. Kennedy in January of 1961 signaled the beginning of a more imaginative and realistic approach to American foreign policy. Although the fundamental objective remained the same — the containment of communism and Soviet influence — Kennedy put increased emphasis on the need to address Third World concerns, most notably in the area of socioeconomic development. This emphasis was evident in the formation of the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, his administration also sought to build bridges to Third World leaders through the provision of military aid. In 1962 he authorized Egypt \$220 million in military sup-

plies. Between 1962 and 1967 the United States transferred \$71 million in military hardware to Jordan. Syria, however, rebuffed similar American overtures. Events were soon to occur which ensured even greater U.S. support to Israel.

American policy took a sharp swing in Israel's favor as a result of the 1967 June war. Israel's swift victory in the Sinai, the West Bank and in the Golan Heights won the Jewish state widespread popular admiration in America. Washington replaced Britain and France as Israel's chief source of arms imports. In 1968 President Johnson approved the sale to Israel of 50 F-4 Phantom jet fighters valued at \$220 million.⁴

Jordan's King Hussein, a moderate Arab leader with ties to the West, requested that his country also be provided with F-4 fighters. His participation in the struggle against Israel notwithstanding, he was generally considered to be pro-American. But the most that President Nixon was prepared to do for him was to offer the obsolete F-104 fighter. Whereas Israel received over \$1 billion in aid during the period from 1967 to 1973, Jordan received only \$150 million.⁵ Jordan was still perceived in Washington as a potential threat to Israel.

1972-73 was a momentous period in Middle Eastern political and military affairs. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat downgraded his diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and sent his Russian military advisors home. He conducted menacing military demonstrations near the Suez Canal to keep the Israelis on edge, then he launched his surprisingly successful military operation on October 6.

While Syrian armored and mechanized brigades overran Israeli positions on the Golan Heights, Egyptian troops stormed the vaunted Barlev line overlooking the canal and drove inland. The world was treated to the heretofore unthinkable sight of Israeli prisoners in Arab captivity. Furious Israeli counterattacks in the Sinai were smashed by dug-in and resolute Egyptian infantry. Israeli aircraft losses were heavy due to the use of Soviet air defense weaponry. Although the Israelis were ultimately successful in retaking the Golan and in forcing their way across the canal, cutting off whole divisions of Egyptians in the process, the myth of Israeli invincibility was broken. Hereafter, the Arabs — and most notably

the Egyptians — were recognized as a force to be reckoned with in American foreign policy.

A more balanced approach was evident in Washington's actions as moderator during the Sinai disengagement talks. Both sides had suffered heavy losses in tanks and aircraft and felt vulnerable to future aggressive actions by the other. Washington sought to allay these fears by offering military and economic aid to both sides contingent on the acceptance of a peace agreement. Although Damascus rejected these overtures out of hand, Cairo appeared receptive.

The Sinai I Agreement (January 18, 1974) saw an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian lines and the relief of the encircled Egyptian Third Army. The Sinai II Agreement (September 4, 1975) returned the Abu Rudeis oil fields and the Sinai peninsula as far east as the Mitla Pass to Egypt. For these pull-backs the Israelis were awarded significant U.S. military aid. Egypt received mixed packages of U.S. military and economic aid. Syria, for its part, received massive new arms shipments from the Soviet Union.

Although Israel still enjoyed favorable treatment in American diplomacy, the 1973 war forced the United States to make a serious reassessment of its support for the Jewish state up to then. The Arab-led oil embargo and the subsequent rise in petroleum prices caused severe economic dislocation in the West. Some senior American military officers were alarmed at the depletion of NATO war reserve equipment and ammunition stocks caused by Washington's resupply of Israeli forces. All of America's NATO allies, save Portugal, refused landing rights to the American airlift efforts. Clearly U.S. support of Israel was not without cost.

At the same time, there was growing sympathy for the Arab states, most notably Egypt. Although soldiers on both sides displayed courage and tenacity, it was the Arab forces whose reputation improved as a result of the course of the fighting. Politically, Sadat displayed singular courage and independence of action: first by reducing his ties with the Soviets; then by flying to Israel to conclude a peace agreement; and then by his determination to hold to the peace accords in spite of the almost universal condemnation heaped on him by other Arab leaders as well as many Egyptians.

This new sympathy, or at least sensitivity, to the Arab side of the conflict became all the more pronounced under the Carter administration. Shortly after taking office, Carter announced his three-point Middle East Peace Plan. In this document he publicly and formally called for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland. This was unprecedented as no president had dared to openly suggest that Israel might have to relinquish territory as part of a permanent peace settlement.

The notable foreign policy accomplishment of the Carter administration was the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula with the provision that the area be left demilitarized. A multinational force was to be emplaced to guard against the reintroduction of troops by either side. The Suez Canal was opened to Israeli shipping, and Israel and Egypt opened embassies in each other's capitals.

The peace accords were successful principally because they met the paramount political and military needs of both sides. That Cairo was able to recover the territory lost in the 1967 war served to salve Egypt's sense of humiliation and was a boon to Sadat's domestic prestige. Israel gained a wide buffer zone occupied by third-country troops, but more important, gained formal diplomatic recognition by the largest of its former enemies. Both sides received generous aid packages from Washington. But there was a very large fly in the ointment. In spite of Carter's public call for a Palestinian homeland, there was no formal Palestinian participation in the talks, largely owing to Israel's refusal to deal with "terrorists." More important, the other Arab States (most notably Syria) vociferously condemned the talks and the resulting peace agreement as a sellout. Sadat was later assassinated by Islamic militants and violence continued to flare along Israel's northern border and in neighboring Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union replaced Syria's military equipment losses with updated Soviet equipment. Older items of equipment found their way to Palestine Liberation Organization units in Lebanon.

There was a consistent underlying theme of idealism in the Carter administration. This *leitmotif* was most conspicuous in the frequent references to the problems of human rights and the insistence on making adherence to

those principles a precondition for favorable treatment in the conduct of foreign policy. In keeping with this tone of idealism, Carter decried U.S. arms sales. He went so far as to impose an artificial fiscal limit on military credit sales. But the need to exert influence abroad soon proved stronger than the president's idealism. The restrictions on overseas arms transfers were quietly relaxed. Upon leaving office, Carter had outspent both the Ford and Nixon administrations in the field of foreign military credit sales.

New Perspectives

Two events occurred in 1979 that put a radically new perspective on the way in which Washington perceived its interests in the Middle East: the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Given America's policy goal of containing Soviet expansionism, it is natural that Iran would play a major role in this strategy. As a source of petroleum for both America and its western European allies, Iran had major economic importance. It bordered on the Soviet Union and blocked Russian access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. At the same time it overlooked the other oil-rich states of the Arabian gulf, giving it major strategic importance. Since the overthrow of the nationalist prime minister, Mossadegh, in 1953, the Shah had proven to be a reliable partner of the West and had supplied oil to both America and Israel at the time of the 1973-74 petroleum export boycott. This obvious economic, strategic and political importance gave Teheran a major role to play in Washington's global and regional strategies. Between 1953 and 1979, the United States transferred approximately \$30 billion in armaments to Iran, in part paid for in cash from the country's ample oil revenues. It therefore came as a major shock to Washington that the Shah, America's "Policeman of the Gulf," would meet with such an abrupt and complete collapse.

The second major shock came in the form of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan kept Washington informed of internal politics in that country. Prime Minister Amin, although a member of President Taraki's Khalqi faction, was educated in the United States and maintained close ties with the U.S. ambassador. However, the U.S. ambassador

was assassinated in January 1979. When Amin seized power nine months later, the Soviets apparently decided to invade, partially because they saw Amin as too unreliable and too close to the United States, and partially due to the feuding between the rival Khalqi and Parcham factions. Although much of the expressed outrage was doubtlessly sincere, cynics might argue that the Soviet intervention presented Washington with a valuable opportunity for political propaganda at Moscow's expense. Nonetheless, this Soviet move to the south led to speculation that the Soviets intended to continue their historical effort to gain warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean. The upshot was increased alarm in Western capitals.

In response to the twin shocks of events in Iran and Afghanistan, Carter made a major effort to shake off his image of being indecisive and irresolute. His policy statement, later known as the "Carter Doctrine," declared that the Persian Gulf and its littoral sites were an area of American vital strategic interest, and that any interruption of the flow of petroleum to the United States or its allies would be cause for American military intervention. To prepare for this eventuality, Carter acquired basing rights on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. He also organized the Rapid Deployment Force, a collection of Army and Marine Divisions specially earmarked for insertion to potential trouble-spots in the region.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations attempted to cultivate relationships with Washington's remaining friends in the region, especially after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Israel continued to receive generous packages of the latest American weaponry, while smaller packages were offered to Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Saudi Arabia. This revival of the Nixon Doctrine — containment through the provision of material support — ran into occasional political snags. Although the sale was eventually approved, Israel's supporters in Congress balked at the idea of providing AWACS command, control and intelligence aircraft to Saudi Arabia in the belief that the planes might be used in a conflict against Israel. Others argued that the technology involved was too advanced and too sensitive to be entrusted to the Saudis. Israel received several diplomatic setbacks that embarrassed the state in American eyes. Although the

1982 intervention in Lebanon was a smashing military success against Syrian Air Forces, the continued occupation of the country put the Israelis in the unenviable role of policeman and Army of occupation, a role which became increasingly embarrassing after the Sabra and Shatillah refugee camp massacres. The perception of Israeli heavy-handedness in dealing with civil disorders in the West Bank and Gaza strip, as well as Israel's clandestine re-export of American military materials to Third World countries, caused an erosion of the Jewish state's popularity in America.

Finally, mention must be made of America's ill-fated participation in the Lebanon Peacekeeping Force. The net effect of the catastrophic loss of over 200 U.S. Marines in the Beirut airport car bomb attack and the force's ignominious withdrawal diminished the American public's enthusiasm for direct involvement in Middle Eastern security affairs.

In short, the net effect of the events occurring in the Middle East since the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords has not augured well for American policy in the region.

Conclusions

In the official terminology of the Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, America's general goals for the Middle East are:

- to promote peace,
 - to enhance cooperative defense and security,
 - to deter and combat aggression, and
 - to promote regional stability.
- But on examining the needs of America and its allies, and reviewing Washington's activities and pronouncements concerning the region over the past years, U.S. objectives are clearly:
- to limit Soviet military, political and economic influence in the region,
 - to safeguard Western access to petroleum supplies from the Arabian Gulf,
 - to guarantee Western use of the maritime lines of transit in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and
 - to safeguard the state of Israel.

As we have seen, Washington has used a variety of means in its effort to attain its objectives. Diplomatically, it sought to build an interlocking web of

alliances to the south of the Soviet Union, but this effort has largely resulted in failure. Only Turkey and Pakistan seem to give serious thought to the idea of the Soviet Union as a major threat and, in the case of the latter, India figures as a more clear and present danger. The states of the Middle East are concerned with regional rivalries: Egypt versus Libya, Iran versus Iraq, Jordan versus Syria, Syria versus Iraq and virtually all against Israel. This interlocking web of mutual suspicion and hostility makes it highly improbable that Washington can achieve the "strategic consensus" necessary to forge a bulwark against the Soviet threat.

This is not to say that American diplomacy has been completely unsuccessful. The highpoint of Carter's diplomacy was the signing of the Camp David Accords, an agreement made possible because it addressed the security needs of both signatories. America has been able to improve its ties with the Arab states because of the Iranian threat to Gulf shipping. Washington's successes have thus been of a regional nature seemingly divorced from the bipolar competition between America and the Soviet Union.

In the purely military sphere, America's efforts have largely resulted in failure. Although successful in the Persian gulf, continuing U.S. Naval actions cannot help but revive lingering Arab fears of potential American hegemony. In Beirut, U.S. ground troops fell casualty to an enemy that played by its own rules; meaning no rules. Although the air strike of Libya inflicted heavy dam-

age on Qaddafi's imported hardware and damaged his domestic prestige, it did not end his control of the country. Libya continues to support terrorism.

Washington is attempting to achieve mutually contradictory goals in the Middle East. The threat of southward Soviet expansionism and preoccupation with superpower rivalries calls for a "strategic consensus" among Middle Eastern states, but overwhelming U.S. support of Israel alienates the very Arab states it wishes to draw into the alliance. Historically, American idealism has led Washington to reach for the optimal (and unobtainable) outcome of a united and peaceful Middle East squarely in the Western camp. Regional tensions and suspicions are likely to persist, and America has yet to come to terms with Arab nationalism and the all-embracing hold of Islam. The Arab States are unlikely to willingly enter any formal alliance with any outside powers. In each of the countries in question there are pressing demands for security, for economic development and for the respect due to sovereign nations. Genuinely impartial and balanced U.S. policies in the Middle East that recognize legitimate Arab as well as Israeli concerns hold the only true path toward peace in the region. America can achieve its vital strategic interests only by acting in the role of "honest broker." ★

Footnotes

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2. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), p. 82.

3. Fred J. Khouri, "The Challenge to U.S. Security and Middle East Policy," *American-Arab Affairs*, Summer 1983, p. 12.

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5. Harry B. Ellis, "The Dilemma of Israel," *Interests in the Middle East Series* (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, October 1970), p. 59.

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Writer's Award Nominee

In accordance with the guidelines for the *Military Intelligence* annual Writer's Award Program published in the January-March 1986 issue, the editorial staff is pleased to announce that Capt. Brian R.E. Miller's article, "Counterterrorism and Intelligence," will be the nominee for October, 1988. The winner of the 1988 Writer's Award will be announced in the April 1989 issue.

CEWI in Direct Support to a Brigade at the NTC

by Capt. Joseph C. May and
1st Lt. David C. Erickson

Team A, 105th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (CEWI), provided collection and jamming (C&J) and ground surveillance radar (GSR) in direct support to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) during preparation for and conduct of operation Desert Raider V, a deployment to the National Training Center (NTC) in January 1987.

The team was organized into a Company Headquarters, a C&J Platoon, a GSR Platoon and a Service Support Platoon. The GSR Platoon included two teams dedicated to emplacement and recovery of remote sensors. Although the 105th does not have REM-BASS, the Brigade S2 had coordinated with the U.S. Marine Corps for a REM-BASS monitoring team and sensors.

Training

Units in the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) do not "train up" for the NTC. The battalion trains for war and considers the NTC deployment as merely another step in the process of being ready for combat. The only variation to the norm was in training as a company team for a period of two weeks in conjunction with the supported Brigade during external evaluations of the Infantry and Armor task forces scheduled to deploy. With the exception of this two-week period, each platoon and section trained exclusively with its parent company.

This approach to training paid off well at the NTC. While each subelement of the team had been trained by the subject matter experts within their respective companies, the two weeks of working as a team allowed sufficient time to examine the logistics and command and control aspects of team operations.

Deployment

Team A deployed all equipment to the NTC by rail and all personnel by air. For the team, deployment was one of the more complex aspects of the entire rotation. In order to conserve funds, trains had to be loaded efficiently at the expense of maintaining unit integrity. Vehicles and equipment were loaded

on five different trains using seven different railheads over a period of three days. Having the right vehicles at the right railroad with the right train markings at the right time was the first test of how well the team could function.

With the exception of a six-person liaison party and a 10-person advance party, the team's personnel flew to the NTC as a unit. By the time the team arrived, the advance party was ready to help the main body begin preparation for two weeks of combat operations.

Command and Control

While in the "Dustbowl," the Brigade task organized for combat operations. The liaison officer and liaison NCO became a part of the Brigade S2 section. The GSR Platoon was fragmented with the Platoon Headquarters and the sensor teams became OPCON to the Brigade S2. One GSR section became attached to each Task Force. The C&J Platoon and the remainder of the company remained under the control of the Company Team Commander.

From this point until the end of the exercise, the Team Headquarters focused on ensuring that all elements of the team properly executed the orders given by the Brigade S2 or the supported maneuver commander. Probably the single most important function performed by a Team Commander is to ensure that the logistics effort allows the operational teams to perform their assigned missions.

The Team A Commander had been to the NTC twice before as the S2 of the First Brigade. Although many members of the staff had changed since the previous rotations, the Brigade's methods of operation remained essentially the same. This, coupled with a clear-cut understanding between the Team Commander and the Brigade S2 on areas of authority or responsibility, greatly enhanced the team's ability to support the Brigade. The Brigade S2 determined what he needed to know from the collection assets. The liaison officer and the C&J Platoon leader determined how best to employ the assets. The Brigade S3 approved locations, and the C&J Platoon leader made sure his assets were placed and tasked in accordance with the Brigade's plan. The GSR Platoon leader also worked directly

with the Brigade S2 and S3 in coordinating the emplacement of sensors while his section chiefs made direct coordination at the battalion level on employment of radars. The Team Commander's primary involvement was in ensuring that all assets remained in an operational status. This was accomplished through an aggressive preventive maintenance program, logistics support forward and a lot of hustle by the team's Service Support Platoon.

Logistics

Once deployed, logistical support to the C&J assets became a paramount mission. Team A provided this support by equipping the C&J Platoon sergeant with a 3/4-ton truck and 1/4-ton trailer. The team first sergeant would pick up Class I daily at the Brigade Support Area and bring it forward to the team command post. While the first sergeant picked up rations and mail, the platoon sergeant filled his trailer with five-gallon cans of MOGAS and diesel and loaded his truck with five-gallon cans of water. The first sergeant and the platoon sergeant would meet at a predesignated point and time and the platoon sergeant would take meals, mail, water and fuel forward to his deployed assets. Full mermits, water cans and gas cans would be exchanged for empties, usually on site, thus allowing virtually uninterrupted operations by all deployed assets. The next day the cycle would be repeated. This required a double load of mermits, water cans and gas cans. This method, though time consuming and supply intensive, allowed the team to keep all assets deployed on a continuous basis for the entire two-week period.

The most difficult logistical area was the repair of motor and communications equipment. Repair parts for the M-561 and other wheeled vehicles as well as jeep trailer axles seemed in short supply at the NTC during the rotation. In compensation, Fort Irwin has the best "Can Point" ever seen by anyone in Team A. The Fort Irwin "Can Point" is available seven days a week, 24-hours a day on an on-call basis. Similarly, replacement of defective J-boxes and VINSON cables was extremely easy. This support, plus having organic

motor and communications and electronics maintenance allowed Team A to stay 100 percent operational in both areas for the duration of the rotation.

The OPFOR

The NTC OPFOR is extremely well trained. Still, they can be beaten both on the ground and in the air. A major hindrance in identifying OPFOR radio nets is the fact that they use the same language (English) and the same call sign methodology as that employed by the friendly forces. Once this minor obstacle is overcome, collection against them can be surprisingly productive. Key targets are the dismounted observation points the OPFOR emplaces within and to the rear of friendly positions. These two-man teams are usually composed of a soldier from the NTC paired with one from an augmenting infantry company. They are normally emplaced during the two to four hours after an "end of mission" is called while most of the friendly Task Force's leadership is conducting an after action review and the troops are trying to get some sleep. This is usually around 1400 hours. Aggressive intercept here can help begin the process of net construction for the evening and next day. These observation points will report sporadically throughout the afternoon and evening. At 2400 hours, they change frequencies. Again, aggressive intercept will allow the quick location of new frequencies and continued exploitation.

The most critical time for intercept is from 0300 hours until the day's battle is over. At 0300 hours, the observation points will make their final reports on what they have observed, and the Regimental S2 will provide all OPFOR Battalion Commanders with an intelligence "dump." This is also when the OPFOR nets start to get active (radio checks) in preparation for the morning's attack (or defense).

Team A used a couple of techniques to maximize intercept. The first and simplest technique was to treat every C&J asset as an interceptor. The GLQ-3B and RACAL jammers proved to be just as capable of intercept as the PRD-11s, although without direction finding capability. The TRQ-37's scan mode was used to identify active nets which were then reported to the platoon operations center. The platoon operations center would assign one of the other assets to monitor an active net in order to allow the TRQ-37 to continue in scan

mode. Team A deployed with one TRQ-37 and two PRD-11s and three jam assets, one GLQ-3B and two RACALs, which gave the team the capability to monitor up to six nets at any given time.

Team A was able to direction find only against jammers due to the permanent radio relay stations located throughout Fort Irwin, especially the complex on top of Tiefert Mountain. While more modern direction finding equipment may be sensitive enough to search out the transmitter instead of the relay stations, the TRQ-37 and PRD-11s were incapable of doing so.

OPFOR radio communications do not always stay within the military band. The TRQ-37 found the OPFOR in the 130 Megahertz range, apparently using either CB radios or hand-held Motorolas. This became one of the more productive nets as the OPFOR did not seem to expect anyone to catch them using a frequency so far off the normal band.

Lessons Learned or Relearned

1. Marginal equipment fails in the desert — don't "save" your equipment for the NTC. Get it out to the field and train with it so it will break (if it is going to) while you are at home station and not 30 miles from Death Valley.

2. Accuracy in reporting is equal to speed in importance — train your platoon operations center to analyze as well as receive and report. Use them to screen information going to the brigade in order to weed out the obviously wrong.

3. The platoon operations center is the key to success — the platoon operations center must be a dictator to ensure you maximize use of all deployed assets.

4. Site selection is best done by personal coordination at the brigade tactical operations center — remember, the brigade S3 owns the ground. Have the C&J Platoon leader make face-to-face coordination with the liaison officer, S2 and S3 when selecting sites.

5. Operator maintenance is critical — daily Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services on every vehicle, generator, radio and piece of equipment is a must if all parts of the whole are to work.

6. A robust prescribed load list is needed — too much is better than too little.

7. Too many personnel can be

worse than too few — ideal platoon operations center strength is six. Sixteen is minimum for motor and communications and electronics maintenance and retransmission. Four-man GSR teams and two-man sensor emplacement teams are ideal.

8. Take at least one supply clerk and one prescribed load list clerk — the middle of the desert is not the place to try to figure out how to manually order a repair part.

9. Take back-up radios, J-boxes, VINSON cables — this makes it possible to repair forward, then exchange or repair the bad ones at the command post.

10. Forward resupply and repair works — make sure your platoon sergeants have a vehicle with a trailer. You can't transport fuel and food together.

11. Check and recheck (and then recheck again) — nobody is perfect, everybody forgets something.

12. Take a 30-day supply of forms — the middle of the desert is not the place to find out that you have left all the blank 2404s and 2407s in the rear.

13. Prime intercept time is end of mission — also the first two to four hours after end of mission for the observation points.

14. Good C&J sites equal good OPFOR observation point sites — one RACAL team captured four OPFOR observation points within a few hundred meters of the RACAL site.

15. C&J troops can kill OPFOR — one two-man team supplied with a VIPER killed two T-72s as they drove by their site (taking only flank or rear shots at close range when employing single VIPERS).

16. The more mechanics the better — treat your 63Bs, 52Ds, etc., like gold. ★

At the time this article was written, Capt. Joseph C. May was serving as Commander, Company A, 105th MI Battalion (CEWI), 5th Infantry Division (Mech). His previous assignments included infantry battalion S2, 9th Infantry Division; Intelligence Center Pacific; and S2, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). May has a bachelor's degree from Northeast Louisiana Univ. and a master's degree from the Univ. of Southern California.

1st Lt. David Erickson was serving as Platoon Leader, 2nd C&J Platoon, Company A, 105th MI Battalion (CEWI), 5th Infantry Division (Mech). He is a 1985 Distinguished Military Graduate of the Univ. of Tennessee and a graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course.

Training Notes

Hohenfels Training Area: NTC-European Style

by 1st Lt. Patrick M. O'Sullivan

Hohenfels is the National Training Center (NTC) of Europe. This relatively small (approximately 20 kilometers by 20 kilometers) training area represents a chance to succeed as a combat arms battalion S2. Hohenfels provides S2s the opportunity to perform their wartime mission of intelligence, in conjunction with actual maneuver, without the garrison distractions. Outside of NTC, there is probably no more realistic training in today's Army.

In the January 1988 issue of *Military Intelligence*, Capt. Nathan E. McCauley stated in his article "The Military Intelligence Profession in the U.S. Army, Part II," that "each intelligence professional must be able to identify what is within the realm of possibility and what is not. Not being able to accurately predict or exactly describe future enemy action is not necessarily an intelligence failure." While this statement may be true, try and impress it upon combat arms leaders. Telling your commander "I don't know where the reserve force is" or "I'm not sure what they will do next," constitutes an intelligence failure during your annual ARTEP.

It is difficult to really prepare for your first ARTEP. Complete the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) overlays, annexes, estimates and a collection plan. Brief your portion of the Operations Order. As a minimum, take the initial planning steps.

As we prepared to depart the Hohen-

fels cantonment area, I tried to think of anything that still needed to be completed. I had joined with my supporting ground surveillance radars (GSRs) and collection and jamming (C&J) assets. My M577A2 was fully loaded with supplies. I had good communications on the Task Force command, brigade operations and intelligence and scout platoon nets. I had done everything according to plan and SOP.

For the next 72+ hours, I would realize that successful execution of the plan is an entirely different story. Everything seemed to go wrong. GSRs got lost or broke down. I never seemed to be able to get on the radio. The Task Force tactical operations center (TOC) never stayed in one place for any length of time. I wasn't able to execute my mission as planned. In my eyes, the ARTEP qualified as an intelligence failure.

Going into the After Action Review (AAR), I wasn't sure what to expect. The evaluators covered the Task Force's strengths and weaknesses. Upon our return to home station, I sat down and listed the lessons I had learned. Some of the key ones were:

1. Do all the basic IPB and planning prior to deployment. At this level, IPB is more a mental process once the battle starts. In a smooth, efficient TOC operation, the decision support template should be your overlay to track the battle. Concentrate primarily on the battle at hand. If you don't, there may not be a future battle.

2. Continually track the battle. Closely monitor all radios. Ensure that you thoroughly brief your section personnel on the operation. Demand that they perform, but also adhere to a sleep plan.

3. Stress accurate reporting. Your primary sources of information are the scout platoon, company commanders and GSRs. Demand that they report thoroughly and habitually. Don't hesitate to drop down to an internal net and "wake" people up. You can't do your job without information. Go after it.

4. Emphasize reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance plans. Make this system work. Ensure that all unit patrols, listening posts/observation posts, night vision devices, platoon early warning systems, etc., are used to support the operation. Compile this information into a Task Force plan and monitor it throughout the battle. Adjust it if necessary.


5. Question the brigade S2 for current intelligence. Request C&J assets, aeroscouts and anything else you can get. Don't forget to keep these assets informed. Submit all pertinent Task Force spot reports and INTSUMS in a timely manner.

6. Maintain positive control of your GSRs. Brief them thoroughly. Have them report over one of your nets. Ensure they get supported logistically. Give them specific guidance in case they are separated due to the battle or communications. They are there to support you.

7. Make your assessments known, whether it be at Operations Order briefings, over the Task Force command net or just inside the TOC. Be able to assess the enemy situation at any time.

8. Know the terrain. As far as the Task Force is concerned, you are the terrain expert. Prior to the exercise, conduct a thorough physical reconnaissance of the area.

9. Be confident. You must be an integral part of the Task Force leadership and planning process. While a lot



of this confidence comes with experience, you must show the initiative to learn about all facets of friendly combat operations.

About 11 months later we returned to Hohenfels and I was an integral part of the unit. The Task Force Commander, Executive Officer and I were veterans from the previous ARTEP. The entire Task Force leadership had been exercised during other field training exercise/command post exercise scenarios, but this would be the first time we maneuvered as a whole unit.

I had met all my goals based on what I had learned the previous year. My section had done in-depth IPB and planning in the weeks leading up to the ARTEP. I had inundated the scout platoon leader and company commanders with messages outlining the information I needed. The GSRs and C&J assets were more thoroughly tied in.

Time and experience paid off: we excelled. Plans were executed almost flawlessly.

While nothing can prepare you for the physical and mental exhaustion experienced during an ARTEP at Hohenfels, prior planning and confidence can make execution much easier. When people come up to you and say "Outstanding work S2," or "That was an impressive showing, congratulations," then you know that you have met the challenge.

Scenario Design at the Battalion Level

by Capt. Lee A. Sweetapple

The battalion field training exercise (FTX) provides an S2 with an excellent opportunity to conduct his intelligence training mission. To effectively exploit this opportunity, the S2 must ensure that he is involved with all FTX planning. If you as an S2 involve yourself in each phase of FTX planning, not only will realistic OPFOR play occur, but other important training opportunities become possible. The FTX scenario can become the focal point for familiarization of foreign geography, culture and current events.

Coordination with your S3 is the first step in creating a successful FTX scenario. A face to face meeting with the S3 should cover the basics of the FTX. The mission of your unit in the field and

your commander's guidance are always governing factors for your development of the scenario.

Once you have determined your unit's mission, focus on a specific geographic area of concern. The area of concern should be a current area of special interest.

After you know the mission and the geographic area of concern, determine the size of the fictional friendly deployment package. If the S3 leaves that decision to you, a brigade task force is often a great start. The brigade task force provides a large enough element for true combined arms operations on your situation map, and yet it is a small enough force to manage.

Once the parameters of the scenario have been established, decide upon an appropriate OPFOR. An example would be the use of Soviet airborne forces if your unit is conducting a rear area protection mission. Your OPFOR will need thorough researching. During your research you may want to develop a short course of instruction on the OPFOR to be given in conjunction with your FTX. Numerous reference books are available on larger OPFOR nations, while for more obscure OPFOR (often appropriate in a light infantry division), the G2 has resources that can be a great help.

Once you have decided upon the OPFOR force structure, establish realistic force ratios for the attack or defense, based on both friendly and enemy doctrine.

An absolute prerequisite for the success of your scenario is the selection of the right maps. The correct choice of maps for an FTX will add to the realism of the scenario and will be invaluable for S2 section level training. Although maps of the geographic area of interest should be used for intelligence buildup prior to the FTX and for any intelligence classes on that region, they should not be used during the conduct of the FTX. The use of two sets of maps and notional grid coordinates is confusing and, therefore, can be dangerous. When troops are on the ground, "real world" should be the only maps in their hands. It is your job as an intelligence professional to incorporate those map products into the FTX. Korean or Soviet overprinted maps available through the G2 are one solution. Overprinted maps have information printed with notional foreign names, but terrain and manmade features remain

accurate. Maps such as these can be produced on request with sufficient lead time. When necessary, the S2 section can improvise and create overprinted maps of their own. In addition to the overprints, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products are often available from the topographic engineer section attached to the G2.

Many unit SOPs dictate the use of 1:50,000 maps. Larger scale maps (from 1:250,000 on up), however, are very useful during operations order briefings and tactical updates. Political divisions and the much larger areas of interest in low intensity conflict make large scale map products especially important in light infantry divisions. The use of large scale map products of the geographic area of interest along with 1:50,000 maps of the training area also allows strategic factors to be incorporated into the scenario for added color.

Annex B to the Operations Order is the keystone of the scenario. An excellent example of Annex B can be found in Field Manual 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*. With the exception of weather and light data, all information needed to complete the annex has been uncovered in your research. There are several options for the use of weather and light data. On a CPX, where no troops are actually on the ground, light and weather data for the target area may be used; however, on a standard battalion FTX the light data for the real world location of your unit should be used. For safety reasons, accurate weather data is a must. Commanders rely on accurate weather data to determine frostbite, heat casualty or flash flood risk levels. If weather in the scenario area of operations is significantly different from your real world location, it is your responsibility to advise your commander and staff on how the differences in climate will affect the tactical situation. Weather and light data are available from the Staff Weather Officer attached to the G2.

An active and accurately portrayed OPFOR is also a key element in a successful FTX. Uniforms for your OPFOR can be obtained at TASC or locally produced, following the guidelines given in Army Regulation 381-10, *U.S. Intelligence Activities*. Foreign weapons and blank ammunition can be obtained through the G2 OPFOR detachment. Blank ammunition for U.S. weapons,

as well as simulators and pyrotechnics, can be obtained from your battalion S4 after coordination of ammunition allocations with the S3 section.

An accurately portrayed OPFOR is not created simply by dressing an American soldier in another uniform. An accurate OPFOR requires training and a commitment of personnel prior to the OPFOR activity. Your G2 OPFOR detachment can provide training and help you select realistic application of

your OPFOR.

The use of OPFOR can greatly complement the exercise as long as control is maintained; however, it presents many obvious hazards that must be considered. There is no substitute for meticulous planning and common sense. Most range regulations provide a satisfactory degree of safety, and before an OPFOR is employed all parties involved in the exercise must be made familiar with those regulations.

The realistic use of OPFOR should be coupled with intelligence message play and reporting. Use of the SALUTE report format and prompt reporting need to be emphasized. Prisoner of war play and SHELREPs sent after the use of artillery simulators should also be incorporated into training.

Remember, every unit functions a little bit differently. Flexibility on your part will be a great start at success in training your soldiers for combat.

Training MI Tactical Teams to Survive

by Capt. Jiyul Kim

In September 1987 and again in March 1988, Company B (Electronic Warfare (EW)), 501st Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) of the 1st Armored Division in Katterbach, Germany, conducted a series of highly challenging and realistic tactical Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) for its signals intelligence (SIGINT) and radio tele-teams.

Synthesis and Development

The Army's experience with combat battalions and brigades at the National Training Center (NTC) has promoted a fundamental change in our attitudes toward the ARTEP. Instead of a do or die evaluation that can make or break unit reputations and careers, the NTC philosophy has brought about a healthy attitude of learning from mistakes with the freedom to experiment.

The factors of synthesis of our ARTEP came from two sources. The first was the arrival of Maj. Gen. Leland as the commanding general. Coming from a previous assignment as the commander of the NTC, Leland totally restructured the 1st Armored Division's Task Force ARTEP program. With the first iteration in October 1986 and the second in May 1987, the IRONSTAR series of externally evaluated Task Force ARTEPs recreated the NTC training structure at the Hohenfels training area in Germany. It was a huge effort involving not only the division, but extensive support from VII Corps and the 7th Army Training Command. The keys to the success

of IRONSTAR were the use of highly qualified trainer-controllers (TCs) who were handpicked by the commanding general.

The task forces faced a continuous 4-day scenario which rigorously evaluated and trained every aspect of task force operations. The TCs provided not only overall control, but frequent short after action reviews (AARs) for every major scenario event, a major AAR after each battle and a capstone AAR at the end of the four days. These rapid feedbacks proved to form the backbone of a rapid training and learning cycle. Many task forces floundered initially, many learned quickly and all of them left Hohenfels with an understanding of their strengths, weaknesses and future training needs.

Early in 1987, the 501st MI Battalion considered various ways to effectively ARTEP the battalion and its subordinate companies, platoons and teams. Due to the technical nature of the battalion's mission, a realistic integrated ARTEP was a difficult proposition at best. Using the two-echelon rule, the task of conducting team level ARTEPs fell on the companies. However, a key decision was made to conduct SIGINT/EW team ARTEPs in two parts: a technical ARTEP under technical control and analysis element (TCAE) auspices and a tactical ARTEP conducted by the companies.

Generally speaking, such a split would detract from the full validity of an ARTEP. But, the difficulties of setting up a realistic tactical environment with SIGINT targets possessing accurate threat signatures and target languages and involving a full set of field interactions with friendly forces, situations and maneuvers were almost impossible. It was certainly beyond the means of not only the company and the battalion but the division and, possibly, corps as well. An article in the January -

March 1982 issue of *Military Intelligence* discussed the ARTEP structure of the 372d All-Source Analysis Company in Korea. Interestingly, though it called for a totally integrated tactical and technical environment, the described ARTEP structure consisted of two distinct phases on tactical and technical skills, not unlike the 501st MI Battalion's ARTEP program.

In Germany, the proximity of real world threat targets allowed deployment of TO&E equipment and personnel to exercise and evaluate technical and language proficiencies in the best possible training environment. This was an important advantage, as a technical ARTEP should focus not only on technical and language skills but also on the use of those skills in wartime equipment under field conditions. It is precisely for this reason that the use of classrooms, garrison, fixed site and Trojan for technical evaluations is invalid for an ARTEP. With a quarterly deployment for technical exercises, we felt that the technical portion of the ARTEP was well covered.

Company B started planning in earnest for a valid tactical ARTEP in February 1987. From the start, the officers and senior NCOs set the following principles to guide the overall development of the team tactical ARTEP:

- Train and evaluate teams to survive the future modern battlefields.
- Review and revise as necessary, tactical tasks, conditions and standards in the current ARTEP manual (ARTEP 34-288, *Electronic Warfare*, August 1986). Incorporate appropriate tasks from other ARTEP manuals.
- Use the division's experience from IRONSTAR to set up the infrastructure of the ARTEP.
- Create a realistic and credible tactical scenario.
- Stress and challenge the teams with a continuous series of scenario

events and controlled physical deprivations (rest, food, etc.).

Tactical Tasks - The Tactical METL

After a thorough review of ARTEP 34-288, appropriate portions of the battalion mission essential task list (METL), armor/infantry/cavalry ARTEPs and division AARs from IRONSTAR, a list of 14 tasks was developed. These tasks were supplemented with three additional tasks which were identified and incorporated during the course of the ARTEP (Figure 1). The full listing of tasks with detailed standards has been submitted to the Unit Training Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., for consideration in the next version of the ARTEP manuals.

Figure 1 provides a standardized list of tasks for each particular team in the EW Company. It is of sufficient detail to allow development of training strategies and objective evaluation criteria. Tasks 1 through 14 are proposed for incorporation into all MI company ARTEP manuals (with appropriate adjustments for other team types). Tasks 15, 16, and 17 need further refinement and field testing for standards before

incorporation.

In reviewing these tasks, the reader must keep in mind the overall philosophy we had toward the tactical METL. We felt that the overwhelming direction for MI teams in training and honing their tactical skills had to be geared toward surviving rather than fighting. We saw passive rather than active measures as being superior (for example, finding cover and concealment rather than using our small arms to try to shoot down an aircraft).

Another unique aspect for MI teams vis-a-vis combat units was their relative isolation and independence under a junior leader. It would often mean that survival depended on successful negotiation of friendly "threats" as well as enemy threats (trying to get through a friendly checkpoint or passage point). When we realized that these tasks were often done by officers at company and battalion levels in combat units while enlisted team chiefs had to do it in MI units, we saw the absolute necessity for thorough training and evaluation.

Of the 17 tasks, only tasks 4, 5, 6 and 8 are covered in any detail in ARTEP 34-288. However, these tasks were not covered for all the teams nor with suffi-

cient consideration for realities of the field. For example, no nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) tasks were listed at the team level. Another was the obvious time difference necessary for a team to be prepared for displacement between fully camouflaged and uncamouflaged conditions.

Infrastructure

Using the 1st Armored Division's IRONSTAR structure as a conceptual model, we reorganized the company by function. Principal elements or cells were:

- **CONTROL CELL:** Under a platoon leader and responsible for coordinating the overall operation and logistics of the ARTEP by controlling the following cells:

- **LOGISTICS CELL:** Under the maintenance sergeant and responsible for providing maintenance, transportation, rations, supply, billets, training ammunition, fuel and administrative support. Personnel came from the maintenance and supply sections.

- **RESPONSE CELL:** Run jointly by the senior sergeants in Trailblazer and Teampack sections and responsible for replicating all radio nets, sta-

Military Intelligence Team METL

Military Intelligence Team METL

NOTE: As a common measurement of standards in stationary or fixed site operations, the following "Priority of Work" is in effect. Team chiefs must use their discretion and good judgment in modifying the priorities to fit particular situations.

PRIORITY OF WORK

1. Clear the site (enemy, NBC) and establish local security (active or passive measures; weapons are positioned with crew served weapons first; M8 chemical alarms are placed; etc.)
2. Establish communications.
3. Perform hasty camouflage (e.g., nets draped without poles or spreaders).
4. Establish system operations.
5. Improve site (e.g., finish camouflage, dig positions and shelters, etc.) and establish life support area (e.g., tents).

TASKS

- TASK 1: MISSION PREPARATION:** Troop leading procedures, preventive maintenance checks and services, movement planning.
- TASK 2: MOVE:** Driving (day/night, road/off road), map reading, movement security.
- TASK 3: SITE SELECTION** (specific requirements for each

type team).

TASK 4: SITE ESTABLISHMENT (largely covered in ARTEP 34-288, but with modifications).

TASK 5: PREPARE TO DISPLACE (with different time standards for camouflaged and uncamouflaged conditions).

TASK 6: DISPLACE AND ESTABLISH NEW SITE (as per tasks 1, 2, 3, and 4).

TASK 7: ESTABLISH A CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS PLAN: shift scheduling, sleep plan, site improvement, security and resupply.

TASK 8: RESPOND TO NBC ATTACK AND/OR THREAT.

TASK 9: CROSS CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED AREA AND PERFORM HASTY DECONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL, VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT.

TASK 10: REACT TO ACTUAL OR THREAT OF ENEMY FIRE OR CONTACT: Artillery, ambush and raid situations.

TASK 11: REACT TO THREAT OF AIR ATTACK AND USE PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE IN AN AIR ATTACK

TASK 12: ACTIONS AT AN OBSTACLE (minefield, ditch, abatis, etc.)

TASK 13: "HIP SHOOT" OPERATIONS: going into operation within 3 to 5 minutes.


TASK 14: CONDUCT FIELD RECOVERY: Per unit SOP.

TASK 15: MEDICAL/FIRST AID

TASK 16: CASUALTY HANDLING

TASK 17: LEADERSHIP, CHAIN OF COMMAND, DISCIPLINE, MORALE AND TEAM WORK

Figure 1



tions and responses to interact realistically with the teams (this included the platoon operation center, the company command post and the TCAE).

OPFOR CELL: Run by the senior sergeant of the section not immediately involved with response cell duties and provided OPFOR actions and battle-field simulations (obstacles, contaminated zones, passage point guards, etc.). The NBC sergeant and some teams not under evaluation were assigned to this cell.

SECURITY CELL: Two teams not undergoing evaluation were assigned to this cell to secure the laager area under a 24-hour watch.

• **EVALUATION CELL:** The company commander and the first sergeant were the evaluator-controllers and were responsible for the conduct of each team ARTEP scenario, short AARs after each major event and the final overall AARs. The commander, of course, was also responsible for the total conduct and safety of the ARTEP.

These cells interacted and coordinated closely with a comprehensive communications net. Figure 2 shows these links and the radios used at each station. Note that no additional radio assets other than those organic to the company were used.

Training Area and Support

We had numerous external support requirements which will vary for other units depending on their location. In Germany, there were no training areas that were integral to military bases. You either deployed to a Major Training Area such as Hohenfels or to a designated Local Training Area (LTA). LTAs were usually small and often shared with local German civilians. Many LTAs also had restrictions concerning tracked vehicle movements, use of pyrotechnics, refueling operations and overnight laagering.

In the Katterbach-Ansbach area there were almost a dozen small LTAs. One LTA provided almost unrestricted usage but was too small for full tactical maneuvering. It was used for administrative laagering, placement of the control cell and some of the scenario actions. We chose a second LTA, located about 25 kilometers away, to obtain additional maneuver space. The two LTAs provided adequate space for administration and conduct of the ARTEP.

We planned use of a wide range of training ammunition and pyrotechnics and had to make local coordination to secure permission for their use. Further complications involved obtaining road clearances for movement to and in between the LTAs. We had to carefully synchronize the road clearances for every team as they moved back and

forth between the two LTAs as set by the scenarios. Movement planning had to be extremely detailed with close coordination among the company, the Battalion S4, the Division Movement Control Office, Division G5 and the local German communities. Even though the movement planning requirements were far greater in Germany than they would have been at a large U.S. training site, we believed that the training areas were superior and worth the efforts. These LTAs afforded an opportunity to train in our wartime environment with all the constraints of operating in built-up and populated areas.

Other support measures involved the following:

- **CLASS I:** Hot meals were delivered from the consolidated dining facility twice daily by the logistics cell. Teams under evaluation subsisted only on meals, ready to eat (MRE) to add further stress and to reflect the probable reality of not receiving hot meals during wartime.

- **CLASS III:** Headquarters, headquarters service company made scheduled runs with tank and pumping units to the laager area. This was supplemented with fuel coupons for drawing fuel from a local station in an emergency.

- **CLASS V:** MI battalions do not use a lot of training ammunition and pyrotechnics. We were able to secure almost the entire battalion stock of blanks (5.56, 7.62, .50 cal), artillery and grenade simulators, smoke grenades, star clusters and parachute flares. The pyrotechnics were used in the following manner:

Red smoke, star cluster, flare = real world emergency;

Purple/white smoke, star cluster, flare (with or without artillery simulator) = artillery;

Yellow smoke = non-persistent chemical;

Green smoke, star cluster = air attack.

- **Maintenance:** Operator and organizational maintenance were done by the company. Direct support maintenance was available on-call. The 501st was still organized under Division 86 MTOE with an organic maintenance section in each company. Reorganization under Army of Excellence MTOE was effected between April and June 1988.

- **Medical:** Primary medical support came from the local civilian hospital and an on-base dispensary.

MI Team Tactical ARTEP Scenarios

SCENARIO A: FOR TEAMS EVALUATED/ CONTROLLED BY THE COMMANDER				
Time	ARTEP Team Action	Control Cell Action	Evaluation Cell Action	OPFOR/NBC Action
0800	Receive FRAGO 1 Mission Prep	Issue FRAGO 1		
0900	SP for move to site 1 Move Hasty Decon RP at Site 1			Set persistent contaminated zone
1130				Recon probe
1200	Site established		Arty/Chem attack	
1300	Move to alternate site (team chief decision)			
1500	Receive FRAGO 2		Issue FRAGO 2	
1600	SP for Site 2 Move Friendly passage point Negotiate Minefield RP at Site 2	Set up Friendly passage point		Set up Minefield

Figure 3

Scenario

Our next major task was to incorporate the METL into a coherent and realistic scenario. In fact, the scenario formed the heart of the ARTEP as it would provide credibility not only from the company's and the battalion's perspectives, but especially for the teams and soldiers undergoing the evaluation.

From the start, we decided to keep the scenario hidden from the teams to prevent a tailored preparation for the ARTEP. The team-level training, as planned and conducted by the team chiefs, was guided by the METL. Platoon leaders and sergeants provided further guidance, direction and support and were briefed on the scenario only at the last possible moment.

The scenario was 18 hours long with two teams being evaluated concurrently. In effect, two separate scenarios were developed to prevent the two teams from meeting. The commander and the

first sergeant each took charge of evaluating one scenario set of teams to provide consistency in observations and evaluations.

Figure 3 shows one of the two scenarios developed. Teams not going through the ARTEP were assigned other duties with security and OPFOR cells along with time for preparation before the ARTEP and recovery afterwards. This assured that everyone was kept busy with vital tasks for the duration of the exercise.

Safety

Safety, as in any peacetime training, was the top priority, as there were many opportunities for accidents and injuries. The ARTEP was realistic under full tactical conditions to include tactical terrain driving, blackout conditions, use of a "smart" OPFOR, blanks and pyrotechnics, and two road movements of at least one hour in duration for every team. The commander and the

first sergeant, as the principal controllers, became the safety officers for each team. In addition, a "Rules of Engagement and Safety" manual was published and thoroughly briefed to all soldiers.

After Action Review

At the end of the ARTEP exercise, we conducted a formal overall AAR with the entire company. After an introduction which reaffirmed the purpose of the tactical ARTEP, team chiefs were given the opportunity to cover their strengths and weaknesses for each task in the METL. The platoon leaders and sergeants presented their observations, after which the commander and the first sergeant presented detailed observations of general trends among the teams for each task. A discussion covered the structure and support of the ARTEP for improving future iterations. The closing remarks keyed on using the ARTEP experience to formu-

Time	ARTEP Team Action	Control Cell Action	Evaluation Cell Action	OPFOR/NBC Action
1800	Site established			
1900			Air/arty attack.	Recon probe
2100	Move to alternate site (team chief decision)			Long range ambush
2230		STRIKEWARN message		
2400	ENDEX			
FRAGO 1:	Move to Site 1, SP 0900, establish site by NLT 1200.			
FRAGO 2:	Move to Site 2, SP 1600, establish "hip shoot" operation NLT 1800. Conduct friendly passage.			

Figure 3 (continued)

late future team and platoon training strategies.

The oral AAR was supplemented with detailed written remarks from the commander and the first sergeant with specific team level observations limited to platoon leader's, sergeant's and the concerned team chief's eyes only. Written feedbacks were solicited and received from many of the team chiefs.

The entire AAR process was totally open, positive and uninhibited. It was very important that the team chiefs understood that they were neither ranked nor were their personal evaluation reports affected by the ARTEP results. The teams' proficiencies equated to the unit's total proficiency and readiness. It was a healthy experience where every soldier comprehended the unit's training status, some of the demands of war and the requirements for future training in tactical skills.

Conclusion

The specifics of the results of the ARTEP are irrelevant. What is relevant is that we must have a clear understanding of the methods to train and evaluate our tactical teams to survive on the future battlefield.

The ARTEP forum is an excellent basis for fulfilling this training requirement. As long as the leaders of MI units continue to use their full energy and abilities to refine this process, we will maintain a genuine state of readiness for tactical MI teams and units to survive and support future battles.

USAICS Notes

Field Manual 34-60, Counterintelligence

by Maj. Terry B. Wilson

Field Manual 34-60, *Counterintelligence*, is taking on a new look. USAICS fielded a coordinating draft of the manual last spring but decided the manual did not fully support the needs of the field. The manual was rewritten and restructured to fully incorporate the multidisciplinary nature of counterintelligence (CI). We trust it will be of use to the field in describing what CI is, how it operates as a function of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), and how CI operations are conducted. Field Manual 34-60 will be coordinated with the field a second time. Please take a critical look at it and comment on where it hits the mark and where it misses. Your input will provide the focus for the doctrine writers. We will then have a manual that answers the "what" as well as the "how to" concerning CI.

The manual now has six chapters:

Chapter 1, "The Mission," is an introduction to the CI mission. This chapter describes multidisciplinary CI, specific tasks by echelon, tasking and reporting channels, and standard tac-

tical missions. It is designed to explain CI to both CI operators and staff planners.

Chapter 2, "Counter-Human Intelligence," describes the missions and functions of the CI Special Agent in countering foreign human intelligence operations. It also describes, in general terms, CI liaison and intelligence collection missions. Counter-HUMINT analysis is discussed as well as using an analysis of terrorism as an example.

Chapter 3, "Basic Investigative Techniques and Procedures," describes in detail how to conduct CI investigations. It is a "how to" chapter for the CI Special Agent to use as a guide. It is supported by a detailed appendix of reports examples.

Chapter 4, "Counter-Imagery Intelligence," describes the input to multidisciplinary CI provided through counter-IMINT techniques and analysis. It focuses on the CI Analysis Section's ability to monitor enemy IMINT capabilities so the command can protect itself from surveillance and targeting.

Chapter 5, "Counter-Signals Intelligence," describes in depth the four-function C-SIGINT process. It incorporates doctrine previously provided in Field Manual 34-62, *Counter Signals Intelligence*. This chapter describes how to establish and maintain a C-SIGINT data base that supports the C-SIGINT

process.

Chapter 6, "Multidisciplinary CI Analysis," puts the separate aspects of multidisciplinary CI back together to describe CI analysis. The process discussed is designed to provide commands a full understanding of the intelligence collection threat in order to

decide what to do about the threat. It keys on development of the CI Estimate and CI Summaries as well as tracking enemy operations in a wide variety of battlefield areas. It is closely tied to Rear Operations IPB and the development of IPB products to support rear operations.

Though rewriting and restructuring the manual does little to reduce its bulk, USAICS feels this manual will provide more direction on the CI role in IEW to carry us on into the future. Again, though, without your assistance we will have a USAICS product rather than a field-driven field manual.

Branch Notes

TSCM Program

There are openings within the ranks of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program. The Army needs dedicated, hard-working counterintelligence (CI) special agents (Warrant Officers MOS 351B and NCOs (SSgt. and Sgt.) MOS 97B) to fill these positions and serve as TSCM special agents. Volunteers must be able to perform the intensive duties of a TSCM special agent, as well as brief detailed subjects to senior officials, write comprehensive technical reports and be available for extensive travel.

The TSCM Program is a CI investigative discipline which uses specialized electronic equipment to ensure areas where discussions of extremely sensitive information take place are free of clandestine monitoring devices. The TSCM mission is to detect and neutralize clandestine surveillance devices employed by hostile intelligence services against sensitive U.S. facilities worldwide and identify weaknesses that could permit the employment of such devices. The complex equipment employed in TSCM requires application of high standards for selection and training of TSCM personnel. Extensive technical training is provided at military and civilian institutions. The basic TSCM course consists of three phases:

- Phase I - 15-1/2 weeks of fundamental electronics.
 - Phase II - seven weeks of audio countermeasures and equipment techniques.
 - Phase III - eight weeks of advanced TSCM techniques.
- Phase I is presented at Fort Devens, Mass.; Phase II at Fort Meade, Md.; and Phase III in the Washington, D.C. area.
- Upon successful completion of the

required training, the individual is assigned to a TSCM position. The individual then works under the supervision of a Certified Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Special Agent (CTSA) until eligible for certification. An individual must complete a minimum of six months of on-the-job training before being eligible to undergo certification testing, which consists of both practical and written tests. Certification is a significant achievement. To retain certification, each CTSA must attend an annual refresher training program designed to enhance proficiency and keep the CTSA abreast of ever-changing technology. CSA's who make major contributions to the field and have five years of cumulative TSCM experience may be nominated as Master Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Special Agents (MTSA).

Applicants for TSCM duties must meet the following minimum standards:

- Normal hearing with test results per audiometer test not to exceed plus 15 decibels at frequencies of 250, 500, 1,000, 2,000 and 4,000 hertz.
- Both eyes distant vision 20/20 and near vision J-1. Correction of vision through glasses to achieve these results is acceptable.
- Color perception test results, employing the pseudoisochromatic plates for testing color perception, not to exceed four incorrect identifications out of 14 test plates.
- Free from any physical defects which materially hinder manual dexterity.
- Approved access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).
- Warrant officers must be CI Technicians (351B) and members of the active Army, with a minimum of four but not more than 16 years of active military duty.
- Enlisted personnel must be CI Agents (97B) in grade E5 or above and

members of the active Army, with a minimum of four but not more than 16 years active military duty. They must have completed the one-year probationary period.

- Have credit for high school level algebra and/or have a standard score of 120 or higher in aptitude area EL.

In addition to the above standards, it is highly desirable that candidates have a minimum of one year CI experience.

Volunteers for training and entry into the TSCM Program should submit a DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action), in accordance with procedure 3-10, DA Pamphlet 600-8, to:

Department of the Army
Total Army Personnel Agency
ATTN: DAPC-EPL-M (for enlisted personnel)
ATTN: DAPC-OPW-II (for warrant officers)

2461 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, Va. 22331-0400

Prior to acceptance for formal training, applicants must voluntarily acknowledge a three-year utilization obligation, to begin upon successful completion of the TSCM course. After an application is submitted, the applicant must be interviewed by a CTSA. During the interview the CTSA will explain TSCM duties and responsibilities, verify TSCM personnel standards, determine the applicant's rationale for requesting TSCM training, and evaluate the applicant's future potential within the TSCM program. Upon successful completion of training, assignment to a TSCM position is required. For further information, contact:

Office of the TSCM Program Director,
HQ USAINSCOM,
ATTN: IAOPS-CI-TC,
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Va. 22212-5000
or call commercial (202) 692-6622/7351
or autocon 222-6622/7351.

PROFESSIONAL READER

The Four Days of Courage by Bryan Johnson, New York: The Free Press, 1987, 290 pages, \$19.95.

In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos was elected the sixth president of the Philippines. Seven years later, to tighten his grip on the country, Marcos declared martial law and began a systematic roundup of all opposition members to include the charismatic leader, Benigno Aquino. During 1980 Aquino was allowed to leave the Philippines for heart surgery in the United States. Marcos lifted martial law in 1981 but retained his dictatorial powers. Then, in 1983, amid reports that Marcos had serious health problems, Aquino returned to the Philippines and was assassinated upon his arrival at the airport.

A commission investigating the assassination found that a military conspiracy was responsible and named the chief-of-staff, Gen Fabian Ver and others as prime suspects. As the situation in the country deteriorated, and because of outside pressures, Marcos called for "snap elections" for the following February. Benigno Aquino's widow, swayed by a million-signature petition, announced her presidential candidacy. In December, Ver and all other defendants were acquitted of the Aquino assassination. The hypocrisy of the events led to the formation of a plan for the overthrow of the government. As Marcos had announced elections this plan was put on hold pending the outcome.

The elections were marred by widespread violence and the promised "quick count" evaporated amid charges of ballot box stuffing and looting of polling places. Two days later, computer operators at the vote counting center walked out charging fraud. On February 15, the Marcos controlled National Assembly declared Marcos the duly elected president and the stage was set for revolution.

The Four Days of Courage is an account of the events that followed as viewed by the rebels. The cover flap says the book "is a fusion — at times, I'm afraid an uncomfortable one — of first person narrative and journalistic history." Unfortunately, the fusion fails to work so often that it is somewhat difficult to get into the account. This is a shame, for the purpose of the book is of great importance to anyone who would study Southeast Asia.

Johnson is a newspaper reporter and his book suffers from the years of constant pressure of meeting deadlines. He states in the opening of Chapter 11: "... there is hardly a foreign correspondent anywhere who will pass up the chance to inject an

M-16 assault rifle, a Sikorsky gunship or an Uzi machine gun into a news dispatch." He is most guilty of this as every helicopter seems to become a "Sikorsky gunship" and every weapon either an M-16 (or an Armalite), or an Uzi or a Galil. Such waywardness leads one to question his facts in almost every other point. Thus, I became a skeptic early on and was biased about the remainder of the book. But this is as it should be, for Johnson feels that the whole affair is the fault of the United States. He contends that if the United States had put pressure upon Marcos to resign, the four days of revolution may have been averted. This places the United States in the position of being condemned for whatever it did.

Johnson's journalistic history is relegated to the view of the rebels and his own embellishment. For obvious reasons there are no firsthand interviews with Marcos, Ver, other "Loyalists" or Cory Aquino. Therefore, we are led to believe that what is reported is that which was needed to be reported. The evident veiled threats and innuendos relating to the forthcoming negotiations about military installations casts further doubt on the journalistic history of the book.

The book at times seems to be a problem for Johnson. It takes on the vision of an expanded newspaper report and suffers from lack of cohesion in certain areas. For all this, Johnson does bring forth a point that has been the topic of conversation for some time: "How can the United States continue to support despotic dictators to keep the status quo?" Unfortunately, again he has no answers but continues to chastise the United States for finding itself in this predicament. The reporting of events is good when one overlooks the tendency for exploiting the situation. The last portion is much better than the first. Check the book out from the library to be safe.

J.R. Dodson
Urbana, Ill.

America's First Battles by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1986. \$29.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

America's First Battles is a timely book that examines essential questions about how the U.S. Army prepares for and goes to war. Today, the U.S. Army could find itself in combat on very short notice at any one of several points around the globe. For a country which has been seen as traditionally unprepared for war, the essential questions which this book addresses center on the ability of the peacetime Army to make the

transition to war and adapt to the rigors of combat.

The battles addressed in this book cover the major wars from the American Revolution to Vietnam. Many of the battles are familiar ones, such as the Battle of Long Island, Bull Run and Kasserine Pass. Others are not so well known. Queenston Heights, the first major engagement in the Eastern theater during the War of 1812, or Cantigny, the American Expeditionary Force's baptism of fire in World War I, are prime examples. Nonetheless, the reader will learn much from the fine analyses offered on even the most widely known battles.

The ten case studies in this book are organized along the same general lines. Each essay describes and evaluates the overall political and strategic situation facing the nation, the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, Army organization and doctrine for combat, leadership and command and control, combat performance, and the lessons learned (or not learned) as a result of the first engagement. The common structure of these essays contributes significantly to their success in tracing the several themes common to first battles throughout American history.

The themes are drawn together admirably in a concluding essay by historian John Shy. He notes that first battles are unique because the forces involved generally lack recent combat experience and find their weapons, doctrines, organizations and preconceptions of battle being tested under extremely trying and deadly conditions. However, the peculiarity of first battles disappears quickly because the results of the initial engagements dictate subsequent events and serve to obscure some of the vital lessons to be learned.

Overall, America's Army fared reasonably well in the first battles of its wars. Army doctrine prior to the opening of hostilities was generally sound but suffered from poor execution on more than one occasion. The battles of Long Island and Bull Run, for example, were fought well at the tactical level but were lost due to events beyond the control of the lower-echelon commanders. On the other hand, the American success in the opening rounds of the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars can be attributed, in part, to the proper execution of doctrine.

Command and control in battle was very weak in almost every battle examined. The authors demonstrate that this shortcoming was due to the failure of commanders and staffs to prepare realistically prior to the start of the war. Kasserine is held up as a classic case of "how not to fight a battle," while Cantigny demonstrated excellent preparation at all levels.

The Army's preparedness for war in terms of planning, force structure, training and logistics seems not to have influenced the outcome of the first battles as much as one

might think. Although certain weaknesses can be noted in almost every instance, none of the battles examined here can be said to have been lost due to some failure in planning or lack of supplies. If anything, the essays in this book seem to support the well established thesis that when American soldiers are well-led and equipped, they will do well in combat.

Perhaps the most important motif brought out in the book is the inextricable link between first battles and the political context of the war just beginning. Politics determined the objectives, timing and overall strategy of the United States in every opening battle. For example, the political necessity of defending New York City and environs in 1776 forced Washington to spread his tiny army too thin to be effective at any one point. In World War I, the American Army might not have fought as an independent national force if its competence in battle were not proved at Cantigny. The relationship between political and military factors is extremely complex, even more so, perhaps, when the opening shots of a war are fired. The most important point here, is that "rather than regarding political intrusion as abnormal or deplorable, professional soldiers might better prepare for the inevitable, and discard the idea that 'purely military' is a useful category."

Although not the primary focus of interest in the essays, intelligence receives honorable mention as an important factor in the Army's first battles. In at least two cases, Long Island and Kasserine, better intelligence might have prevented or, at the very least, attenuated the effects of the routs suffered by American forces. More timely intelligence and a better appreciation for the tactical competence of the enemy at Cantigny, during the initial engagements with the North Koreans, and at Ia Drang might well have saved some American lives. Needless to say, it is much easier to identify these weaknesses in preconflict intelligence after the fact. Considered in concert with the other factors which characterized the U.S. Army's first battles, intelligence played no greater or lesser role in determining the final outcome of the battles than poor leadership or improper execution of combat orders.

America's First Battles raises many vital questions about how the American Army has prepared for the initial period of combat in its major wars. No less important is the question of how well the lessons of the first clashes are incorporated into doctrine and the conduct of subsequent operations, a theme that is introduced but not fully developed. The process of how an army learns to be effective in combat is an idea which deserves further examination.

There are many more elements of first battles to be considered than can be covered by this brief summation of the book's main ideas. **America's First Battles** is an extremely important volume which deserves a place in

every military professional's library.

Capt. Robert E. Kells, Jr.
Fort Monmouth, N.J.

American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy by Bruce D. Berkowitz, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986, 264 pages, \$25.00.

In this book, Bruce D. Berkowitz gives the reader obvious, but often ignored conclusions on defense policy. Berkowitz believes three ways to think about defense policy exist. First, policymakers have a limited number of choices; second, desirable goals call for a degree of sacrifice; and third, policymakers cannot guarantee that the best choice will be made. In arriving at these lessons, Berkowitz takes a somewhat circuitous path. The two general themes he uses in drawing the conclusions are the role of the technology and the failure of arms limitations. However, his opinions on these issues take on greater importance than the conclusions. They sound more like a policy agenda than logical argument, bringing to mind Samuel Butler's belief that: "Logic is like the sword — those who appeal to it shall perish by it."

Despite this general criticism, Berkowitz takes a compelling yet one-sided stance on the role of technology and the limits of arms control. In a nutshell, Berkowitz suggests that the unpredictability of technology makes counterforce implausible and arms control negotiations unfeasible. For him, technology makes verification difficult, if not impossible. Even trying to negotiate arms control agreements leads to unjustified tensions between the negotiating sides. Besides, if one does get an arms control agreement, each side shifts to other weapons systems. This requires the process, and the tensions, to begin again. His position is compelling. It spells out how the problems of technology increase the difficulty in verifying arms control agreements, and how this inability to verify is the major problem with present arms control.

Nowhere in the author's position, however, is there a discussion on the technology of intelligence collection. Though much open source material exists on the subject, none is included in his discussion. This is the book's major omission.

The book is not limited to technology and arms control. Chapters five and six consider NATO and its alternatives. Berkowitz considers the Soviets' need for rapid victory because of the West's superior economies and manpower. Yet, he excludes the idea that the allied threat of nuclear weapon "first use" also may affect the Soviet decisions. He concludes that the rationale for NATO first use is "dubious" and dependence on

tactical nuclear weapons is sheer folly. He is also critical of NATO allies not paying their "fair share," but does not address European indirect costs, such as free U.S. basing rights. The author merely repeats the time-worn criticisms of NATO and U.S. spending, casting little new light on the subject.

Chapter seven involves U.S. Persian Gulf policy and the reasons we should not become aligned with Egypt, though his discussion involves more criticism of U.S. "fuzzy thinking" on the definition of our national interests than of an alliance with Egypt. He also believes more attention should be paid to the threat of Soviet interests in the gulf. Prophetically, he suggests that it would be easy for the United States and Britain to sweep the gulf of Iranian mines. Recent facts belie the point. He writes extensively on how verification of missiles in Europe is almost impossible, yet blandly asserts that locating mines in the gulf is a simple task.

Chapter eight discusses the problem of institutional bias in the National Intelligence Estimate process. He concludes the estimates are not the truth as best we know it, but represent the negotiation skill of the individual agencies involved. Chapter nine highlights how he believes we should think about national security.

Berkowitz does an excellent job representing his particular views towards national security. He does not, however, adequately address the full range of issues in the national security debate, though this is probably not his intention. He selects his topics with care to ensure they do not provide ammunition for those that may take a different view from his own.

Capt. Lance Eldridge
Woodbridge, Va.

War Without Men: Robots on the Future Battlefield by Steven M. Shaker and Alan R. Wise, Elmsford N.Y.: Pergamon Books, Inc., 1988, 196 pages, \$19.95.

War Without Men is a superb book for those in the business of developing concepts, doctrine and weapons systems for the battlefield of the future. The authors have carefully and accurately documented opportunities available for exploitation now; marked several interesting pathways into the future; and meticulously chronicled errors and successes of the past. Those embarking for the first time on research and development programs will find this a valuable primer. Old hands in the R&D business will recognize past errors and hopefully avoid their repetition as technology offers us opportunities to surge ahead in the competition for battlefield supremacy.

Shaker and Wise start with a chapter guaranteed to raise the hackles of soldiers, of

civilians, and uniformed bureaucrats alike as they describe a futuristic European battlefield populated by robotic sensors and killing systems. And if that were not enough, the entire operation is being orchestrated by an over-the-hill general and run by a female scientist supported by a few teenagers from a remote spot in West Virginia. That's a concept guaranteed to be about as popular in the Pentagon as *glasnost* is among the hardliners in Moscow. Chapter 1 continues by noting that bureaucratic impediments have prevented the timely fielding of a remotely piloted vehicle. This is a case where technology is clearly in hand, but management shortfalls and sociological pressures have combined to nearly halt progress. If the reader gets no farther than Chapter 1, major lessons will have been imparted.

The authors then take the reader through a series of chapters starting with some rudimentary ground vehicle experiments in the 1920s and pilotless aircraft of World War I, through the space initiatives of modern times. Chapters dedicated to ground, air, sea, under the sea and space are clearly and precisely written and thoroughly footnoted, making this an indispensable reference for scholars and applied scientists alike. Senior Department of Defense officials should make this book required reading for subordinates newly embarked on advanced technology programs. Concept and doctrine writers will find pages filled with stimulating ideas and challenges for the future. Although current Army policy requires that concepts and doctrine must be developed and approved before hardware research and development can be supported, one should not ignore the opportunities captured in this book.



War Without Men concludes with another look at the future and at the challenges facing advanced planners as they attempt to modernize operational concepts and the machines of war. Here the authors avoid the emotionalism evident in Chapter 1 to systematically take the reader through a series of thought provoking paragraphs outlining where the opportunities lie and where the pitfalls are likely to be encountered. Based on the record of the past, the road into the future will probably be filled with frustrations and a continuing series of setbacks. The United States seems to make significant technical strides only when confronted with desperate situations. Perhaps works like **War Without Men** can help us see the wisdom of letting machines share in the tough and bloody work of the battlefield and prod us to support truly advanced developments that will give us a winning edge.

Col.(Ret.) Leonard G. Nowak
Sierra Vista, Ariz.

M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist by Col. Gen. Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev (Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff), Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Books, 1987, 402 pages, \$44.00.

Frunze's life as portrayed in Gareev's book was short (1885-1925) yet full of superb achievements. Frunze's ideas on the development of Red Army doctrine, organization and training are listed in each chapter of this book. I recommend readers be prepared to severely test their patience levels before attempting this work.

Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze was born on February 2, 1885, in Pishpek (presently renamed Frunze, the capital of Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic (located near China's northeastern border)). Frunze's early life was caught up in continuous underground activity against the Czarist authorities. Frunze was arrested on several occasions by the police, and once when caught by a Cossack patrol while returning from an underground party meeting, was tied to a horse and dragged until he was unconscious.

Frunze's underground activities included organizing strikes and the spreading of Marxist propaganda among students, workers and peasants. Frunze was sentenced to death twice, but both times his death sentences were reduced to prison terms. He remained throughout his life a disciple of Marx, Engels and Lenin. He was an ardent believer in world revolution and in establishment of a social system based on the model of the classless society. Frunze's military experiences were developed through the crucible of underground warfare, which

also involved establishing a communist subversive cell within the Czar's army. After the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, Frunze became a key military player during the Civil War between Red and White armies that lasted from 1919 to 1923. Frunze commanded the 4th Red Army in successful military actions against the White admiral, Kolchak. Frunze's other Red Army assignments included the command of Red Army Forces operating from the Turkestan Front, where Frunze's military achievements were described as "exceptional capacity for work, courage and bravery." Frunze later became the commander of all Red Army forces in the Crimea and the Ukraine.

After the Civil War, Frunze embarked on writing a series of articles; "The Reorganization of The Red Army," "The Military-Political Indoctrination of The Red Army" and "A Unified Military Doctrine and The Red Army." His writings helped accomplish the reorganization of the Red Army leadership.

Frunze preached that in effect the Soviet state "must steal from the capitalist rich to provide for the Soviet poor." In terms of the capitalist sciences, Frunze advocated that the Red Army doctrine and battle tactics learn from, but not stereotype, the study of bourgeois military thought. This would enable the Red Army to "be victorious over the bourgeois, to disarm it and put an end to wars." Frunze believed that for the Soviet state to survive, the Red Army must be well-trained, indoctrinated and well-led.

Frunze blamed the world's ills and the need for a powerful Red Army on predatory wars unleashed by the imperialist states for economic and capitalist profits. He believed the global spread of European colonies indicated that the capitalist nations intended to exploit the resources of the colonized nations to enrich their economies and improve their military capabilities. This would then threaten the Soviet Union. To counter this threat, the Red Army initially attempted to put together a series of strategies evolved by groups of Red army generals calling for either a strategy of destruction or a strategy of starvation. The destruction strategy advocated destroying the enemy by means of one large and violent campaign. The starvation strategy advocates wanted to win a future war by gradually wearing down the enemy through destroying their military forces and weakening them politically and economically. Frunze melded the two strategic viewpoints and created the doctrine of positional warfare. Positional warfare in Red Army operations would reflect "active, offensive zeal with a decisive nature, not limited to repelling enemy attacks." Frunze advocated the implementation of offensive doctrine, training, combat tactics and tying the military power of the Red Army to the growth of the industrial potential of the Soviet Union. The efforts to re-equip and mechanize the army (tanks, artillery and air forces) are credited with enabling the Red

Army to survive the German onslaught in June 1941.

Readers of Gareev's book will get the impression that Frunze did not make many mistakes. Every document he wrote, all his public utterances and his relationships with the leaders of the Communist Party and Red Army were impeccable. Frunze is lauded to this day as founder of the Red Army, along with Trotsky, and as a military theoretician and frontline commander of the first rank.

A significant missing link in the book concerns the role of intelligence: a collection used by the Red Army. This could mistakenly indicate that combat intelligence did not play a very large role. However, its absence is most probably due to the Soviet paranoia for secrecy and security rather than editorial oversight. The author does breach sensitive issues such as the arrests, executions and mass purging of the leadership of the Red Army in the 1930s. The reader should be prepared for a one-sided, biased view of Frunze's military accomplishments, presented by a senior general of the Soviet army.

Michael S. Evancevich

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Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Strength for the Fight by Bernard C. Nalty, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1986, 424 pages, \$22.50.

Strength for the Fight is a strikingly candid account of the Black American in the military from the prerevolutionary war period to the present day. It parallels American history and Black American history and weaves itself into a story that cleverly relates the untold challenges, problems and conflicts of black soldiers in the military. The author highlights some of the policies, social attitudes and significant events that shaped the destiny of blacks in the military. Some of the prominent black figures, as well as the impacts they had on blacks in the military and American society are discussed.

The author begins by discussing the introduction of blacks into North America and captures the apprehension of whites arming slaves and allowing free blacks to enlist in the colonial militias. This attitude would prevail throughout all the American wars. It also relates how the new settlers were concerned about blacks and Indians and would set one against the other to minimize the possibility of either slave uprising or Indian attacks. Early attempts of blacks to enter the military would set the stage for blacks to expect freedom from slavery and acceptance into a new society in return for service in the armed forces.

When blacks were allowed to enter the military service, they would serve as laborers, drummers or fifers, and this trend of blacks as noncombatants would continue well into the World War II period. Some



blacks would be allowed to fight, but in many cases, separate units would be formed to segregate black soldiers from white soldiers. Black units performed poorly in most cases throughout history and this would be used to justify prejudices that blacks were inferior soldiers.

During the Civil War, blacks would again be anxious to fight for their freedom and acceptance. Both the Union and Confederate forces initially rejected the enlistment of blacks. The political policies, the social attitudes and the dilemmas of each opposing force with respect to accepting blacks into the military is covered in complete detail. For example, President Lincoln initially did not want to allow blacks in the Union Army because of perceived lack of support both from the North or the border states. In addition, he did not perceive a need to enlist blacks at the inception of the war due to its assumed brevity. As the war dragged on, however, a need for blacks in the Union Army and Navy became readily apparent.

For the Confederate Army, the use of black soldiers was not seriously considered until nearly the war's end when the opportunity for a favorable impact was lost.

After the war, blacks were once again either not wanted in the military or placed in segregated units. Totally segregated black units proved to be inefficient in combat. On the other hand, when blacks were integrated with white units, as with the French in World War I, blacks distinguished themselves. Sgt. Henry Johnson and Pvt. Needham Roberts were decorated with the French *Croix de Guerre*.

Government legislation and policies and military policy would only serve to halt progress for increasing the numbers of black

enlistments, special schooling and promotions. The Fahy Committee and the Gessell Committee would strive to bring about integration of the military but this would be an illusion. Theoretically sound solutions were proposed but did not always gain the support of either higher government officials or post commanders.

Nalty is effective in relating the social, political and commonly known events and attitudes that occurred throughout history. He cleverly narrates the untold black soldier story by getting the reader's attention with little known facts of the black military and then putting those facts into perspective with a prominent figure or event that most readers would know and understand. For example, he introduces Thurgood Marshall and Martin Luther King, Jr. and their involvement with actions that had an effect on changing attitudes and policies. Nalty also introduces some of the presidents involved with blacks and the military such as Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. The author shows a command of history through this approach. He is straightforward, though not inherently offensive, and forceful without being excessively overbearing. Readers might find some of the material unpalatable to accept, but Nalty presents it as it happened.

The author does not bring out the fact that the way blacks were treated in the military was clearly a national liability. There are indications that he attempted this when he cites Booker T. Washington's statement about settling the problems of blacks and Indians before attempting to civilize the Philippines. He does cite the difficulties presented by the racial tensions of the sixties and the uncertainty of blacks fighting in the Vietnam Conflict. The fact that our nation

was politically weak with respect to human rights and equal rights until the late 1970s was addressed but not deliberately as a central theme of the book.

This book can provide a reference for those interested in social problems of the nation today. This book is a must for anyone who wants a complete account of American and military history. It fills in the gaps and provides a few more essential details that make our knowledge of history complete. Furthermore, it allows us to reflect on that part of our history that perhaps we do not want to view and protects us from that cliché that those who do not know their history are bound to repeat it.

Capt. Michael E. Sands
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies by Samuel F. Wells, Jr., and Mark Bruzonski, eds., Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987, 366 pages, \$39.95.

With the possible exception of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union — by no means certain in this era of *Glasnost* and presidential summits — no part of the world is more enigmatic and more resistant to Western intelligence than the Middle East. This book, a collection of papers presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. between 1981 and 1983 and later revised for publication, attempts to penetrate the fog.

Typical of such compilations, this one is a mixed success. The book is sensibly organized into three parts. The first set of papers examines the major nations of the region: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. Readers unfamiliar with the history and politics of these nations will find this a convenient brief reference.

But the balance of the book deals with current issues — in Part II, "The Palestinian Quagmire" and Part III, "The Great Powers, Oil, and the Middle East" — and when it does, it inevitably comes up short. Among other things, the book points up the perils of drawing conclusions from ongoing events. No one could have foreseen the Palestinian *intifada*, the revolt of the stone-throwers in the West Bank and Gaza. The jury is still out on whether this represents an entirely new phase in the Palestinian struggle or whether Israeli repression will succeed in restoring the troubled calm that existed before December 1987. It will not make news, nor contradict any of the analyses presented in this book, if, as usual, the rest of the Arab world merely pays lip service in support of the Palestinian uprising. But there are signs of something more substantial in the offing.

There are other critical imponderables in the Middle East of too recent origin to be

addressed in a book whose contents are four or more years old. Foremost is the leadership change in the Soviet Union. Certainly the thaw in Soviet-Israeli relations, with the impending restoration of diplomatic ties, was unimaginable in the days of Brezhnev and his heirs. In the face of this development, the rationale for American-Israeli opposition to a Middle East peace conference is losing plausibility. Whether such a conference would be able to move the Palestinian deadlock toward resolution is another question.

It is in fact a question that needs to be posed in the broadest terms. No one doubts that the superpowers have a role to play in the region, but their ability to shape the outcome is limited. Iran for the United States and Afghanistan for the Soviets demonstrated that. The subtitle of this book, therefore, is somewhat misleading. The superpowers keep learning the same lesson: all that their wealth and military power can buy, at best, is reluctant and sometimes intractable proxies. The massive U.S. aid program in Egypt, for example, has hardly served to turn President Hosni Mubarak into a champion of Washington's recent peace initiatives. Nor has Israel's economic dependence upon this country made her servile in political matters; judging by her recent behavior, quite the reverse seems true.

What this book mostly provides is a snapshot of the Middle East at the time it was written. There is much that is admirable in its densely-packed pages, and one will find no better summation of the Palestinian issue and the politics of Middle East oil. There is also much interesting material on the Iran-Iraq war. The list of contributors is long and illustrious. But they are hampered by a lack of perspective. Regional specialists will no doubt want this volume on their shelves; historians and general readers will continue to rely on newspapers and other reportage until more definitive accounts become available.

Jesse H. Stiller
Fort Bliss, Texas

The CIA and the US Intelligence System by Scott D. Breckinridge, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, Inc., 1986, 364 pages, \$33.00.

Scott Breckinridge spent 26 years with the CIA and was twice awarded its Distinguished Intelligence Medal. This book was written to provide a textbook for a course on the intelligence community taught by the author at the Univ. of Kentucky.

The entire book is well written and verifies the length and breadth of his service in the intelligence community. It is refreshing to read a book that is bolstered by experience that included service as a CIA liaison to foreign intelligence agencies and as a Deputy

Inspector General for CIA.

The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 offers the reader a good foundation of knowledge about the founding and organization of the CIA, especially its outgrowth from the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) after World War II. In light of the fact that only five percent of the government intelligence budget goes to the CIA (the remainder being given to DOD intelligence agencies), public attention is constantly focused on the CIA with the role of DOD agencies being downplayed in the media. He provides a well-researched examination of the National Security Council and a deep examination of the role of the Director, Central Intelligence. That role is strictly identified in the founding charter and further redefined in additional Executive Orders. Of particular value to the non-intelligence community reader would be Breckinridge's examination of the interrelationship of DOD agencies and the CIA.

Part 2 is very interesting in that the author scores a number of "firsts" in his examinations of collection management, including technical collection; overt and clandestine collection; secrecy activities and techniques and covert/paramilitary operations. These areas have not been openly examined at this length in any nonclassified publication familiar to this reviewer. The book also looks at the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Air Force Technical Intelligence Center and the role of the Army's Edgewood Arsenal.

The author makes his best contribution in Part 3, entitled, "Considerations Affecting Intelligence." During the 1975-76 Church Committee Hearings on intelligence, the author was a CIA representative to the committee and his thoughts and insights into the role of intelligence in American policy are intriguing. Chapters include "Intelligence under American Law," "Intelligence under International Law" and "Principles and Standards of Conduct." The author's comments summarize his thoughts on the agency and its role:

"The sole purpose of foreign intelligence lies in the domain of foreign affairs and it must be judged in that context. As long as the world continues in its restless state, the United States will need a complex and comprehensive intelligence system. Perhaps the most important part of the system is that, in spite of the differing demands and missions, it is fair to say it works very well."

One of the problems facing the intelligence community is the public's misunderstanding of its role in foreign policy and protecting American interests. This book goes the distance in closing that information gap and provides, in addition, interesting insights. It is of value to the intelligence professional or the noncommunity reader.

Capt. Rick Ugino
NYARNG, Rochester, N.Y.

102d Military Intelligence Battalion



Silver gray and oriental blue are the colors used for Military Intelligence units. The divisions of the shield are symbolic of weather and terrain with the scarlet sword representing the enemy. The unit's deployment overseas is symbolized by the wavy blue section and the black area in the base refers to the steep, mountainous terrain of Korea where several elements served during the Korean War. The lightning flash signifies the seeking, gathering and dissemination of information relative to the areas of weather, terrain and the enemy. It further denotes the constant vigilance inherent in the mission of Military Intelligence.

The 102d Military Intelligence Battalion was constituted September 16, 1981, assigned to the 2d Infantry Division and activated in Korea. The 329th Army Security Agency Company was redesignated as Company A and the 2d Military Intelligence Company was redesignated as Company B, 102d Military Intelligence Battalion.

The 329th Army Security Agency Company was constituted on October 23, 1943, as the 3106th Signal Service Platoon. It was activated in November of that year at Fort Monmouth, N.J. Following World War II, the unit was inactivated at Okinawa. The unit was reactivated at Vint Hill Farms Station, Va., in November 1946. In April 1947, the platoon was redesignated as the 3d Signal Service Platoon. It was reorganized and redesignated in March 1949 as the 53d Signal Service Company and

again reorganized and redesignated in December 1950 as the 329th Communication Reconnaissance Company and allotted to the Regular Army. On June 25, 1955, the company was reorganized and redesignated as Company B, 301st Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. In July 1956, it was redesignated as Company B, 301st Army Security Agency Battalion. The battalion was inactivated in October 1957 in Korea. The battalion was redesignated in November 1975 as the 329th Army Security Agency Company and activated in Korea. On October 1, 1976, the company was assigned to the 2d Infantry Division. Company A is entitled to the Meritorious Unit Commendation streamer Korea 1951-1952, the Meritorious Unit Commendation streamer Korea 1952-1953, and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation

streamer.

The 2d Military Intelligence Company was constituted July 12, 1944, as the 2d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and activated in France in August 1944. It was allotted to the Regular Army in March 1949. The detachment was inactivated in September 1956 at Fort Lewis, Wash. It was redesignated as the 2d Military Intelligence Detachment in February 1958 and activated that June at Fort Benning, Ga. The detachment was assigned to the 2d Infantry Division in June 1976. It was reorganized and redesignated in February 1979 as the 2d Military Intelligence Company. Company B is entitled to the Presidential Unit Citation (Army) streamer embroidered Hongchon and the Meritorious Unit Commendation streamer embroidered Korea.

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